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Shaken, Not Stirred: The Supreme neo-Framers (likely) will continue their perversion of the First Amendment speech clause tomorrow.

In an email this morning, Bill H asked me whether I know much about a case called Harris v. Quinn, in which the Supreme Court will announce the likely 5-4 majority’s ruling tomorrow.  I responded:

I know LOADS about it, Bill, and wrote about it–and about a bizarre comment by Alito during the argument on the case–right after the argument back in Jan. and have mentioned it two or three times since then.  It is really striking that the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in order to consider the claim: that requiring public employees to pay a fee (not the full union dues, but instead some small percentage of the membership dues as compensation for the union’s legal obligations by which employees who opt out of membership nonetheless gain the benefits of the union contract (pay, benefits, job protections), violates the employee’s First Amendment speech rights.

But what’s downright stunning is that at the argument, Alito said he believed that the very existence of public-employee unions violates the First Amendment because–seriously; he said this–the non-member union-contract beneficiary might want small government.  This, from someone whose first official act as a justice was to join Kennedy (the opinion’s author), Scalia, Thomas and Roberts in ruling that a district attorney did not violate an assistant district attorney’s First Amendment speech rights by retaliating against him for writing an internal memo saying that he believed that a cop had falsified some evidence in obtaining a search warrant.  That opinion, in a case called Garcetti v. Ceballos, was and remains extremely controversial–it was shocking, really–and played a key role in a case, called Lane v. Franks, that the Court decided two weeks ago.

I suggested in my posts about Harris and about that comment by Alito’s during the argument that the non-union beneficiary of a public-employee union contract had the option of quitting his job or refusing the negotiated benefits in order to reduce the size of government.

I had predicted from the outset that the opinion in Harris would be issued on the same as the opinion in Hobby Lobby, so that news coverage of Hobby Lobby would overwhelm coverage of Harris, and I was right. Because of the way in which the Court divvies up majority-opinion-writing among the justices, it is clear that Alito was assigned to write the opinion in Harris.

There is a (very) outside chance that one justice changed his mind since the week of the argument (when the vote was taken and the majority-opinion-writing was assigned), and that someone other than Alito therefore is writing a 5-4 opinion rejecting the outrageous First Amendment claim.  Something sort of like that happened in a case called Bond v. US, argued last Oct. and decided [on Jun. 2], a case that they planned to use to advance their states’-rights juggernaut but instead ended up making an important statement about abuse of prosecutorial discretion–a ground on which they never, ever, would have even considered agreeing to hear the case (okay, maybe they would have, but only because the prosecutor was a federal one, not a state one; but even so, probably not).  In that case the actual outcome didn’t change, nor did the author of the opinion (Roberts), but the basis for the ruling, and the statement of law, changed significantly.

I call Bond the Stirred, Not Shaken opinion.  I have a theory about the reason for Roberts’ late change of heart, and I’ve been intending to post in-depth about it but haven’t yet.

I do expect an outrageous 5-4 opinion by Alito in Harris, though.

Yes, the undermining of public-employee unions–like state-courts’ rights to baldly violate individuals’ non-gun-ownership, non-religious, non-real-estate-regulation-er-takings constitutional rights, and to supersede Congress’s Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment powers to buttress, say, individuals’ voting rights–is definitely on the List of Circa 1983 Movement Conservative Legislation-via-Supreme-Court-Pronouncement THINGS TO GET DONE.

And done, these things will get. Now that the chief justice has expressly conceded that their end game has been all along a Court-mandated plutocracy in which legislators’ constituents are those who pay to become one, irrespective of any connection between the location of the constituent/benefactor’s voting residence and the legislator/beneficiary’s legislative district–now that these five justices have used the First Amendment speech clause to formally institute a poll tax, and redefined the term “constituent,” and therefore “democracy,” beyond former recognition*–it’s time for them to get back to other uses of the newly reconstructed First Amendment speech clause.  In the name of the Framers.

The original ones, of course!

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*In his Apr. 2 opinion in McCutcheon v. FEC, Roberts redefined “constituent” as an American who, irrespective of place of residence, donates to a political campaigns in sufficient amounts to buy the candidate or incumbent’s proxy vote on legislation, and “democracy” as plutocracy.  The specific statement is:

[C]onstituents have the right to support candidates who share their views and concerns. Representatives are not to follow constituent orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and respon­sive to those concerns. Such responsiveness is key to the very concept of self-governance through elected officials.

Ergo–voila! It’s official; we have a plutocracy.

Just in case you were wondering.

[Clarification added 6/29 at 5:08 p.m.]

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The DOMA Opinion

Now the shoe is on the other foot, and it is time for the court to strike down a federal statute in order to advance a liberal policy goal rather than a conservative policy goal. Justice Scalia’s paean to the democratic process* in his dissent sounds a little hollow, coming in the wake of his votes to strike down affirmative action programs and Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act—both of them the result of the democratic process, as much as DOMA was. Meanwhile, none of the liberals pipe in to explain how to reconcile the outcome of this case with the concerns about democracy that they expressed in dissenting opinions in the other cases. (Ginsburg, in Shelby County: “That determination of the body empowered to enforce the Civil War Amendments ‘by appropriate legislation’ merits this Court’s utmost respect.”)

But this is a trite point, and never mind. The problem faced by opponents of DOMA is that there was no clear constitutional hook for striking it down. The Equal Protection Clause does not seem to apply because gay people (unlike, say, African-Americans) have not been regarded as politically weak enough to be a “suspect class,” justifying heightened review. That means that only a rational basis is necessary to uphold DOMA and a rational basis is easy to find (uniformity, efficiency, blah, blah, blah). The Due Process Clause does not seem to apply because that clause protects only rights that are rooted in history and tradition, and the right of same-sex marriage, however compelling a moral issue it may seem today, is not such a right. Federalism says that (under ill-defined conditions) the U.S. government cannot trump state law, especially in an area like family law, but in fact there are plenty of federal laws that regulate marriage, at least along the margins.

— Eric Posner, There was no clear constitutional reason to strike down DOMA, but the court did it anyway. Slate, today

I don’t understand why Posner thinks there is a conflict between the liberals’ position in Shelby County (yesterday’s 5-4 opinion gutting the Voting Rights Act) and their position in joining Kennedy in Windsor without reconciling the two.  Why does he think Ginsburg’s statement in Shelby County—“That determination of the body empowered to enforce the Civil War Amendments ‘by appropriate legislation’ merits this Court’s utmost respect.”—conflicts with Kennedy’s use of equal protection in Windsor?  DOMA surely was not intended to provide equal protection to same-sex couples.  And the liberals surely did not say in their dissent in Shelby County that democratically enacted laws are fine even if they violate constitutional equal protection guarantees.

And I’m not sure why Posner and many other commentators today complain that Kennedy’s opinion doesn’t identify the specific level of equal protection scrutiny that gay people are entitled to.  He establishes a separate, new class of people, including but not limited to gays, who are entitled to heightened equal protection: people targeted by laws or policies whose very intent and whose effect is to disadvantage them. “Discriminations of an unusual character especially require careful consideration” of the motive and effect–in other words, heightened equal protection scrutiny by the courts–he says.   That’s new, and not all that specific, but it’s certainly a level of scrutiny that’s different, and higher, than the rational-basis level of scrutiny. Kennedy clearly was saying that under this new type of scrutiny, there very much is a constitutional reason to strike down DOMA.

And I think it will play a role in next term’s affirmation action case challenging the constitutionality of 2006 successful Michigan ballot initiative that amended the state constitution to prohibit state-sponsored race-based affirmative action in employment and college admissions.  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals struck it down on the basis that, for equal protection purposes, constitutional amendments were different than ordinary legislation because the targeted groups can’t simply lobby the legislature to change the law; they must instead go through the lengthy, difficult and expensive ballot-initiative process.  The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.  The case is Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.  Linda Greenhouse had some interesting comments about it in the NYT a couple weeks ag0.

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*Scalia’s paean comes at the opening of his dissent.  He says, stupifyingly:

We have no power to decide this case. And even if we did, we have no power under the Constitution to invalidate this democratically adopted legislation. The Court’s errors on both points spring forth from the same diseased root: an exalted conception of the role of this institution in America.

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The Fundamental Principle That States Are People, My Friend

OH. WOW.  I actually called this exactly right in my post yesterdaythis being, well, this.  [Inadvertently-omitted link to court opinion inserted.  H/T Dan Crawford.]  Specifically: Roberts’ 5-4 opinion today in Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, the Voting Rights Act case that I discussed, and predicted the outcome of, in that post yesterday.

Regular AB readers might recall a recent post of mine excoriating an article on Slate by University of Chicago law professor Eric Posner concerning a Fourth Amendment search issue.  But Posner, who along with his father, prominent federal appellate judge Richard Posner and two others, is blogging on Slate this week in its annual final-week-of-the-Supreme-Court-term discussion, and he’s posted this spot-on analysis and bald criticism of the Roberts opinion in Shelby County:

Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Shelby County v. Holder, the Voting Rights Act case, is a pretty lame piece of work. There is a longstanding constitutional norm of judges deferring to Congress. Courts strike down laws when they violate rights or exceed Congress’ power. But Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which requires nine states in the South (and other scattered places) to get approval from the Justice Department before changing their election laws, doesn’t violate anyone’s rights. It’s the type of legislation specifically authorized by the 15th Amendment of the Constitution, which says the right to vote “shall not be abridged” because of race or color. Roberts says that the singling out of Old South states, for what’s called “preclearance” by DoJ, makes little sense now that blacks are as likely to register to vote as whites in those states, or nearly so. But Congress passes hundreds of statutes that are based on weak evidence, and courts routinely uphold them. Roberts doesn’t even try to argue that the costs imposed on states by the preclearance part of the Voting Rights Act exceed the benefits for people who would otherwise be deprived of the vote, which is what would be minimally necessary to show that the law does not advance the public good.

Roberts focuses on the offense to the sovereignty of states and a newly invented idea he calls the “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty.” State sovereignty means that the federal government should not intrude on political decision-making of states, including, Roberts says, their election laws; equal sovereignty means that when it does, it should intrude equally—on all of the states to the same degree.

But neither of these principles can explain where Roberts ends up. The idea of state sovereignty is riddled with exceptions and is largely a joke these days. The federal government calls the shots, and the states obey, in the area of elections as much as in any other. Roberts accepts the constitutionality of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which forbids states to discriminate against minority voters and in this way also intrudes on state control over their elections. (Section 2 wasn’t at issue in the case the court decided Tuesday, so it’s alive and well. But it relies on lawsuits, not preapproval by the Justice Department, to ensure the rights of minority voters.) If Section 2 does not violate the Constitution, then what is special about Section 5—which also forbids discrimination? From the standpoint of state autonomy, Roberts’ argument does not wash.

That leaves the “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty,” the idea that Congress may not single out certain states for special burdens. Yet Roberts is able to cite only the weakest support for this principle—a handful of very old cases that address entirely different matters. None of the usual impressive array of founding authorities show up in his analysis, even though the founding generation took state sovereignty much more seriously than we do today.

Posner follows that with this priceless deconstruction:

Still, it is worth looking at this principle. What exactly is wrong with the singling out of states by the federal government? Is the idea that when Alabama is on the playground with the other states, they’re going to make fun of it because it had to ask its mama for permission before going out to play? In fact, the federal government doesn’t treat states equally and couldn’t possibly. Nearly all laws affect different states differently. Disaster-relief laws benefit disaster-prone states at the expense of disaster-free states. Pollution-control laws burden industrial states. Progressive taxes burden states where the rich are concentrated. Thanks to Congress, the Environmental Protection Agency can single out states with serious pollution problems, the Justice Department can keep an eye on states with serious corruption problems, and immigration authorities can single out border states for surveillance. Indeed, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act will continue to burden states with substantial minority populations relative to other states, just because you can’t discriminate against a minority population that doesn’t exist. Many more Section 2 claims will be brought in Alabama than in Montana, and so even under Section 2, Alabama has vastly less control over its election law than Montana has over its election law. Yes, Section 5 places an incremental burden on Alabama—but on top of an already unequal burden that Roberts cheerfully tolerates. So whatever explains the court’s decision today, the putative principle of equal sovereignty can’t be it.

Posner raises a point that occurred to me after the oral argument in Shelby County, concerning what appeared (as I said yesterday), accurately, to be the intention of the Fab Five to create a new constitutional doctrine by which states, just like people, are entitled to the equal protection of the law.  It occurred to me that under this new states-are-people-and-therefore-entitled-to-equal-protection doctrine, states (most of them Democratic-leaning) that pay more to the federal government than the state and its residences receive in federal funds could challenge the constitutionality of the laws that provide states (most of them Republican-leaning) and their residents with more federal funds than the state’s residents pay in federal taxes.

But Roberts gets around this—or tries to—by effectively saying that the Tenth Amendment, which he says grants states the right to do whatever they want unless one of the Constitution’s “enumerated powers” (the powers that the Constitution expressly grants to the federal government, and which were central in last year’s Obamacare litigation) provides otherwise.  Thus, he says, the Tenth Amendment trumps the Fifteenth Amendment, notwithstanding that the Fifteenth Amendment was added to the Constitution after the Tenth Amendment was.

Roberts, no numerologist, does nonetheless superficially finesse this by claiming that, well, yah, sure, maybe the Fifteenth Amendment’s Section 5 could be considered an enumerated power— although he doesn’t actually call it an enumerated power, because rightwing mantra dictates that only the powers enumerated in the Constitution’s Article I (which creates the Congress) qualify as authentic enumerated powers.  But, y’know, the real purpose of the section of the Fifteenth Amendment, which authorizes exactly the type of legislation that section 4 of the VRA is, is prospective—that is, to make this a better country going forward.  And, well, how can you make the country a better place when you’ve based your law authorized by the Fifteenth Amendment on outdated evidence, for heaven’s sake?!

The fundamental principal of equal sovereignty is nowhere, even arguably, in the Constitution.  But now, well, states are people, my friend.

Of course, as Posner suggests, and as I point out, if states are entitled to equal protection of federal law, then hopefully New York, Massachusetts, Washington state, Illinois, Connecticut and Vermont will join together to challenge the constitutionality of the federal laws that serve as a financial funnel to Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, Florida, and Alabama—including Shelby County.  Roberts’ opinion notwithstanding, it is itself a violation of equal protection to limit this new equal-protection-of-person-states (state personhood) to state “sovereignty” prerogatives. Even though that’s what serves the interest of the Republican Party.

This is an outrageous new doctrine and it is part and parcel of the Reagan-era legal cabal’s really wacky, really aggressive states-are-people jurisprudence juggernaut, which conveniently trumps both federal and individuals’ (actual humans’) rights to the extent, but only to the extent, that it matches these folks’ political or ideological preference.  The Tenth Amendment, not incidentally, reads:

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

A hallmark of their brand of states’-rights jurisprudence, filled with downright bizarre Court-created doctrines, as it is, is that the post-Civil War era Reconstruction amendments—the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments—are part of the Constitution and its delegation of federal authority only when state or local legislatures or administrative agencies or government bodies infringe upon, say, the right of an upper-middle-class high school senior to be admitted to her state college of choice on the basis of her grades and SAT score.  Or upon the rights of a real estate property owner to do whatever with, or on, his property.  Or upon gun-ownership rights.

You get the idea.  We all do.

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UPDATE: I’m grateful to a Slate front-page editor for his or her decision to feature Eric Posner’s post at the top of Slate’s opening page—and to caption the post to highlight Posner’s point that the opinion is based on a flawed and outright made-up legal concept, a newly fabricated, wacky legal doctrine that has no conceivable actual basis in the Constitution.  None whatsoever.

The opinion is as blatant a political artifice as was Bush v. Gore.

 

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Soooo … Eric Posner’s Angling to Ghostwrite David Brooks’s Columns. Or At Least to Fully Shed That John-Yoo-and-I Stigma. Fine, But Don’t Stigmatize ME In the Process. [FORMAT-CORRECTED AGAIN]

When Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was arrested Friday night, the celebration was instantly overtaken by an ideologically charged debate. Liberals argued that the government must respect Tsarnaev’s constitutional rights, by which they meant that he should be treated the same as any ordinary criminal suspect—informed of his Miranda rights, supplied with a lawyer, presented to court as soon as possible. The subtext was that the treatment of Tsarnaev would refute yet again the hated Bush administration’s claim that it needed expansive war powers to fight terrorists. Conservatives by contrast, notably Republican Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham, argued that the government should classify Tsarnaev as an enemy combatant, and thus deprive him of the rights of ordinary criminal suspects. For the left, the Tsarnaevs are examples of “vulnerable Muslims” driven to extremes by President Obama’s immoral drone war; for the right, they are foot soldiers in a civilizational war. …

Neither the knee-jerk liberal nor the knee-jerk conservative response appreciates all of these underlying dilemmas. For liberals, the constitution is a fetish to be stroked at times of peril; it will protect us, whatever the stakes. They forget that criminal procedural rights were cobbled together over decades by fallible judges, who were responding to the needs of the time. What might have been appropriate during the civil rights era, when police used criminal law to suppress protesters and torment African-Americans, may not be appropriate for an age of terror. …

The isolation of terrorist suspects is hardly a new idea; it was used effectively in the 1970s by Germany, Italy, and other European democracies to defeat terrorist groups like the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigade. Here and now in the U.S., there are several advantages to this approach. It treats in the same manner anyone who engages in terrorism or mass killing and does not single out Muslims, who are burdened by the legacy of the declaration of war against al-Qaida. It gives the police broad powers to deal with cases of extraordinary violence without granting them similar powers for ordinary criminal investigations. It avoids any reference to war or martial law, skirting the massive legal and political complexities associated with war powers. And because Congress would make the rules, and judges would oversee the system, the courts would likely hold it constitutional.

The New Law We Need in Order to Deal With Dzhokhar Tsarnaev: Congress should authorize the isolation and detention of suspected terrorists., Eric Posner*, Slate, yesterday

After reading that article this afternoon, I posted the following comment to it:

For the left, the Tsarnaevs are examples of “vulnerable Muslims” driven to extremes by President Obama’s immoral drone war; for the right, they are foot soldiers in a civilizational war? Really? For the entire left, Prof. Posner?

I’m a regular writer on a blog called Angry Bear, a left-of-center economics/politics/legal-issues blog, and yesterday, at the request of the guy who runs the blog, I posted a lengthy piece on these issues, at [this link; link corrected 4/25]. I began writing for that blog three years ago at the request of the guy who runs it, and a few of my pieces have been linked to or tweeted by some heavy-hitters. Including Paul Krugman (once), Brad DeLong, several times, and Naked Capitalism, also several times. (And occasionally by non-ideological blogs and tweeters as well, although that doesn’t matter here.) Suffice it to say that I’m of the left. Have been all my life. Almost literally; by the age of about six, I knew about McCarthyism, courtesy of my parents!

So I’m a good test case, and I invite Prof. Posner to read my blog post (if he can bear the thought and expend the time to read something written by a no-name) and point out where exactly I said or implied that I view the Tsarnaev brothers as examples of vulnerable Muslims driven to extremes by President Obama’s immoral drone war. And, since he won’t, I invite all you readers here to do that. I wish you luck.

Posner spent the early and mid 2000s angling (I think) to join his father as a judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, an effort that included co-authoring with that well-known civil libertarian John Yoo (google him, folks, if you don’t know who he is and therefore don’t get the reference and characterization). Posner has spent the time since his dalliance with Yoo trying to salvage his own reputation, fairly successfully, and this article is, I think, another piece in his ongoing attempt to rid himself of the Yoo-association taint; you never know when a Republican might win the White House next, and anyway, well, y’know.

But the next presidential inauguration is nearly four years away, and so to bide his time he’s apparently now auditioning as David Brooks’ ghostwriter. Brooks really, really does need one, and Posner has that sweeping-generalizations-and-categorizations thing down pat, which is a good start. All he needs now is to practice up on the faint-correlation-equals-definitive-causation thing. Or at least the a-series-of-statements-of-fact-invites-a-non-sequitur-conclusion technique, a David Brooks special. And no one will be the wiser that the columns are ghostwritten.

As a liberal, I can also attest, by the way, that it is not a characteristic of ours to forget that criminal procedural rights were cobbled together over decades by judges. Nor to forget, or not to, um, notice, that judges are fallible. We notice that; trust me. Some of us even think that some judges are deliberately fallible. In fact, some of us are pretty sure of this.

As for what’s appropriate for an age of terror, one thing that I’m pretty sure is not is that any statute passes constitutional muster because Congress would make the rules, and judges would oversee the system. Congress sort-of-normally makes the rules in detailed statutes, and judges sort-of-normally oversee the system that statutes establish, at least since Marbury v. Madison. So I don’t know why the courts would likely hold it constitutional because Congress would make the rules, and judges would oversee the system. At least until Professor Posner becomes a member of one of those courts.

And just to be clear, I do not consider the Tsarnaev brothers examples of vulnerable Muslims driven to extremes by President Obama’s immoral drone war. This even though that may well have been why the older brother was able to gain the younger brother’s assistance. And even though I, too, believe that the drone war is immoral. And that there is no legitimate reason for this country to be involved in Afghanistan militarily, and that there has been no reason for a decade or so. It already looks likely that the younger brother was vulnerable to his older brother’s manipulations, probably mainly concerning the drone wars, but that the older brother had an agenda apart from the drone wars.***

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*Eric Posner is a longtime professor at the University of Chicago Law School and a son of Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals judge Richard Posner.

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**I had to fully edit the format of this piece once and then still make another formatting correction, because I’m still having trouble getting used to our new platform.  After the second edit, the title disappeared, so I had to edit this a third time. Aaargh.

Steve Roth, Dan Crawford, and reader RJS have helped a lot via emails–thanks, guys!–but I’m still semi-clueless about it all.  Apologies, readers.  I think I finally got this one right. 4/23 at 3:04 p.m.

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***In light of my exchange with Woolley in the comments below, I just amended this paragraph in  my Slate Comment and here. 4/23/13 at 4:19 p.m.

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Wellll, as I learned the hard way from perplexed emails to me about this post, our format here in WordPress does not distinguish blockquotes clearly enough.  JazzBumpa, for example, said he wondered who had poisoned me–until he finally realized that that stuff was a blockquote.  [Poisoned me?  More like kidnapped me, and then waited for Stockholm Syndrome to kick in before he allowed me to post anything.]  The solution, for the moment anyway? Italics.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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