The originalist theory of legal interpretation holds that judges, in reviewing the implementation of a statute, should be guided by the “plain meaning” of its language at the time it was adopted. This is in opposition to the notion of a “living law”, whose interpretation should evolve as the conditions it addresses evolves. For instance, originalists are appalled by Supreme Court decisions like Roe v Wade, since nowhere does the Constitution establish a right to bodily privacy, nor could the framers have plausibly thought back in the eighteenth century that the language they drafted encompassed such a right. It is one interpretation of the living law view, on the other hand, that, as governments increasing acquired the administrative power to regulate our intimate lives, the zone of restriction implicit in the first amendment should be extended to measures that impinge on the freedom to control one’s own body.
Until his death the most vocal supporter of originalism on the Court was Antonin Scalia; now we are looking at the nomination of Amy Coney Barrett, who describes herself as an acolyte of Scalia and a resolute defender of his philosophy.
Here is a case I would bring up if I were questioning Barrett.
The rules governing elections are established at the local and state levels, not federal, but the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of how they might be interpreted. It is common for jurisdictions to have regulations prohibiting interference with or attempts to influence voters at voting sites. In every instance I’ve seen this is expressed in terms of physical distance, something like “within 100 yards of the polling place”. In enforcement this has always implied a radius extending from the door voters use to enter the building in which they will cast their vote. You can’t hold signs and shout at voters, much less accost them, within so many feet of that door.