So what’s Romney’s point? Best as I can tell, adding the actual facts to the op-ed, it’s that Chrysler’s secured creditors, who would have been paid virtually nothing had the company dissolved, weren’t privileged over the employees, in the restructuring. This doesn’t sound to me like a serious plea for votes. Not from employees—even laid-off ones—anyway. And, since most of Chrysler’s secured creditors probably don’t vote in Michigan, not from the secured creditors either. But maybe they’ll attend his next fundraiser, to meet those lobbyists whom Romney will delegate his policymaking to.
An Invitation for Libertarians
Here at Angry Bear, we’ve had a number of posts on LIbertarians over the years. Inevitably, someone writes to tell us we’re misrepresenting Libertarians… even when we’re quoting well known libertarians.
So… if you are libertarian consider this an invitation. Send me one to three paragraphs on what it means to be a libertarian or what libertarianism is. Or put it in comments. (I beg the indulgence of non-libertarians to please not put up comments of their own.) If you feel what you are writing about applies particularly to one or another strain of libertarianism, please make that clear.
I will put up as a separate post, verbatim, those e-mails and comments I get sent that seem to me to best tell the libertarian story from the libertarian perspective to the slightly left of center audience that resides here at Angry Bear. (I can’t promise to print everything that comes in to avoid the sort of repetition that will simply detract from the story.)
Here’s your chance to have your story told in your words.
Part of an e-mail from Beverly Mann on additional expansion of corporate personhood concept at the Supreme Court:
I agree that, as the article at Raw Story says, the decision is a striking contrast to the court’s ruling in Citizens United, which upended decades of campaign finance regulation, allowing corporations to spend unlimited amounts on political campaigns without having to identify themselves.
Some commentators are amused by the last sentence of the final paragraph of Roberts’ opinion in the case. The paragraph reads:
We reject the argument that because “person” is defined for purposes of FOIA to include a corporation, the phrase “personal privacy” in Exemption 7(C) reaches corporations as well. The protection in FOIA against disclosure of law enforcement information on the ground that it would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy does not extend to corporations. We trust that AT&T will not take it personally.
The line strikes me as a nod to a hilarious Supreme Court Dispatch article that Dahlia Lithwick wrote in Slate, reporting on the oral argument in the case in January, in which she treated AT&T as an actual human and said “he” was in court that day to watch the argument.
But there’s really no mistaking that Roberts and some of the others are feeling burned by the massive criticism of the Citizens United opinion last year.
by Beverly Mann
Does the Tea Party Dislike Goodwin Liu?
Politico had an article last week called “Will Senate ever vote on Liu?” Liu is Goodwin Liu, a prominent liberal Constitutional Law professor at the UC, Berkeley. His official profile at the U. is here.
Obama nominated him in 2009 to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the appellate court for the west coast states, Arizona, Nevada and Hawaii, and by far the largest of the federal appellate courts. His Judiciary Committee hearing was held more than a year ago, and the nomination was voted out of that Committee more than a year ago but was never brought to a floor vote because Republicans planned to filibuster it. Obama renominated him early this year, and his Committee confirmation hearing was held yesterday. The Politico article says this time the nomination will be brought to a floor vote but that his confirmation is unlikely.
Liu, 39, has captured the hopes of liberals who see him as one of Obama’s few bold judicial picks, someone with the intellect and youth for the circuit court bench, a traditional stepping stone to the Supreme Court. But Republicans have argued that he lacks any judicial experience, his legal writings are proof of his intention to legislate from the bench, and his criticism of Supreme Court Judge Samuel Alito after he was nominated to the court revealed an inexperienced social activist who has no place on a federal bench.
The article says the Democrats and the Obama administration blame Senate gridlock, generally, on judicial nominees for the Senate’s earlier failure to confirm Liu, but “Republicans have suggested that Democratic leadership had been unwilling to take time on the Senate calendar in order to entertain a lengthy floor debate about Liu’s positions on controversial issues like affirmative action and the death penalty.”
Apparently what offends the Republican senators the most about Liu is that he testified against Samuel Alito’s confirmation to the Supreme Court in 2006, saying that Alito’s record as a federal appellate judge suggested that he “envisions an America where police may shoot and kill an unarmed boy to stop him from running away with a stolen purse … where a black man may be sentenced to death by an all-white jury for killing a white man.” Liu has retracted the comment and apologized for it, and said yesterday in his opening statement that it “was not an appropriate way to describe Justice Alito as a person or his legal views.”
He’s probably right that that statement was not an appropriate way to describe Justice Alito as a person or his legal views. The statement was, after all, about Samuel Alito, not Clarence Thomas. But the fact remains that Alito, like Thomas, selects a (very) few constitutional rights that he votes to interpret broadly, almost always those that are part of the rightwing political agenda, circa 1985, and, like Thomas, votes to effectively decimate the other constitutional rights, certainly when it comes to the rights of criminal defendants, but also concerning the rights of others. (Unlike Thomas, Alito and his spouse haven’t claimed intellectual-property rights to “Liberty.”)
The Politico article quotes Rep. Judy Chu (D-Calif.), chair of the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus as saying, “We will have to work very, very hard on his behalf and I know that Goodwin Liu is intending to meet with every senator that he can. I hope that through his one to one meetings people will see how reasonable and measured he is, and he can get enough support so that he can break through cloture.”
But Chu and the White House should focus their efforts as well on noting that Liu, unlike Alito, is a strong civil libertarian in most respects, not just the respects that rightwing ideology dictates, and certainly not just in the respects that Reagan-era rightwing ideology dictates. And although Washington has yet to recognize this, the two—Tea Party ideology and Reagan-era rightwing ideology—diverge significantly, at least in theory, on many legal issues, including concerning the issues that they really care about.
I mean, how many Tea Partiers really care one way or the other about the death penalty? Or, for that matter, about affirmative action? What they do care about is civil liberties, generally, not just a few select ones.
So moderate Republican senators who vote for cloture on Goodwin Lui’s nomination probably won’t be defeated by a Tea Party candidate in a primary election because of that cloture vote. If it’s mentioned at all, say in a TV ad by some private group (the Koch crowd, maybe?), the senator could simply respond that Liu is a libertarian.
And, if necessary, that Alito is almost entirely not.
Beverly Mann maintains her own blog at the Annarborist
by Beverly Mann
from The Annarborist
A Scalia Tea Leaf on the Healthcare Law?
Judicial decisions, like the Constitution itself, are nothing more than “parchment barriers,” 5 Writings of James Madison 269, 272 (G. Hunt ed. 1901). Both depend on a judicial culture that understands its constitutionally assigned role, has the courage to persist in that role when it means announcing unpopular decisions, and has the modesty to persist when it produces results that go against the judges’ policy preferences. Today’s opinion falls far short of living up to that obligation—short on the facts, and short on the law.
—Antonin Scalia, yesterday, dissenting in Michigan v. Bryant
The tea-leaf-reading on how two or three of the justices will vote on the constitutionality of the PPACA has become a bit tiresome, I think, but I’ll engage in it here anyway.
As most people who’ve followed the issue closely know, in 2005 the Supreme Court held (in a case called Gonzales v. Raich) that Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to criminalize the production and use of marijuana even when the marijuana is home-grown and used only by the grower, and therefore never enters interstate commerce, because marijuana grown for the personal use can have a substantial effect on the marijuana trade in interstate commerce.
Also as people who’ve followed the PPACA-constitutionality tea leaf-reading debate know, Scalia wrote a separate opinion in that case concurring in the majority’s result. The Commerce Clause alone, he said, does not give Congress that authority, but that Clause coupled with the Necessary and Proper Clause—the clause that gives Congress the power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof,” including the power to regulate interstate commerce—do.
A fine distinction that only constitutional law nerds think about, but it is the distinction that is at the heart of the debate about the constitutionality of the PPACA.
Michigan v. Bryant is not a Commerce Clause case. It is a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause case. The Sixth Amendment gives criminal defendants certain specific rights, including the right to confront (i.e., cross-examine) the prosecution’s witnesses under oath at trial. And seven years ago, in a case called Crawford v. Washington, the Court reversed a 1980 opinion that had carved out a chasm of an exception to that right by allowing the admission of hearsay statements if the statement bears “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ ”
Scalia wrote the Crawford opinion. Since then Scalia has been at the forefront of the Court’s expansion of Crawford to kill prosecutors’ use at trial of various types of hearsay evidence, and apparently had been able to run interference internally within the Court to kill attempts by prosecutors to overturn Crawford at least in part. Until yesterday, when he lost that battle to, of all justices, Sonia Sotomayor.
Scalia, in a dissent eloquent both in its logic and its passion, masterfully deconstructs Sotomayor’s opinion. I recommend it to anyone who’s interested in issues of this sort or who wants to see Scalia in a context beyond the sort of public caricature he has, seemingly deliberately, become. That opinion is very understandable to non-lawyers, I think.
But its importance to the issue of the constitutionality of the PPACA is not just the paragraph I quoted from it but that he wrote it in defending a constitutional right dearer to the political left than to the political right. The paragraph is the second-last one. The very last one says:
For all I know, Bryant has received his just deserts. But he surely has not received them pursuant to the procedures that our Constitution requires. And what has been taken away from him has been taken away from us all.
I sent this Salon article on the Supreme Court justice Clarence Thomas The bigger Clarence Thomas scandal by Ben Adler to Beverly Mann asking her what she thought of the article. The article discusses the possible conflict of interest regarding Judge Thomas’s ruling on Citizen’s United and his failure to disclose his wife’s earnings:
Experts on legal ethics don’t all agree on whether Thomas should have recused himself in Citizens United and whether he will be honor bound to do so for healthcare reform. But they are unanimous in their condemnation of Thomas’ dishonest filings on his disclosure forms. “Since it went on for six years [2003-2007 and 2009] it’s especially troublesome,” says Stephen Gillers, a prominent expert on legal ethics at NYU law school. “It’s impossible to claim it’s an oversight.”
The article makes clear that the rules such as the Code of Judicial Conduct do not apply to Supreme Court Justices, and suggests we take take a look at the matter.
Beberly Mann responds to my query on what she thought of the article:
What a terrific article. Thanks for pointing it out to me.
One thing that jumped out at me was that the expenses for Thomas’s trip to Palm Springs to attend a conference sponsored by the Koch brothers, and which Thomas reported as being paid by the Federalist Society, might have come from Koch Industries instead. I knew that there was a discrepancy between one of Thomas’s versions of events (that he only popped into the conference for a few minutes) and a more recent version (that he attended all four days of the conference. The latter version was given after there were questions raised about the propriety of Thomas’s accepting airfare and four days’ hotel costs from the Federalist Society if he only popped into the conference for a few minutes.
But I didn’t know that there’s some suspicion that it actually was Koch Industries rather than the Federalist Society that paid his expenses. That would be breathtaking, in my opinion, especially if he lied about the source of the money on his disclosure statement.
As for Thomas’s having filed false disclosure statements for at least six years (somewhere, I read that the number of years is greater than six) concerning his wife’s income, a friend of mine has suggested that it violates a particular criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, titled “Statements or entries generally. My friend also says, “The DoJ said that the statute was aimed at willful failure to make proper EIGA disclosure.” The EIGA is the Ethics In Government Act of 1978, which is the statute that requires disclosure statements.
This is not my area of expertise, so I can’t (or at least shouldn’t) comment more on this. It is the Department of Justice’s Public Integrity Section’s area of expertise, though, and if the filing of knowingly false disclosure statements does violate that or another criminal statute, then I would hope the DoJ will investigate. I also hope that if it is, the lawyers who work on the matter include Republicans, maybe even a Federalist Society member or two, as well as non-Republicans. This should be entirely apolitical. It really, really bothers me that this justice apparently simply decided to not comply with that law, and that he just presumed that because of his position as a controversial justice he was untouchable because it would cause too much political controversy to actually investigate him under the criminal law (I’m assuming here that this does violate a criminal statute, although, as I said, I don’t really know.)
If the Doj does investigate, it would be done secretly, at least initially.
Another thing mentioned in the article that I didn’t know—but am absolutely ecstatic to hear—is that Grassley had reintroduced a bill to establish an office of inspector general for the federal courts. I know that that was something that was proposed by House and Senate Republican Judiciary Committee members back before the Republicans lost control of both houses in the 2006 election—and it was the single thing on which I agreed with the Republicans rather than the Dems. It was, of course, very controversial. High-profile members of the judiciary, present and retired, complained publicly that this was an assault on the independence of the judiciary.
I absolutely disagree, if it’s set up properly and with meaningful safeguards. To avoid separation-of-powers problems, it would have to be part of the judicial branch, just as the various executive-branch offices of inspector generals, such as the one Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General, are part of the executive branch. But an obviously key part of the setup is that they operative independent of the executive branch hierarchy.
As a direct result of the six-Republican, one Democrat California Supreme Court’s decision last week, people who have shared everything for 21 years now get to marry. Pull quote:
As a Japanese American, I am keenly mindful of the subtle and not so subtle discrimination that the law can impose. During World War II, I grew up imprisoned behind the barbed wire fences of U.S. internment camps. Pearl Harbor had been bombed and Japanese Americans were rounded up and incarcerated simply because we happened to look like the people who bombed Pearl Harbor. Fear and war hysteria swept the nation. A Presidential Executive Order directed the internment of Japanese Americans as a matter of national security. Now, with the passage of time, we look back and see it as a shameful chapter of American history. President Gerald Ford rescinded the Executive Order that imprisoned us. President Ronald Reagan formally apologized for the unjust imprisonment. President George H.W. Bush signed the redress payment checks to the survivors. It was a tragic and dark taint on American history. [Updated to note: Three Republicans, including an alleged totemic icon. The Ancestral Party used to know how to Do the Right Thing.]
With time, I know the opposition to same sex marriage, too, will be seen as an antique and discreditable part of our history. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy remarked on same sex marriage, “Times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper, in fact, serve only to oppress.”