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AWESOME opinion today by Roberts in Bond v. United States!

I’ve written extensively here at AB about a two-time Supreme Court case called Bond v. United States, first three years ago when the case was heard the first time, then in the last few months as the case was heard there again.  My most recent post on it, from May 15, was called “The Supreme Court’s opinion in Bond v. U.S. will be about separation of powers.  But about separation of WHICH powers?”  I updated that post on May 17 to include an exchange between reader Mike Hansberry and me in the Comments thread to the post.

In that exchange of comments, I outlined exactly what I hoped the Court would do in the case–and how, and why.  I haven’t yet read the opinion and the concurrences in the judgment* and won’t have a chance to until later today, but SCOTUSblog’s Amy Howe and Tom Goldstein summarized it briefly on the live blog of the Court’s actions this morning, and it appears that the opinion, written by Roberts and joined by Kennedy and the four Dem appointees, is exactly what I said in that post and exchange with Hansberry that I hoped–but did not expect; no one did, best as I could tell–that the Court would do and say.  Here’s their summary from the live blog:

  • Here’s Lyle again. The third and final opinion is Bond v. US. The decision holds that Section 229 does not reach Bond’s simple assault. It is by the Chief Justice.
    by Amy Howe 10:11 AM
  • The decision of the Third Circuit is reversed. There are no dissents; there are multiple opinions, however. Scalia has concurred in the judgment, joined by Thomas and in part by Alito. Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Scalia joined and Alito joined in part. Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
    by Amy Howe 10:12 AM
  • The Court seems to avoid a major ruling on the Treaty power by limiting the federal criminal statute under which the defendant was charged.
    by tgoldstein 10:13 AM
  • The opinion makes clear that the Court does not interpret the scope of the international weapons treaty at issue. The state laws are sufficient to prosecute an assault like the one in this case. There is no indication in the federal law that Congress intended to abandon its traditional reluctance to define as a federal crime conduct controlled as criminal by the states.
    by Amy Howe 10:13 AM
  • The separate opinions by the other conservatives likely argue that the Treaty Power should be limited. But the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy do not join them.
    by tgoldstein 10:13 AM
  • A quote from the Court’s opinion: “The global need to prevent chemical warfare does not require the federal government to reach into the kitchen cupboard.”
    by Amy Howe 10:14 AM
  • Here is the opinion in Bond.
    by kborkoski 10:16 AM

The surprise basis for the ruling–an actual honest consideration of what Congress’s purpose was, and the breadth Congress actually intended, in enacting the statute at issue–is similar to a ruling on May 19, in an opinion by Ginsburg, concerning a procedural statute.  This is a very good, new development for the current Court (although the three dissenters in that case, a Copyright Act case, called Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, were Roberts, Kennedy and Breyer).

The other big news from the Court this morning–and this is VERY big news–is that the Court agreed to hear two cases filed respectively by the Alabama Democratic Conference and the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus, both which lost in the lower federal courts.  Amy Howe writes:

The questions at issue in the Alabama redistricting cases involve packing black voters into districts to concentrate their voting strength. In 13-1138, there is a subpart in the question that the Court agreed to hear about whether these plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims of racial gerrymandering.

And, a few minutes later:

Here’s Lyle [Denniston, at the Court]. We have one grant (technically noting of probable jurisdiction), in the two Alabama redistricting cases, Alabama Democratic Conference v. Alabama (is limited to question one), Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama (question two only).

I probably will write a detailed post on Bond, hopefully tomorrow.  I don’t think I’ll have time today.


*Corrected to say “concurrences in the judgment” rather than “dissents.”  I was really rushed this morning when I inadvertently misstated  that these were dissents, despite Amy Howe’s clear statement that these were concurrences in the judgment, not dissents–a particularly important distinction in this case, and one that highlights the importance of the grounds the majority did choose versus the grounds that they rejected. 6/2 at 8:42

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Finally … a growing public awareness and concern about the ‘attitudinal model’ of Supreme Court votes. [Expanded repost]

Correction appended below.


Scott Lemieux weighs in at The Week, writing that, although “Supreme Court voting is too complex to be explained by any single factor,” the “attitudinal model” – which posits that “Supreme Court votes are explained by what judges consider desirable policy” – “still contains a good deal of truth.”

— Amy Howe, SCOTUSblog, Friday Roundup, May 16 this morning

Lemieux’s article is a must-read–for his own excellent commentary and because it mentions recent articles and empirical studies that not only make the substantive point but also illustrate that we’ve reached, or are about to reach, the point at which, having broken through to the larger, general news media, it becomes a subject of discussion among, y’know, ordinary folk. The sort of people whose cert. petition, should they file one, the Court wouldn’t be caught dead actually considering granting.

Lemieux’s statement that “Supreme Court votes are explained by what judges consider desirable policy” is profoundly accurate.  During the 1980s and ‘90s the justices were quite open about this, at least regarding access-to-federal-court issues.  By which I mean that they engaged in wholesale fabrications of jurisdictional, quasi-jurisdictional, and “immunity” doctrines, and the rewriting of procedural statutes (the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are statutes)–in an unremitting juggernaut to deny federal-court access to pretty much everyone who isn’t a corporation, a state (states are now people, just like corporations, except when someone wants to sue them), a public official or employee acting in the course of his or her employment, or a rightwing culture warrior.

The Roberts Court has continued this, in spades, except when a mega-corporation or a multi-millionaire represented by a $1,000/hr. Washington-based Supreme Court Specialist asks that they narrow the doctrine.  There was a very, very recent (May 5), stunning exception to this hard-and-fast qualifications-to-have-your-cert.-petition-considered prerequisite list, in an opinion that I would consider the second-most-significant opinion of this term  (McCutcheon v. FEC is the most important, in my opinion), except that I already know that the lower courts will ignore the opinion–simply pretend that it doesn’t exist–and get away with it. The Court, as currently constituted, won’t grant another cert. petition to enforce the two (equally important) rulings in that case, Tolan v. Cotton, unless a mega-corporation needs it–a highly unlikely event.

If you doubt that, please read the dissent from the decision to hear that case.*  It will be educational, I trust.

The Roberts Court’s contribution to the Court’s wholesale self-conferred policymaking role is to purport to justify their policymaking as mandated by the Constitution–by its structure, its history, its … whatever.  Whatever, usually being some comment by one of its framers (almost always James Madison, the unwitting mascot of today’s far right), or a pre-Civil War Supreme Court opinion.

That the actual structure of the Constitution, as well as its explicit provisions, include, for example, a clear separation-of-powers bar to judicial-branch fabrication of jurisdictional and other procedural bars to access to federal court has, since the early 1980s mattered not one whit.  So the Court no longer adds to the a veritable avalanche of fiats that the justices themselves justified in some instances as simply their idea of good policy.  The fiats these days come clothed as alleged personal dictates of Madison or of Congress, notwithstanding the chasm between Madison’s (and other framers’) actual expressed beliefs–or Congress’s actual clear intent, as per the statute’s or procedural Rule’s words as those words are commonly understood (or were, at the time of enactment)–and the Court’s suspiciously rightwing interpretation of them. And now, finally, the general news media and the larger public are catching on.


Another terrific article about this is an op-ed by journalist Michael McGough in Thursday’s Los Angeles Times, in which he says he’s “struck by how the controversy over whether the Supreme Court justices have become more partisan in recent years parallels a phenomenon I discovered when writing about the Church of England: the ‘party bishop.’”

Relatedly, another terrific article in The Week, this one by Matt Bruenig, argues for term-limiting Supreme Court justices, and is subtitled “Lifetime appointments were meant to preserve judicial independence. But the high court has devolved into a political body with too much power.”  That article is similar to one by law professor Eric Segall published at earlier this week, except that Bruenig’s article details some specific amendment proposals.

These are matters whose time finally may have come as issues worthy of serious attention, with real possibility for change.

Like this one.


NOTE: This is an edited and expanded version of a post I posted yesterday and have now deleted.


CORRECTION: I received the following email this morning from a law clerk to a federal magistrate judge:


I read your article, “Finally . . . a growing public awareness and concern about the ‘attitudinal model’ of Supreme Court votes” this morning after linking to it from SCOTUSblog.  In it, you referenced Tolan v. Cotton from the current Supreme Court term saying, “The Court, as currently constituted, won’t grant another cert. petition to enforce the two (equally important) rulings in that case, Tolan v. Cotton, unless a mega-corporation needs it — a highly unlikely event.  If you doubt that, please read the dissent in that case.  It will be educational, I trust.”

Upon linking to Tolan v. Cotton, however, I found no dissent, only a concurrence by Justice Alito, joined by Justice Scalia. Did I misread your comment?

I responded:

I am sorry; you are right that the Alito opinion, joined by Scalia, is a concurrence in the judgment.  It was a dissent from the decision to grant cert., but a concurrence in the two substantive rulings–one concerning summary-judgment jurisprudence, the other concerning “qualified immunity” federal common law. Once the Court decided, 7-2, to grant the cert. petition, Alito and Scalia did agree that the Court of Appeals had ignored the mandate of Rule 56 and the Court’s own summary-judgment and qualified-immunity jurisprudence. But since petitioner Tolan was neither a state trying to have the Court overturn a federal habeas grant nor a mega-corporation asking the Court to rein in the rampant and breathtaking misuse by the lower federal courts of the Court-fabricated jurisdictional/quasi-jurisdictional “federalism” doctrines, Alito and Scalia objected to the majority’s decision to grant the petition.

The part of my post in which I (briefly) discussed Tolan addressed the issue of who has access to Supreme Court “error review”, and when, and why. So I used the word “dissent,” but should have explained that the opinion was only a dissent to the part of the opinion granting cert. and stating why, and not to the substantive outcome.

I’ll add a correction to my post.

Beverly Mann

Some of this is technical language, and sometime later today or tomorrow I’ll post separately about this, explaining it.  But I wanted to post this correction here as soon as possible.  The emailer said she serves as the death-penalty law clerk to the magistrate judge she works for. 5/21 at 1:21 p.m.

* Sentence corrected, 5/21 at 1:47 p.m.

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If the Justices “fail to recognize where their assumptions about society and technology break from the norm—or indeed, where they are making assumptions in the first place—we’re all in trouble.” Indeed.

  • At Crooks and Liars, Parker Higgins focuses on comments made by Chief Justice John Roberts during the oral argument in the cellphone privacy cases, in which the Chief Justice expressed skepticism that many law-abiding people carry more than one cellphone.  Higgins suggests that if the Justices “fail to recognize where their assumptions about society and technology break from the norm—or indeed, where they are making assumptions in the first place—we’re all in trouble.”

    — Monday Roundup, Amy Howe, SCOTUSblog, today

Via me; H/T this post by run75441 a.k.a. Bill H.

An important find, Bill.  And now maybe some people who actually matter will read Higgins’ post.

That’s quite a “money” quote. It transcends the issue in the two cellphone-privacy cases, and technology cases in general, and cuts to the heart of what’s wrong with the current Supreme Court. As things stand now, all of us who know that it’s no longer the 1980s or even the ’90s are in trouble.


NOTE: The Court’s argument schedule is completed for this term, and the Court is not scheduled to “sit” again until May 19, so unless it announces an opinion-release session that is not currently scheduled–which probably won’t happen, because these folks probably have full speaking/interview schedules until then–we get a two-week break from this stuff.

Thank heavens.  I mean, praise the Lord.


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The Supreme Court’s Runaway AEDPA Train–And What Can Be Done About It Via Collateral Judicial Review. (Yes, this is technical language, but bear with me. I explain it.)

UPDATE: Elena Kagan served as an Associate White House Council in the Clinton administration in 1995-96, when AEDPA was being drafted and negotiated.



“Freedom” does not include actual physical non-imprisonment; to the contrary, “freedom” means states’–or actually, state courts’–and prosecutors’ freedom to violate criminal defendants’ constitutional rights, to their heart’s content.

— Me, Angry Bear, Apr. 5

For about 24 hours this week, specifically between Tuesday morning and Wednesday morning, I thought that might be about to change.  The issue in Tuesday’s big affirmative action case, Scheutte v. BAMN, was not actually affirmative action.* It was instead whether a state voter initiative that amends the Constitution and that singles out minority races erects unconstitutionally high barriers to racial minorities’ practical ability to obtain a change in that policy, because it removes the possibility of gaining a change through the normal political and governmental processes.

Kennedy wrote the plurality opinion for himself, Roberts and Alito. Roberts also wrote a separate concurring opinion.  Breyer joined only in the outcome, writing a separate opinion only for himself. Scalia, joined by Thomas, wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Sotomayor, joined by Ginsburg, wrote a dissenting opinion.  Kagan did not participate.

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SCOTUSblog’s Problem: It’s Not Incorporated [OK, I’m sure it is, but you get the point.]

Last week, the Senate Press Gallery denied SCOTUSblog’s application for a press pass, and advised us that it would refuse to renew the credential it had previously granted Lyle when it expires next month.  We were disappointed in that decision, and we are grateful for the support that we have received through social media, emails, and phone calls.

We thought it would be useful to write and explain the state of play regarding our credentialing.  SCOTUSblog is not now, and has never been, credentialed by the Supreme Court.  The Court’s longstanding policy was to look to credentials issued by the Senate.  We pursued a Senate credential for several years, modifying several policies of the blog to address concerns expressed by the Gallery.  Last year, we  finally succeeded – the Senate Press Gallery credentialed Lyle as a reporter for SCOTUSblog.  We then presented that credential to the Supreme Court, thinking that the issue was resolved.

But the Court declined to recognize the credential, explaining that it would instead review its credentialing policy.  The Court has not indicated when that review will conclude.

— An update on our press pass, Tom Goldstein, SCOTUSblog, this morning

I would joke about what happens to popular blogs when they start linking to blog posts by the likes of me on blogs like AB (talk about hoi polloi!)–or about SCOTUSblog’s need to incorporate so that it is an association of press citizens, or something (OK, I did do that in this post’s title)–but really, this isn’t funny.  At all.

Harry Reid, and also the Senate Judiciary Committee, should become involved the Supreme Court’s credentialing policy, which should not be left entirely to the Supreme Court to establish.

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Turns out Alito isn’t the only justice who conflates the Securities Exchange Act with state-law corporate-structure statutes. Roberts does, too! (Unless, that is, racial-minority-owned corporations are denied access to restaurants and hotels when traveling. Or something.)

Roberts suggested that he believes Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood can bring forth claims of religious freedom, saying courts have held that “corporations can bring racial discrimination claims as corporations” and that “those cases involve construction of the term ‘person.'”

John Roberts Offers Conservatives A Way Out Of Birth Control Dilemma, Sahil Kapur, TPM, yesterday

Late Tuesday afternoon, after I’d read two or three early reports on the argument at the Supreme Court that morning in the Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood cases, I posted a piece here titled:

“My early take on the ACA-contraception-mandate-case argument: Alito conflates the Securities Exchange Act with state-law corporate-structure statutes (yikes); Kennedy really, really wants to give corporations the full complement of human constitutional rights; and Scalia really, really needs to limit this ruling to an interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.”

That post harked back to one I’d posted the day before about what to look for in the upcoming argument.  What to look for, I said? Mainly whether “the court will back away somewhat from its Citizens United claim that corporate CEOs can, in the name of the corporation, access the constitutional rights of citizen-association members.”  I predicted that it would–that the Court “will find some way to segregate speech rights from other constitutional rights, and will rule against the plaintiffs in these two cases.” I wrote:

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My early take on the ACA-contraception-mandate-case argument: Alito conflates the Securities Exchange Act with state-law corporate-structure statutes (yikes); Kennedy really, really wants to give corporations the full complement of human constitutional rights; and Scalia really, really needs to limit this ruling to an interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

When [U.S. Solicitor General Donald] Verrilli said the Court has never found a right to exercise religion for corporations, Alito wondered if there was something wrong with the corporate form that it would not be accorded religion freedom rights.  Did Verrilli agree, Alito said, with a lower court’s view that the only reason for a corporation to exist was to “maximize profits?”  Verrilli said no, but Alito had made his point.

Argument recap: One hearing, two dramas, Lyle Denniston , SCOTUSblog, reporting on this morning’s Supreme court argument in Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Specialties v. Sebelius

That paragraph was one of two in Denniston’s recap that dismayed me, albeit only momentarily. Unquestionably, a threshold issue in these cases is whether or not the proverbial corporate veil–a shorthand legal term that conveys that the very purpose of the state-created corporate structure is a severance of the rights and liabilities of corporations from those of its shareholders–can be “pierced” in order to allow the shareholders in these two closely-held corporations to confer to the corporation their personal legal right of religious exercise under the First Amendment or under a federal statute called the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the latter which expressly uses the term “person” to identify its beneficiaries.  I addressed this in detail in this post here yesterday.

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Scalia Changes His Mind … About the Purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.

Wow.  It looks, from SCOTUSblog’s Lyle Denniston’s report on the argument this afternoon in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, that I was, um … right in saying yesterday and again earlier today that this case is not, at heart, an affirmative action case.  The case is really about when a voter referendum can amend the state constitution to remove a particular issue from the normal political process.

This issue has a name–or, rather, the legal theory that challenges the constitutionality of such state constitutional amendments does.  It’s called the “political process theory,” which was developed in two old Supreme Court cases concerning voter-referendum amendments to a state’s constitution.  (I should have used the name in my earlier two posts, just so that I could now use it as shorthand in this post, but I didn’t.)

In Schuette, the voter referendum amended the state constitution to remove from the normal political process–lobbying legislators, local government officials university regents–the policy issue of race-conscious affirmative action in public university admissions processes.  So the case is about whether a voter initiative–in this case, one heavily funded by an out-of-state rightwing group–can amend the state constitution to remove access to the normal political process by people with a particular viewpoint on a particular issue.  This is the “political process theory” issue.  And according to Lyle Denniston’s report, it’s the issue on which Justice Kennedy–clearly the swing vote in this case–focused almost all of his very extensive questioning at the argument today.

But here’s something else in Denniston’s report that caught my interest:

[A.C.L.U. lawyer Mark] Rosenbaum’s time in argument was difficult enough, especially in the exchanges with Justices Alito and Scalia, but it turned out to be less challenging than the barrage that confronted the other lawyer opposing ”Proposal 2,” Detroit attorney Shanta Driver (who was a last-minute substitute for another lawyer scheduled to be in the argument).

Driver’s opening comments got her immediately into trouble.  She asked the Court to return the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of legal equality “back to its original purpose,” which was to protect minorities.  Justice Scalia took strong offense to that, saying he thought the aim of the Amendment was to guarantee equality to all people.

The lawyer tried to hold her ground, but Scalia kept testing her thesis.   Had the Supreme Court ever issued an opinion saying that the Amendment was only to protect minorities? he asked. Driver conceded that there was no such case.

Okay.  As I mentioned in my post yesterday about Schuette, Scalia, in the argument last spring on the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, said the purpose of the equal protection clause was to protect the rights of former slaves and their descendents, and therefore does not grant equal protection of the laws to non-African Americans.  He has made that statement elsewhere, I believe, in speeches or interviews.  And he has said that because the purpose of the clause was to confer rights upon former slaves and their descendents, the clause does not apply to prohibit gender discrimination. The clause’s use of the word “people” to state whom its protections covered, notwithstanding.

But that view of his in the past, I see. At least until the next gay marriage case comes to the court.

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What I agree with Richard Kahlenberg about on Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action. And what I don’t.

As Dan Crawford posted below, SCOTUSblog linked in its daily Round-up feature this morning to my AB post yesterday about Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, which is being argued at the Supreme Court this afternoon. Dan posted the Round-up paragraph in which the reference appears.  It says:

Commentary on Schuette comes from Richard Kahlenberg, who in an op-ed for The Wall Street Journal argues that “[a] ruling in Schuette that promotes race-neutral strategies to boost minority admissions would reinforce the message the court tried to deliver last term in Fisher v. University of Texas but has largely fallen on deaf ears.” And at Angry Bear, Beverly Mann explains why she “expect[s] that the chief justice will vote to affirm a lower federal appellate court’s ruling in the high-profile affirmative action case that the Court will hear argument on tomorrow.”

I posted the following comment to Dan’s post:

Yikes. In reading that sentence that Amy Howe [of SCOTUSblog] quoted, I guess I better say that the rest of my post makes clear (I hope) that that sentence is facetious.

Facetious, it definitely is.  The chief justice will use, or try to use, this case to kill affirmative action in public higher education.

But after reading Dan’s quote of the SCOTUSblog paragraph, I decided to read the Kahlenberg op-ed in the Wall Street Journal.  Kahlenberg, the op-ed says, is a senior fellow at the Century Foundation, is author of “The Remedy: Class, Race and Affirmative Action,” published in 1996.

His op-ed is titled “A Fresh Chance to Rein In Racial Preferences.” And most of the article uses the University of Michigan/Ann Arbor as an example of why racial preferences per se as a state university admissions criterion are bad policy.  He argues instead for socioeconomic criteria, and identifies several major state universities that have used various tools to achieve some semblance of socioeconomic, and not-coincidendally racial, diversity.  U-M/Ann Arbor is not among them and has not even tried to be.

I couldn’t agree more.  On all points.  Anyone who spends so much as a couple of hours on or near campus on a weekday during the fall or winter semester would be struck by how almost-thoroughly white and upper-middle and upper-class the undergraduate, non-Asian student body is.  Denizens of Ann Arbor itself are not much into current-model upscale foreign-import cars–old Volvo station wagons and Detroit-made small and midsize cars are far more common–but walk through a student parking lot and you’ll probably see several of the he high end import variety.

And I can attest that this was so during the 2006-2007 school year, the last admissions year before the constitutional amendment at issue in Schuette became effective. Indeed, I recall a longtime U-M professor, then nearing retirement, lament how much the nature of the student body had changed since his early years teaching there in 1970s.  He said that back then, there was a feeling of real connection between the university and the Big Three automakers whose headquarters were only 40 miles or so away and whose manufacturing and design plants dotted the metro area, and the central part of the state, because so many of the students had parents or other family members who worked there.  Now, he said, the student body is almost all upscale. Macbooks outnumbered Windows-based laptops by, I’d guess, three to one.  And most of them were recent models.

Kahlenberg mentions the University of Florida/Gainesville as one of the public universities that has made a successful effort at socioeconomic and thus racial diversity in its undergraduate body. That is clear just from walking through the campus during the school year, as I did not long ago on a visit to North Central Florida. He also mentions UCLA, UC-Berkeley, the University of Georgia/Athens and the University of Texas/Austin. But he also could have mentioned Michigan State University, The University of Illinois.Champaign/Urbana, I believe, and the University of Wisconsin, I also believe.

What I suspect happened at U-M, although it’s just my speculation, is that in the wake of the Supreme Court’s two 2003 racial affirmative action programs, one case about U-M freshman admissions policies, the other about U-M law school admissions policies–both opinions which focused heavily on the legitimate state interest in racial diversity among its student body the university–the university began to focus almost entirely on racial diversity, but, as it happens, without a lot of success. Had the school ditched its alumni-legacy preferences, which Kahlberg points out, UCLA and UC-Berkeley did but U-M did not–and instead focused more on socioeconomic diversity, it probably would have been more successful at achieving racial diversity as part of the broader socioeconomic diversity.

But, for the reasons I explained (or tried to) in my post yesterday on Schuette, that case is not, in essence, an affirmative action case.  Kahlberg sort of acknowledges that.  He says:

At issue is whether voters can amend a state constitution to ban racial preferences by referendum, as Michigan voters did by 58%-42% in 2006. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals struck the measure down by an 8-7 vote in 2012, arguing that the amendment introduces an extra political hurdle for minorities. Whereas alumni can lobby the University of Michigan to strengthen legacy preferences for their children, the Sixth Circuit said, minority parents would need to amend the constitution to get racial preferences reinstated. “Such a comparative structural burden undermines the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantee that all citizens ought to have equal access to the tools of political change,” the court said.

This case is about whether a voter referendum can amend a state constitution in a manner that removes a particular type of group, or removes groups with a particular type of cause, from access to the normal democratic methods of lobbying elected or appointed officials–the legislature, a local governing body, the University’s Board of Regents.  That is what this case is about, and Kahlberg, unlike (surprisingly) Emily Bazelon in Slate yesterday, does not miss that point.  But he both says that he thinks the court will nonetheless use the case to kill affirmative action in public universities and urges the court to do that.  His justification:

Although minority voters cannot easily lobby to reinstate racial preferences in Michigan, they remain free to lobby for race-neutral programs that assist many minority students. These would include programs that help low-income students of all races—programs for more generous financial aid; for more community college transfers to the main campus of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor; for an end to legacy preferences that disproportionately benefit white students; and for admitting students in the top of every high school class in the state.

Hey! They remain free to lobby for race-neutral programs that assist many minority students! Well, aren’t they lucky!  For now, anyway.

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