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AWESOME opinion today by Roberts in Bond v. United States!

I’ve written extensively here at AB about a two-time Supreme Court case called Bond v. United States, first three years ago when the case was heard the first time, then in the last few months as the case was heard there again.  My most recent post on it, from May 15, was called “The Supreme Court’s opinion in Bond v. U.S. will be about separation of powers.  But about separation of WHICH powers?”  I updated that post on May 17 to include an exchange between reader Mike Hansberry and me in the Comments thread to the post.

In that exchange of comments, I outlined exactly what I hoped the Court would do in the case–and how, and why.  I haven’t yet read the opinion and the concurrences in the judgment* and won’t have a chance to until later today, but SCOTUSblog’s Amy Howe and Tom Goldstein summarized it briefly on the live blog of the Court’s actions this morning, and it appears that the opinion, written by Roberts and joined by Kennedy and the four Dem appointees, is exactly what I said in that post and exchange with Hansberry that I hoped–but did not expect; no one did, best as I could tell–that the Court would do and say.  Here’s their summary from the live blog:

  • Here’s Lyle again. The third and final opinion is Bond v. US. The decision holds that Section 229 does not reach Bond’s simple assault. It is by the Chief Justice.
    by Amy Howe 10:11 AM
    Comment
  • The decision of the Third Circuit is reversed. There are no dissents; there are multiple opinions, however. Scalia has concurred in the judgment, joined by Thomas and in part by Alito. Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Scalia joined and Alito joined in part. Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
    by Amy Howe 10:12 AM
    Comment
  • The Court seems to avoid a major ruling on the Treaty power by limiting the federal criminal statute under which the defendant was charged.
    by tgoldstein 10:13 AM
    Comment
  • The opinion makes clear that the Court does not interpret the scope of the international weapons treaty at issue. The state laws are sufficient to prosecute an assault like the one in this case. There is no indication in the federal law that Congress intended to abandon its traditional reluctance to define as a federal crime conduct controlled as criminal by the states.
    by Amy Howe 10:13 AM
    Comment
  • The separate opinions by the other conservatives likely argue that the Treaty Power should be limited. But the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy do not join them.
    by tgoldstein 10:13 AM
    Comment
  • A quote from the Court’s opinion: “The global need to prevent chemical warfare does not require the federal government to reach into the kitchen cupboard.”
    by Amy Howe 10:14 AM
    Comment
  • Here is the opinion in Bond.
    by kborkoski 10:16 AM

The surprise basis for the ruling–an actual honest consideration of what Congress’s purpose was, and the breadth Congress actually intended, in enacting the statute at issue–is similar to a ruling on May 19, in an opinion by Ginsburg, concerning a procedural statute.  This is a very good, new development for the current Court (although the three dissenters in that case, a Copyright Act case, called Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, were Roberts, Kennedy and Breyer).

The other big news from the Court this morning–and this is VERY big news–is that the Court agreed to hear two cases filed respectively by the Alabama Democratic Conference and the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus, both which lost in the lower federal courts.  Amy Howe writes:

The questions at issue in the Alabama redistricting cases involve packing black voters into districts to concentrate their voting strength. In 13-1138, there is a subpart in the question that the Court agreed to hear about whether these plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims of racial gerrymandering.

And, a few minutes later:

Here’s Lyle [Denniston, at the Court]. We have one grant (technically noting of probable jurisdiction), in the two Alabama redistricting cases, Alabama Democratic Conference v. Alabama (is limited to question one), Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama (question two only).

I probably will write a detailed post on Bond, hopefully tomorrow.  I don’t think I’ll have time today.

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*Corrected to say “concurrences in the judgment” rather than “dissents.”  I was really rushed this morning when I inadvertently misstated  that these were dissents, despite Amy Howe’s clear statement that these were concurrences in the judgment, not dissents–a particularly important distinction in this case, and one that highlights the importance of the grounds the majority did choose versus the grounds that they rejected. 6/2 at 8:42

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Finally … a growing public awareness and concern about the ‘attitudinal model’ of Supreme Court votes. [Expanded repost]

Correction appended below.

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Scott Lemieux weighs in at The Week, writing that, although “Supreme Court voting is too complex to be explained by any single factor,” the “attitudinal model” – which posits that “Supreme Court votes are explained by what judges consider desirable policy” – “still contains a good deal of truth.”

— Amy Howe, SCOTUSblog, Friday Roundup, May 16 this morning

Lemieux’s article is a must-read–for his own excellent commentary and because it mentions recent articles and empirical studies that not only make the substantive point but also illustrate that we’ve reached, or are about to reach, the point at which, having broken through to the larger, general news media, it becomes a subject of discussion among, y’know, ordinary folk. The sort of people whose cert. petition, should they file one, the Court wouldn’t be caught dead actually considering granting.

Lemieux’s statement that “Supreme Court votes are explained by what judges consider desirable policy” is profoundly accurate.  During the 1980s and ‘90s the justices were quite open about this, at least regarding access-to-federal-court issues.  By which I mean that they engaged in wholesale fabrications of jurisdictional, quasi-jurisdictional, and “immunity” doctrines, and the rewriting of procedural statutes (the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are statutes)–in an unremitting juggernaut to deny federal-court access to pretty much everyone who isn’t a corporation, a state (states are now people, just like corporations, except when someone wants to sue them), a public official or employee acting in the course of his or her employment, or a rightwing culture warrior.

The Roberts Court has continued this, in spades, except when a mega-corporation or a multi-millionaire represented by a $1,000/hr. Washington-based Supreme Court Specialist asks that they narrow the doctrine.  There was a very, very recent (May 5), stunning exception to this hard-and-fast qualifications-to-have-your-cert.-petition-considered prerequisite list, in an opinion that I would consider the second-most-significant opinion of this term  (McCutcheon v. FEC is the most important, in my opinion), except that I already know that the lower courts will ignore the opinion–simply pretend that it doesn’t exist–and get away with it. The Court, as currently constituted, won’t grant another cert. petition to enforce the two (equally important) rulings in that case, Tolan v. Cotton, unless a mega-corporation needs it–a highly unlikely event.

If you doubt that, please read the dissent from the decision to hear that case.*  It will be educational, I trust.

The Roberts Court’s contribution to the Court’s wholesale self-conferred policymaking role is to purport to justify their policymaking as mandated by the Constitution–by its structure, its history, its … whatever.  Whatever, usually being some comment by one of its framers (almost always James Madison, the unwitting mascot of today’s far right), or a pre-Civil War Supreme Court opinion.

That the actual structure of the Constitution, as well as its explicit provisions, include, for example, a clear separation-of-powers bar to judicial-branch fabrication of jurisdictional and other procedural bars to access to federal court has, since the early 1980s mattered not one whit.  So the Court no longer adds to the a veritable avalanche of fiats that the justices themselves justified in some instances as simply their idea of good policy.  The fiats these days come clothed as alleged personal dictates of Madison or of Congress, notwithstanding the chasm between Madison’s (and other framers’) actual expressed beliefs–or Congress’s actual clear intent, as per the statute’s or procedural Rule’s words as those words are commonly understood (or were, at the time of enactment)–and the Court’s suspiciously rightwing interpretation of them. And now, finally, the general news media and the larger public are catching on.

Progress.

Another terrific article about this is an op-ed by journalist Michael McGough in Thursday’s Los Angeles Times, in which he says he’s “struck by how the controversy over whether the Supreme Court justices have become more partisan in recent years parallels a phenomenon I discovered when writing about the Church of England: the ‘party bishop.’”

Relatedly, another terrific article in The Week, this one by Matt Bruenig, argues for term-limiting Supreme Court justices, and is subtitled “Lifetime appointments were meant to preserve judicial independence. But the high court has devolved into a political body with too much power.”  That article is similar to one by law professor Eric Segall published at CNN.com earlier this week, except that Bruenig’s article details some specific amendment proposals.

These are matters whose time finally may have come as issues worthy of serious attention, with real possibility for change.

Like this one.

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NOTE: This is an edited and expanded version of a post I posted yesterday and have now deleted.

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CORRECTION: I received the following email this morning from a law clerk to a federal magistrate judge:

Greetings,

I read your article, “Finally . . . a growing public awareness and concern about the ‘attitudinal model’ of Supreme Court votes” this morning after linking to it from SCOTUSblog.  In it, you referenced Tolan v. Cotton from the current Supreme Court term saying, “The Court, as currently constituted, won’t grant another cert. petition to enforce the two (equally important) rulings in that case, Tolan v. Cotton, unless a mega-corporation needs it — a highly unlikely event.  If you doubt that, please read the dissent in that case.  It will be educational, I trust.”

Upon linking to Tolan v. Cotton, however, I found no dissent, only a concurrence by Justice Alito, joined by Justice Scalia. Did I misread your comment?

I responded:

I am sorry; you are right that the Alito opinion, joined by Scalia, is a concurrence in the judgment.  It was a dissent from the decision to grant cert., but a concurrence in the two substantive rulings–one concerning summary-judgment jurisprudence, the other concerning “qualified immunity” federal common law. Once the Court decided, 7-2, to grant the cert. petition, Alito and Scalia did agree that the Court of Appeals had ignored the mandate of Rule 56 and the Court’s own summary-judgment and qualified-immunity jurisprudence. But since petitioner Tolan was neither a state trying to have the Court overturn a federal habeas grant nor a mega-corporation asking the Court to rein in the rampant and breathtaking misuse by the lower federal courts of the Court-fabricated jurisdictional/quasi-jurisdictional “federalism” doctrines, Alito and Scalia objected to the majority’s decision to grant the petition.

The part of my post in which I (briefly) discussed Tolan addressed the issue of who has access to Supreme Court “error review”, and when, and why. So I used the word “dissent,” but should have explained that the opinion was only a dissent to the part of the opinion granting cert. and stating why, and not to the substantive outcome.

I’ll add a correction to my post.

Beverly Mann

Some of this is technical language, and sometime later today or tomorrow I’ll post separately about this, explaining it.  But I wanted to post this correction here as soon as possible.  The emailer said she serves as the death-penalty law clerk to the magistrate judge she works for. 5/21 at 1:21 p.m.

* Sentence corrected, 5/21 at 1:47 p.m.

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If the Justices “fail to recognize where their assumptions about society and technology break from the norm—or indeed, where they are making assumptions in the first place—we’re all in trouble.” Indeed.

  • At Crooks and Liars, Parker Higgins focuses on comments made by Chief Justice John Roberts during the oral argument in the cellphone privacy cases, in which the Chief Justice expressed skepticism that many law-abiding people carry more than one cellphone.  Higgins suggests that if the Justices “fail to recognize where their assumptions about society and technology break from the norm—or indeed, where they are making assumptions in the first place—we’re all in trouble.”

    — Monday Roundup, Amy Howe, SCOTUSblog, today

Via me; H/T this post by run75441 a.k.a. Bill H.

An important find, Bill.  And now maybe some people who actually matter will read Higgins’ post.

That’s quite a “money” quote. It transcends the issue in the two cellphone-privacy cases, and technology cases in general, and cuts to the heart of what’s wrong with the current Supreme Court. As things stand now, all of us who know that it’s no longer the 1980s or even the ’90s are in trouble.

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NOTE: The Court’s argument schedule is completed for this term, and the Court is not scheduled to “sit” again until May 19, so unless it announces an opinion-release session that is not currently scheduled–which probably won’t happen, because these folks probably have full speaking/interview schedules until then–we get a two-week break from this stuff.

Thank heavens.  I mean, praise the Lord.

 

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