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Shaken, Not Stirred: The Supreme neo-Framers (likely) will continue their perversion of the First Amendment speech clause tomorrow.

In an email this morning, Bill H asked me whether I know much about a case called Harris v. Quinn, in which the Supreme Court will announce the likely 5-4 majority’s ruling tomorrow.  I responded:

I know LOADS about it, Bill, and wrote about it–and about a bizarre comment by Alito during the argument on the case–right after the argument back in Jan. and have mentioned it two or three times since then.  It is really striking that the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in order to consider the claim: that requiring public employees to pay a fee (not the full union dues, but instead some small percentage of the membership dues as compensation for the union’s legal obligations by which employees who opt out of membership nonetheless gain the benefits of the union contract (pay, benefits, job protections), violates the employee’s First Amendment speech rights.

But what’s downright stunning is that at the argument, Alito said he believed that the very existence of public-employee unions violates the First Amendment because–seriously; he said this–the non-member union-contract beneficiary might want small government.  This, from someone whose first official act as a justice was to join Kennedy (the opinion’s author), Scalia, Thomas and Roberts in ruling that a district attorney did not violate an assistant district attorney’s First Amendment speech rights by retaliating against him for writing an internal memo saying that he believed that a cop had falsified some evidence in obtaining a search warrant.  That opinion, in a case called Garcetti v. Ceballos, was and remains extremely controversial–it was shocking, really–and played a key role in a case, called Lane v. Franks, that the Court decided two weeks ago.

I suggested in my posts about Harris and about that comment by Alito’s during the argument that the non-union beneficiary of a public-employee union contract had the option of quitting his job or refusing the negotiated benefits in order to reduce the size of government.

I had predicted from the outset that the opinion in Harris would be issued on the same as the opinion in Hobby Lobby, so that news coverage of Hobby Lobby would overwhelm coverage of Harris, and I was right. Because of the way in which the Court divvies up majority-opinion-writing among the justices, it is clear that Alito was assigned to write the opinion in Harris.

There is a (very) outside chance that one justice changed his mind since the week of the argument (when the vote was taken and the majority-opinion-writing was assigned), and that someone other than Alito therefore is writing a 5-4 opinion rejecting the outrageous First Amendment claim.  Something sort of like that happened in a case called Bond v. US, argued last Oct. and decided [on Jun. 2], a case that they planned to use to advance their states’-rights juggernaut but instead ended up making an important statement about abuse of prosecutorial discretion–a ground on which they never, ever, would have even considered agreeing to hear the case (okay, maybe they would have, but only because the prosecutor was a federal one, not a state one; but even so, probably not).  In that case the actual outcome didn’t change, nor did the author of the opinion (Roberts), but the basis for the ruling, and the statement of law, changed significantly.

I call Bond the Stirred, Not Shaken opinion.  I have a theory about the reason for Roberts’ late change of heart, and I’ve been intending to post in-depth about it but haven’t yet.

I do expect an outrageous 5-4 opinion by Alito in Harris, though.

Yes, the undermining of public-employee unions–like state-courts’ rights to baldly violate individuals’ non-gun-ownership, non-religious, non-real-estate-regulation-er-takings constitutional rights, and to supersede Congress’s Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment powers to buttress, say, individuals’ voting rights–is definitely on the List of Circa 1983 Movement Conservative Legislation-via-Supreme-Court-Pronouncement THINGS TO GET DONE.

And done, these things will get. Now that the chief justice has expressly conceded that their end game has been all along a Court-mandated plutocracy in which legislators’ constituents are those who pay to become one, irrespective of any connection between the location of the constituent/benefactor’s voting residence and the legislator/beneficiary’s legislative district–now that these five justices have used the First Amendment speech clause to formally institute a poll tax, and redefined the term “constituent,” and therefore “democracy,” beyond former recognition*–it’s time for them to get back to other uses of the newly reconstructed First Amendment speech clause.  In the name of the Framers.

The original ones, of course!


*In his Apr. 2 opinion in McCutcheon v. FEC, Roberts redefined “constituent” as an American who, irrespective of place of residence, donates to a political campaigns in sufficient amounts to buy the candidate or incumbent’s proxy vote on legislation, and “democracy” as plutocracy.  The specific statement is:

[C]onstituents have the right to support candidates who share their views and concerns. Representatives are not to follow constituent orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and respon­sive to those concerns. Such responsiveness is key to the very concept of self-governance through elected officials.

Ergo–voila! It’s official; we have a plutocracy.

Just in case you were wondering.

[Clarification added 6/29 at 5:08 p.m.]

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The Supreme Court’s opinion in Bond v. U.S. will be about separation of powers. But about separation of WHICH powers?

Update appended. 5/17 at 1:37 p.m.


I’ve written several times in the last three-plus years about a Supreme Court case called Bond v. U.S. Actually, to be precise, Bond v. U.S. is two Supreme Court cases, although it’s only one lower-court case. This is not unusual, but the case itself is; both the facts and the legal issues are downright weird.

The case first came to the Court in 2010 as a “federalism” (states’ rights!) case, albeit a highly unusual one: Unlike virtually every other criminal-law-related case ni which federalism is at issue, the criminal defendant in this case was prosecuted not in state court but in federal court.  She argued, successfully, to the Supreme Court, on “direct” rather than “collateral” review–a distinction that gives federal criminal defendants an actual shot at Supreme Court review in order to clarify, broaden or narrow criminal or constitutional law; state-court defendants have virtually no chance, and are (very) effectively precluded, by the Supreme Court’s extreme (absurd) interpretation of a federal “jurisdictional” statute, from any such opportunity in the lower federal courts–that she herself had “standing” under the doctrine of federalism to challenge the constitutionality of her federal prosecution. Notwithstanding that she is not a state. But she had been prosecuted under a ridiculously broad reading of a federal anti-terrorism statute, of what should have been a state prosecution.

You have “standing” to sue if there is a direct, actual or imminent injury to you that could be rectified by a favorable court ruling on the issue you want to raise.

Kennedy wrote the opinion, in which he wrote: See, I told you that federalism equals freedom! (Okay, I’m paraphrasing. But you figured that out by yourself.)  Federalism , Kennedy said, is the separation of powers between the federal and the state governments.  Which makes us freer.  Even when it means that state courts (in criminal and civil cases) and prosecutors are free to violate individuals’ constitutional rights. (Okay he didn’t say that latter in that opinion, but he and his colleagues say it regularly in other opinions.)

The Court send the case back to the lower federal appellate court for review of Bond’s substantive claim: Was her prosecution under a ridiculously broad reading of a federal anti-terrorism statute instead of as a run-of-the-mill assault under state criminal law unconstitutional under the doctrine of federalism?  And while her case was in the lower appellate court, she argued that the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act–the statute under which she was prosecuted, and which Congress had enacted under it’s “enumerated” constitutional power to enforce and interpret treaties– was unconstitutional because, well, the part of the treaty that Congress had enacted the statute to enforce, at least as interpreted by Congress in enacting that statute, was an unconstitutional power grab by the executive branch, which had negotiated the treaty.  At least as interpreted by Congress in enacting that statute.

Something like that. I am, I hope it suffices to say, not an expert on international law.  I’m, I just say, way more comfortable discussing the usual federalism (states rights!) controversies than even mentioning, say, treaty law. But I will note that the Constitution’s Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, enumerates that the President “shall have Power, by and with Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”

Bond lost in the lower court on both her grounds, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case again.  The case was argued last November, in the same group of argument “sittings” as Town of Greece v. Galloway.

I had assumed until last week, when Town of Greece was released, that Kennedy would write the opinion in Bond–another ode-to-federalism-because-it-means-freedom opinion–and that Roberts would write the opinion in Town of Greece. (They sort of balance things that way.)  But I was wrong about that. Kennedy wrote Town of Greece and Roberts is writing (or has written; the opinion might be issued on Monday) Bond.  And Vanderbilt law prof. Ingrid Wuerth, who is an expert on international law, writes that she expects it to be a blockbuster.

Wuerth says, if I understand her correctly, that she expects that the opinion will substantially rewrite (i.e., limit) the extent of the federal government’s treaty powers–under some theory of the “structure” of the federal government under the original Articles.

I think it will use a different part of the original Constitution, though, than the one that structures the federal government so that Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, and the habeas corpus provision in the Constitution’s Article I and much of the Fourteenth Amendment (as necessary), are largely nullities. This part of the Constitution, I expect, will have been written not by James Madison, or by Oliver Wendell Holmes (to whom credit will be given, nonetheless), but instead by the Koch brothers, who await this ruling.  The purpose of which will have nothing much to do with terrorism–except the environmental kind that Koch Industries, ExxonMobil, and coal-fired power plants perpetuate.


UPDATE: Reader Mike Hansberry and I exchanged the following comments in the Comments thread to this post:

HANSBERRY:  Your comment puzzles me. If the Court rules that the federal government overreached in prosecuting Ms Bond, that will strengthen Reid v. Covert, which teaches that the Treaty clause does not empower the Pres. and Senate to override Const,. protections, rather than weaken it. In my opinion, the court ought to expand on Reid and say that the Treaty clause does not empower the Pres. and Senate to violate structural principles any more than it allows them to violate enumerated protections.

Moreover the Court could simply say that the treat power extends as far as Missouri v Holland, but no further. So there is no need whatever to for this ruling to have an impact on the law as it stands.

ME:  Your comment indicates that you understand perfectly the point of my post, Mike.  Reid v. Covert indeed teaches that the Treaty clause does not empower the president and Senate to override the Constitution’s protections guaranteed to individual American citizens, in that case, to a U.S. citizen living abroad and tried and convicted, by a military tribunal, of murdering her husband.

I do understand that a major part of the Conservative Legal Movement is to privilege states’ alleged rights over the rights of the federal government and the rights of individuals who aren’t rightwing culture warriors, and attribute this to, as I put it in a new post on this blog, “the Constitution–by its structure, its history, its … whatever.  Whatever, usually being some comment by one of its framers (almost always James Madison, the unwitting mascot of today’s far right), or a pre-Civil War Supreme Court opinion.”

You acknowledge that a ruling in Bond that expands Reid’s “teaching” that the Treaty clause does not empower the president and Senate to override the Constitution’s protections guaranteed to individual American citizens–a ruling that expands it to a “teaching” that the Treaty clause does not empower the president and Senate to override the Constitution’s alleged sovereignty guaranteed to individual states American citizens–would be a clear expansion of Reid’s teaching.  It would, in fact, be not just an expansion but an alteration of the purpose Reid’s teaching, which was to protect individuals, not states, from evisceration of the Constitution’s direct guarantees to individuals.

The question is not whether a treaty can supersede the Constitution’s structure, but instead the right’s claim that the Constitution’s structure is, in essence, the right’s legislative agenda.  That is, the question is: What actually is the Constitution’s structure. In this case–and, really, this case only–a ruling for Bond based on the right’s claims about the Constitution’s structure also would reflect the left’s idea of the Constitution’s structure, but in an entirely different respect.  Carol Bond should win, but because her own individual constitutional rights were violated by a bizarre application of a federal statute.  She should not have to piggyback on some rightwing claim that states, and especially state courts and state prosecutors, are sovereigns whenever they choose to be, including whenever they choose to violate a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights.

THAT would avoid a de facto reversal of what Holmes actually wrote in Missouri v. Holland, as I read that opinion.

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Ah, federalism. Which is in the eye of the beholders. The beholders being Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia, Samuel Alito, Anthony Kennedy, John Roberts … and the Koch brothers.

(Correction appended.)

(Clarence Thomas in his separate concurrence]* adds that in his view the First Amendment religion clauses don’t apply to the states in the first place. And it only probably bars the establishment of a national church—leaving open the question for another day.

Let Us Pray:The Supreme Court gives its blessing for prayer at town meetings. Get ready for a lot more Jesus in your life., Dahlia Lithwick, Slate, yesterday

That’s right; the First Amendment religion clauses don’t apply to the states in the first place. No Sir. No way. No how. It’s only the First Amendment’s speech clause that applies to states in the first place.

In the last two years, Thomas and Scalia have voted with their three compadres to strike down Montana and Arizona campaign-finance laws as violative of the First Amendment’s speech clause–in the Montana case in a summary reversal of a ruling by the Montana Supreme Court; that is, without briefing and argument.  The vaunted freedom conferred by federalism (a.k.a., states’ rights!) is somewhat temperamental.  But, whatever.

I strongly recommend the entire Lithwick article, which discusses several parts of the Kennedy plurality opinion, a concurring opinion by Alito, and the Thomas concurrence.  The statements these people make go well beyond the issue in that case, and are truly breathtaking.


*CORRECTION: Originally this post said that Scalia joined Thomas’s concurrence in full. That was incorrect; he joined all of it except the part in which Thomas repeats his belief that the First Amendment’s two religion clauses are not properly viewed as applying limitations to states via the Fourteenth Amendment, through what’s known as “the incorporation doctrine.”  Thomas is the only justice, to my knowledge, to express or support such a view–ever.

As I understand Thomas’s claim, it’s that the Framers’ intent in drafting the religion clauses was to prevent the federal government from stopping the states from adopting a state-sponsored religion. It’s utter nonsense–absolutely fanciful–but it is part and parcel of a key premise of the Conservative Legal Movement’s “federalism” claim: that the very structure of the Constitution itself as set forth in the original Articles is that the Constitution makes states sovereigns and that a threshold purpose of the document is to protect state’s prerogatives from incursion by the federal government–and that this includes the right of state courts in criminal and civil cases, and the right of state prosecutors, to infringe at will upon the rights of individuals.

Kennedy, in fact, actually has written that the structure of the original Constitution trumps Amendments that alter the relationship between the states and the federal government.  Roberts,for his part, made clear last year in his opinion striking down a key section of the Voting Rights Act that he agrees wholeheartedly with this; his opinion in that case, Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, effectively holds that these folks’ concept of the structure of the original Articles trumps Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.  And it explains the bizarre juggernaut that I wrote about here.

We’re witnessing here a concerted, unremitting restructuring of fundamental parts of American law under the guise of constitutional interpretation, employing medicine-man semantics gimmicks and other such tactics, including baldly false, disorienting declarations stating what others’ opinions are.  The Articles of the Constitution are viewed as really the Articles of Confederation, except when that would limit rather than advance this crowd’s lawmaking or outright partisan agenda.** And they’re getting away with it–and will until the Democrats actually start making it an issue.  My suggestion: that the Dems run ads this election year actually quoting from the opinion in McCutcheon v. FEC and also note the striking down of Arizona’s and, especially, Montana’s campaign-finance laws.  Montana’s statute was enacted in the early part of the last century. – 4/7 at 11:04 a.m.

**I just updated this post again to add “and outright partisan” to that sentence and to link to Thomas Edsall’s terrific op-ed about this in today’s New York Times. This issue is finally getting some mainstream-media attention.  Hurray. – 4/7 at 12:57 p.m.

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A final comment on Scalia’s dissent in EPA v. EMA Homer City Generation

I haven’t read Scalia’s dissents–either one of them–in EPA v. EMA Homer City Generation, and don’t plan to. Nor did I plan to post more than I already have about it. But Kenneth Jost has read it, and at his blog Jost on Justice points out another line in the first of the two:

In dissent, Scalia saw the EPA as making up the approach on its own in the face of an “unambiguous” statute. Even while calling the law “stupid,” Scalia said the episode was “a textbook example” of why many Americans believe they are governed “not so much by their elected representatives as by an “unelected bureaucracy.”

Some Americans do believe they are governed “not so much by their elected representatives as by an “unelected bureaucracy.”  Other Americans, though, believe they are governed “not so much by their elected representatives as by a radical bare majority of justices all but one of whom worked in the Reagan administration and has a quarter-century-old list of what is effectively legislation that they are hell-bent on enacting by Court fiat–largely by striking down legislation enacted by none other than the elected federal and state representatives.

Jost writes:

Scalia takes off against other parts of government in much the same way. When the court considered the Voting Rights Act two years ago, Scalia cited its overwhelming approval by both chambers of Congress as evidence that it was all wrong. When Roberts led the court in a narrow ruling on campaign finance law in 2007, Scalia accused the chief of “faux judicial restraint.” In Scalia’s disordered mind, the rest of government is so often so very wrong — and he alone is not afraid to say so.

There are by now so many examples of federal and state laws that this five-member legislature is striking down under the guise of fanciful interpretations of one or another Constitutional Amendment that it’s hard to keep track.  But the ruling last year in the Voting Rights Act case, Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, really is in a separate category, in my opinion.  In that opinion, this group appears to have stricken down Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, which expressly authorizes the type of legislation that they struck down as unconstitutional in Shelby County.

There, they concocted a constitutional theory that, best as I can tell, is that the structure of the original Constitution–the Articles, as opposed to the Amendments–is such that it supersedes constitutional amendments that alter the “federalist” power structure.  The federalist power structure being that states are sovereigns vis-a-vis the federal government, except when a state legislature enacts a law that contradicts one of the Reagan-era Conservative Legal Movement’s goals. State campaign-finance regulations, for example, even ones enacted a century ago in, e.g., Montana, are being stricken as violative of the First Amendment right to buy elected officials.

I’ve said a few times here at AB recently that I think we’re now in seriously dangerous territory, in which gimmicky redefinitions of common word and phrases, and emotionally manipulative sleights-of-hand faux analogies, are being employed casually and wholesale by this group of five people trapped in a bizarre, airtight time warp, in what amounts to a capture of this country’s legal system.

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John Roberts Introduces a New Favorite Tactic This Term: Sleights-of-Hand Analogies

Roberts suggested that he believes Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood can bring forth claims of religious freedom, saying courts have held that “corporations can bring racial discrimination claims as corporations” and that “those cases involve construction of the term ‘person.’”

John Roberts Offers Conservatives A Way Out Of Birth Control Dilemma, Sahil Kapur, TPM, Mar. 26

About which I wrote a post here the next day titled: “Turns out Alito isn’t the only justice who conflates the Securities Exchange Act with state-law corporate-structure statutes.  Roberts does, too!  (Unless, that is, racial-minority-owned corporations are denied access to restaurants and hotels when traveling.  Or something.)

Yep. Unless, that is, racial-minority-owned corporations are denied access to restaurants and hotels when traveling.  Or something.

What I was referring to was this, from that post of  Kapur’s about the argument on Mar. 26 in Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Specialties v. Sebelius, the two consolidated cases challenging as violative of the First Amendment’s free exercise clause the ACA’s employer contraceptive-coverage mandate, in which a threshold issue is whether corporations can exercise religion and therefore are “persons” within the meaning of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act:

After observing that “eight courts of appeals, every court of appeal to have looked at the situation have held that corporations can bring racial discrimination claims as corporations,” the Chief Justice asked:

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Two Yale law professors think they know what, exactly, the APPEARANCE of quid pro quo corruption looks like. They don’t. But I do.

If the president is to be taken seriously, it’s time for him to make campaign finance a centerpiece of the upcoming campaign. Despite appearances, serious reform remains possible within the new limits set out by the Roberts court. Obama should take full advantage of the chief justice’s explicit recognition that the “appearance of corruption” serves as a compelling rationale for controlling contributions. This provides a meaningful roadmap for concrete reforms that will call a halt to the rise of plutocracy in American politics.

Consider, for example, the pathologies surrounding Wall Street’s defense of the loophole allowing big money to pay only 15 percent tax on investments as “carried interest.” To defend their right to pay lower rates than the average worker, hedge funds have doubled their political contributions from $20 million in 2008 to $40 million in 2012; yet more recently, private equity firms have entered the contribution business in a big way for the first time.

All Eyes on Obama: Obama needs to put his money where his mouth is on campaign finance reform, Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres, Slate, yesterday

In this post of mine here on Thursday, I mentioned that Roberts said in McCutcheon that Congress could still “regulate campaign contributions to protect against corruption or the appearance of corruption,”  but then limited “corruption” to an actual quid pro quo. Which I think there’s no question that he did. I then said this raises the question of what, exactly, the appearance of quid pro quo corruption looks like.  “Y’know, as opposed to the real thing,” I said.

Ackerman and Ayres, both of them Yale law professors, want Obama to try to push Congress to hold Roberts to the “appearance of corruption” thing. Which, as reflected in that quote above, would require an express statutory bar to large campaign contributions–to candidates and also, presumably, political parties–by anyone who made the contribution in order to obtain or prevent an end to favorable tax, subsidy or regulatory legislation, if that candidate wins (or that party wins control) and then does the bidding of the contributor.

That conduct is comfortably within most Americans’ definition of actual (if legal) corruption, I think, but it is expressly precluded from Roberts’ definition of “corruption” and also from his definition of the appearance of corruption. Still, the professors go on to say:

The impact of this rapid expansion in large gifts was recently on display when Republican Dave Camp, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, proposed a sweeping tax reform that would have eliminated this, and many other, loopholes that allow the top 1 percent to pay taxes at lower rates than those imposed on the average working family. Within days, threats of campaign retribution had generated widespread opposition in congressional ranks, leading a despairing Camp to announce that, despite his powerful position, he would not seek another term in office.

This stunning defeat of a reigning congressional baron, together with the escalating sums of big money, is more than enough to establish the “appearance of corruption.” Under present law, for example, federal contractors are not allowed to “make any contribution of money or other things of value” to “any political party, committee, or candidate.” After reviewing relevant case-law, a federal district judge upheld the ban because it “guards against ‘pay-to-play’ arrangements, in which people seeking federal contracts provide financial support to political candidates in return for their help securing government business.”

The same rationale should lead President Obama to propose a ban on contributions from taxpayers benefiting from the “carried interest” loophole. Going further, he should cap donations on any person who pays a lower tax rate than the rate of the average worker.

I assume that Ackerman and Ayres are sarcastically making the point that I tried to make: that McCutcheon actually limits campaign-finance laws to prohibiting what already violates criminal law: bribery.

But this illustrates an even more important point.  A key modus operandi of that crowd is to effectively amend the Constitution by redefining common English-language words and phrases, to the extent needed to achieve their goal.

“Corruption” means only smoking-gun quid pro quo. The “appearance of corruption” means only smoking-gun quid pro quo.

“Freedom” does not include actual physical non-imprisonment; to the contrary, “freedom” means states’–or actually, state courts’and prosecutors’ freedom to violate criminal defendants’ constitutional rights, to their heart’s content.

“People” means “states,” except that it really doesn’t, usually; it only does when the Voting Rights Act is being challenged as an unconstitutional infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process and equal protection of the law. Heretofore (that is, since that Amendment’s ratification in 1868, until last year)  the Fourteenth Amendment was thought to guarantee those rights only to human beings, and its sole purpose was interpreted to protect only against states’ violations of those rights, since that is what it says; the Amendment does limit the guarantees to “people” and protects only against state–not the federal government’s–violations of those rights.

Just so you know, the section of the Fourteenth Amendment that Roberts, Kennedy, et al. said they were relying on to strike a key section of the Voting Rights Act last year, upon their stated conclusion that that section guarantees states the right to equal protection of federal laws, reads:

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

And, of course, “people” means for-profit corporations, for purposes of First Amendment freedoms.

This is a seriously dangerous tactic, being employed now, regularly, by a bare majority of our country’s Supreme Court.  They de facto amend the Constitution to change its very nature, and of course not incidentally the very nature of the electoral process, simply by giving unconventional meanings to common words.

I do disagree, strongly, though, with Ackerman’s and Ayres’ proposition that Obama himself constitutes the end-all-and-be-all of making McCutcheon a significant campaign issue this year (or not). A huge problem for the Democrats, throughout the Obama administration, has been the failure of members of Congress and candidates for Congress to pick up Obama’s bizarre slack–on the ACA, on Keynesian economics, and on other critically important policy issues. Obama’s not going to change.  So what? This year’s Dem candidates can get these messages across on their own.

If they want to.  And they should want to.


*Post edited substantially and expanded. 4-6

** Now cross-posted at my own newly minted blog, called … The Law of the Jungle.

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