The Supreme Court’s opinion in Bond v. U.S. will be about separation of powers. But about separation of WHICH powers?
Update appended. 5/17 at 1:37 p.m.
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I’ve written several times in the last three-plus years about a Supreme Court case called Bond v. U.S. Actually, to be precise, Bond v. U.S. is two Supreme Court cases, although it’s only one lower-court case. This is not unusual, but the case itself is; both the facts and the legal issues are downright weird.
The case first came to the Court in 2010 as a “federalism” (states’ rights!) case, albeit a highly unusual one: Unlike virtually every other criminal-law-related case ni which federalism is at issue, the criminal defendant in this case was prosecuted not in state court but in federal court. She argued, successfully, to the Supreme Court, on “direct” rather than “collateral” review–a distinction that gives federal criminal defendants an actual shot at Supreme Court review in order to clarify, broaden or narrow criminal or constitutional law; state-court defendants have virtually no chance, and are (very) effectively precluded, by the Supreme Court’s extreme (absurd) interpretation of a federal “jurisdictional” statute, from any such opportunity in the lower federal courts–that she herself had “standing” under the doctrine of federalism to challenge the constitutionality of her federal prosecution. Notwithstanding that she is not a state. But she had been prosecuted under a ridiculously broad reading of a federal anti-terrorism statute, of what should have been a state prosecution.
You have “standing” to sue if there is a direct, actual or imminent injury to you that could be rectified by a favorable court ruling on the issue you want to raise.
Kennedy wrote the opinion, in which he wrote: See, I told you that federalism equals freedom! (Okay, I’m paraphrasing. But you figured that out by yourself.) Federalism , Kennedy said, is the separation of powers between the federal and the state governments. Which makes us freer. Even when it means that state courts (in criminal and civil cases) and prosecutors are free to violate individuals’ constitutional rights. (Okay he didn’t say that latter in that opinion, but he and his colleagues say it regularly in other opinions.)
The Court send the case back to the lower federal appellate court for review of Bond’s substantive claim: Was her prosecution under a ridiculously broad reading of a federal anti-terrorism statute instead of as a run-of-the-mill assault under state criminal law unconstitutional under the doctrine of federalism? And while her case was in the lower appellate court, she argued that the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act–the statute under which she was prosecuted, and which Congress had enacted under it’s “enumerated” constitutional power to enforce and interpret treaties– was unconstitutional because, well, the part of the treaty that Congress had enacted the statute to enforce, at least as interpreted by Congress in enacting that statute, was an unconstitutional power grab by the executive branch, which had negotiated the treaty. At least as interpreted by Congress in enacting that statute.
Something like that. I am, I hope it suffices to say, not an expert on international law. I’m, I just say, way more comfortable discussing the usual federalism (states rights!) controversies than even mentioning, say, treaty law. But I will note that the Constitution’s Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, enumerates that the President “shall have Power, by and with Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”
Bond lost in the lower court on both her grounds, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case again. The case was argued last November, in the same group of argument “sittings” as Town of Greece v. Galloway.
I had assumed until last week, when Town of Greece was released, that Kennedy would write the opinion in Bond–another ode-to-federalism-because-it-means-freedom opinion–and that Roberts would write the opinion in Town of Greece. (They sort of balance things that way.) But I was wrong about that. Kennedy wrote Town of Greece and Roberts is writing (or has written; the opinion might be issued on Monday) Bond. And Vanderbilt law prof. Ingrid Wuerth, who is an expert on international law, writes that she expects it to be a blockbuster.
Wuerth says, if I understand her correctly, that she expects that the opinion will substantially rewrite (i.e., limit) the extent of the federal government’s treaty powers–under some theory of the “structure” of the federal government under the original Articles.
I think it will use a different part of the original Constitution, though, than the one that structures the federal government so that Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, and the habeas corpus provision in the Constitution’s Article I and much of the Fourteenth Amendment (as necessary), are largely nullities. This part of the Constitution, I expect, will have been written not by James Madison, or by Oliver Wendell Holmes (to whom credit will be given, nonetheless), but instead by the Koch brothers, who await this ruling. The purpose of which will have nothing much to do with terrorism–except the environmental kind that Koch Industries, ExxonMobil, and coal-fired power plants perpetuate.
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UPDATE: Reader Mike Hansberry and I exchanged the following comments in the Comments thread to this post:
HANSBERRY: Your comment puzzles me. If the Court rules that the federal government overreached in prosecuting Ms Bond, that will strengthen Reid v. Covert, which teaches that the Treaty clause does not empower the Pres. and Senate to override Const,. protections, rather than weaken it. In my opinion, the court ought to expand on Reid and say that the Treaty clause does not empower the Pres. and Senate to violate structural principles any more than it allows them to violate enumerated protections.
Moreover the Court could simply say that the treat power extends as far as Missouri v Holland, but no further. So there is no need whatever to for this ruling to have an impact on the law as it stands.
ME: Your comment indicates that you understand perfectly the point of my post, Mike. Reid v. Covert indeed teaches that the Treaty clause does not empower the president and Senate to override the Constitution’s protections guaranteed to individual American citizens, in that case, to a U.S. citizen living abroad and tried and convicted, by a military tribunal, of murdering her husband.
I do understand that a major part of the Conservative Legal Movement is to privilege states’ alleged rights over the rights of the federal government and the rights of individuals who aren’t rightwing culture warriors, and attribute this to, as I put it in a new post on this blog, “the Constitution–by its structure, its history, its … whatever. Whatever, usually being some comment by one of its framers (almost always James Madison, the unwitting mascot of today’s far right), or a pre-Civil War Supreme Court opinion.”
You acknowledge that a ruling in Bond that expands Reid’s “teaching” that the Treaty clause does not empower the president and Senate to override the Constitution’s protections guaranteed to individual American citizens–a ruling that expands it to a “teaching” that the Treaty clause does not empower the president and Senate to override the Constitution’s alleged sovereignty guaranteed to individual states American citizens–would be a clear expansion of Reid’s teaching. It would, in fact, be not just an expansion but an alteration of the purpose Reid’s teaching, which was to protect individuals, not states, from evisceration of the Constitution’s direct guarantees to individuals.
The question is not whether a treaty can supersede the Constitution’s structure, but instead the right’s claim that the Constitution’s structure is, in essence, the right’s legislative agenda. That is, the question is: What actually is the Constitution’s structure. In this case–and, really, this case only–a ruling for Bond based on the right’s claims about the Constitution’s structure also would reflect the left’s idea of the Constitution’s structure, but in an entirely different respect. Carol Bond should win, but because her own individual constitutional rights were violated by a bizarre application of a federal statute. She should not have to piggyback on some rightwing claim that states, and especially state courts and state prosecutors, are sovereigns whenever they choose to be, including whenever they choose to violate a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights.
THAT would avoid a de facto reversal of what Holmes actually wrote in Missouri v. Holland, as I read that opinion.
Your comment puzzles me. If the Court rules that the federal government overreached in prosecuting Ms Bond, that will strengthen Reid v. Covert, which teaches that the Treaty clause does not empower the Pres. and Senate to override Const,. protections, rather than weaken it. In my opinion, the court ought to expand on Reid and say that the Treaty clause does not empower the Pres. and Senate to violate structural principles any more than it allows them to violate enumerated protections.
Moreover the Court could simply say that the treat power extends as far as Missouri v Holland, but no further. So there is no need whatever to for this ruling to have an impact on the law as it stands.
Anticipating the release of Bond tomorrow, I predict an Obamacare-like 4-1-4 decision:
(1) 5 conservatives will hold that treaty implementation power only covers actions required of a signatory, therefore the possession, receipt, etc. statute is not supported by the treaty power. Liberals will say that implementation power alone or in combination with necessary and proper support the statute. Breyer writes separately to say ability to legislate beyond treaty language is narrow but sufficiently close in this case.
(2) 4 liberals plus Roberts will hold that commerce clause would support the comprehensive regulation of toxic substances but because the indictment lacks a commerce clause allegation, the conviction is reversed. Conservatives minus Roberts say that Lopez applies, commerce power cannot justify police power.
Your comment indicates that you understand perfectly the point of my post, Mike. Reid v. Covert indeed teaches that the Treaty clause does not empower the president and Senate to override the Constitution’s protections guaranteed to individual American citizens, in that case, to a U.S. citizen living abroad and tried and convicted, by a military tribunal, of murdering her husband.
I do understand that a major part of the Conservative Legal Movement is to privilege states’ alleged rights over the rights of the federal government and the rights of individuals who aren’t rightwing culture warriors, and attribute this to, as I put it in a new post on this blog, “the Constitution–by its structure, its history, its … whatever. Whatever, usually being some comment by one of its framers (almost always James Madison, the unwitting mascot of today’s far right), or a pre-Civil War Supreme Court opinion.”
You acknowledge that a ruling in Bond that expands Reid’s “teaching” that the Treaty clause does not empower the president and Senate to override the Constitution’s protections guaranteed to individual American citizens–a ruling that expands it to a “teaching” that the Treaty clause does not empower the president and Senate to override the Constitution’s alleged sovereignty guaranteed to individual states American citizens–would be a clear expansion of Reid’s teaching. It would, in fact, be not just an expansion but an alteration of the purpose Reid’s teaching, which was to protect individuals, not states, from evisceration of the Constitution’s direct guarantees to individuals.
The question is not whether a treaty can supersede the Constitution’s structure, but instead the right’s claim that the Constitution’s structure is, in essence, the right’s legislative agenda. That is, the question is: What actually is the Constitution’s structure. In this case–and, really, this case only–a ruling for Bond based on the right’s claims about the Constitution’s structure also would reflect the left’s idea of the Constitution’s structure, but in an entirely different respect. Carol Bond should win, but because her own individual constitutional rights were violated by a bizarre application of a federal statute. She should not have to piggyback on some rightwing claim that states, and especially state courts and state prosecutors, are sovereigns whenever they choose to be, including whenever they choose to violate a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights.
THAT would avoid a de facto reversal of what Holmes actually said in Missouri v. Holland, as I read that opinion.
Beverly,
Thanks for clearing some of that up. We are in agreement that Carol Bond should win, but we disagree on the point that she should win only because her own individual constitutional rights were violated by a bizarre application of a federal statute.
As I see it, Bond can claim her right to due process was violated since the Federal government lacks authority under the treaty clause to exercise police power reserved to the states (reserved by way of structural principles).
Surely Ms. Bond does not have a constitutional right to poison her rival, but she does have a due process right. The reason that right has been violated is that the Federal government lacks authority to punish her offense, and the treaty clause cannot furnish that authority. The court should strike down the fed government’s claim that it does.
You say the fed government’s application of the chemical weapons treaty as relates to the Bond case is “bizarre”, but if that application does not exceed the Pres. and Senate’s grant of power under the treaty clause it must be constitutional, unless the court is to find that “bizarre” applications are unconstitutional even though the grant of power is not exceeded.
Reid v. Covert has almost nothing to do with Bond v. US. It would have come out the same if Covert had committed the murder on a military post in the US and she had been tried by a court martial; the Court said only that the treaty power did not alter Covert’s rights vis-a-vis the federal government.
For the conservative legal movement, as B Mann says, Bond is only a hobby horse to ride toward a states rights agenda. This conservative position (1) is atextual, arising from Kennedy’s bloviations on constitutional structure, see Alden v. Maine; and (2) ignores the changes in federal-state relations arising out of the Civil War’s verdict that the federal power was superior to the state power and the Progressive/New Deal idea that the federal government had the power to address national economic and social problems even within the boundaries of the states..
Romanette said: the Court said only that the treaty power did not alter Covert’s rights vis-a-vis the federal government..
And that pisses you off? And you would be even more enraged if the Court were to say that the treaty clause does not empower the Pres. and the Senate to alter the structural principles which leave the police powers with the States thus protecting Bond from an overreach by federal prosecutors?
The Liberal agenda for ever enlarging federal power trumps any concern they sometimes feign for individual rights. This was made plain in Kelo, Raich, and most recently NFIBvSebilius.
I don’t want to hijack this post with a fruitless dialog, but just to be clear:
I am fine with Reid v. Covert.as a statement of individual rights vis-a-vis the federal government
I am fine with a strong federal government; when it becomes necessary to mobiliize the nation on behalf of the national interest, only a national government will do. When we passed from being a society of agriculture and small trade, we passed beyond the vision of the founding generation. Economy and technology and popular culture long ago became national. States have become an impediment to democracy because of the vast population disparities they impose on representation and the heterogeneity they hide. To be a democracy, we at least need to use population-weighted voting in the Senate. Also, something needs to be done about winner-take-all voting.
This is not to say that local concerns are unimportant. I have been fortunate enough to have had the opportunity to watch several African governments as they try to restructure themselves to be more representative and to find the balance between centralization and decentralization. Some of the things I have learned are that all service delivery is local, and local government boundaries have to be based on the communities in which people live, which change over time; that there is a need for an intermediate level of government to coordinate government services and harmonize parochial interests; that the intermediate level is appropriate for choosing the national legislature because otherwise the legislature becomes too large; and that the national level is appropriate for defining policy and making sure that the intermediate levels are carrying it out, even to the extent of appointing and removing administrators. Schemes with more levels generally reflect difficulties in transportation and communication which no longer exist.
“..way more comfortable discussing the usual federalism (states rights!) controversies than …”
Something the U.S. Supreme Court will not intervene in, or fight over.
State court violation Separation of Powers DISABLED VETERANS
State court violations of veterans’ VA disability compensation in disregard of State law, as well the Constitution of the United States have been forwarded (6/23/14), to all nine Justices of the United States Supreme Court, who in 2012 denied a petition on this issue by disabled Air Force veteran Peter Barclay. Justices now have stored in their court clerk’s file, my questions of law I find concerning these violations. Namely, “Separation of powers, Due Process, The Commerce Clause, Supremacy Clause,” as well, various veterans’ laws, the property protections of veterans benefits. The point of this mailing? This is now not something the Justices, and as well, the United States Senate and House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs now have not been made aware of. What they do with this information, if anything, will tell you a great deal. The parties have been advised of the following.
In State court cases involving divorce, our disabled veteran’s concerns are over rulings violating both state and federal law. Decades of continuing costly litigation, incurred in pursuing 14th Amendment property rights of veterans VA disability compensation being awarded to third parties in violation of federal law 38 USC 5301, 10 U.S.C. § 1408. This unlawful activity continues in all but a few state courts that do recognize it‘s federal exempt status. Disabled veterans need to know if it’s true that the “… essential purpose of the due process clause is to prevent the government from acting arbitrarily.”
Divorce is, and can be complicated process. However, keeping in mind, that in each case during the court’s initial property distribution rulings of alimony/support, before any conceivable consideration, in determining VA disability compensation as an award of alimony/support, first and foremost, the court’s duty to the veteran, enforcement of the protections secured by the Constitution. “State sovereignty is not a proper basis on which to rest jurisdiction. Instead the focus is on whether the defendant’s due process rights are infringed by the court’s assertion of jurisdiction.” Civil Procedure 4th Ed. West group.
“It is well established that disability benefits are a protected property interest and may not be discontinued without due process of law.” See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976)”
Oregon resident, Peter James Barclay, a disabled Air Force veteran, May 2 2012, filed with the United States Supreme Court a Petition for a writ of certiorari.
ARGUMENT
I. “The Court Should Grant Review to Determine Whether State Courts Are Erring as a Matter of Law By Preempting Federal Law with State Law Federal Law, by Considering VA Disability Pay Divisible Under State Community or Equitable Distribution Laws.”
II. “This Court Should Grant Review to Resolve the States’ Various Interpretations and Applications of Federal Law Governing Veterans’ Disability Benefits and State Communal and Equitable Property Laws in Favor of One Binding Precedent.”
On Oct 1 2012 Petition was DENIED.
This decision fell on all disabled veterans when Peter Barclay was denied his Constitutional rights by Oregon’s State and Supreme court and refusal of the United States Supreme Court to consider his petition. All the while interestingly, permanent alimony reform continues, and has been proposed in Oregon and, as well, legislated in several states, all without one thought of the disabled veteran.
I take that back. Yes, one State did think about the disabled veteran. In 1983, “..the Texas Supreme Court held that …Veterans Administration disability benefits …with the clear intent of Congress that these benefits be solely for the use of the disabled veteran.” And as so, legislated and made part of Texas law. Although alimony reform had been on the legislative agenda, they turned their thoughts once again to the disabled veteran. The Texas legislature in 2013 amended the law. Section 154.062(b), Family Code. Sec. 8.055. AMOUNT OF MAINTENANCE. “(a-1) For purposes of this chapter, gross income:
(5) all other income actually being received, including… United States Department of Veterans Affairs disability benefits ….”
The issue is VA medical disability compensation, the property rights of the disabled veteran, in what VA medical doctors, medical professionals have determined a disabled veterans injuries should be compensated for. If, and when the question is a disabled veteran’s VA disability compensation property rights, it’s time that disabled veterans voices be heard in a matter that has long concerned them. State court judges continue to ignore the disabled veteran, and the law, i.e., 38 USC 5301, 10 USC 1408. “Separation of powers” doctrine is mandated to end this attempt by the state court to manipulate, overlook, and circumvent the law, and manage to stick it to the disabled veteran.
It is said that no person can be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. Forgotten long ago are the property rights of the disabled veterans. Why? It is clear the court’s have no legal right to, exercise, determine, or consider in any equitable calculation thereof, to divide federal VA disability benefits, in order to further enforce judgment arbitrarily in disregard of property rights. The “separation of powers” doctrine imposes the assumption that the state court, in attacking the disabled veterans legal right to claim as exempt, his or her VA disability compensation, further requires subject matter jurisdiction, which address the court’s constitutional or statutory power to entertain a particular controversy. State court’s have the sworn duty and responsibility to enforce federal law. The court’s continued attempt to override VA administered rehabilitative medical services determinations, of disability compensation is not within the courts purview, legal right or jurisdiction to invade.
Disabled veteran’s, and the “separation of powers” doctrine, both overlooked, ignored, for years, by most state court judges. Policy making outside their jurisdiction of constitutional boundaries in re-evaluating and considering long held established VA protocols, of a disabled veteran‘s VA disability compensation for purposes other than rehabilitation and health of the veteran. Substituting their judgment for the judgment of VA doctors and medical professionals. Violating the property rights of a disabled veteran’s earned VA disability compensation “..once they are delivered to the veteran..,” the blatant disregard of 38 USC 5301, “and shall not be liable to ..…or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary.“ and the 14th Amendment, to further degrade property rights of the disabled veteran, runs afoul of the “separation of powers” doctrine. Injurious, and an abuse of power to allow what is happening, was this the intent of Congress?
A disabled veteran’s plea to the judge, “I have a very severe serious back injury, I do need all of my VA disability compensation.” The judge will, of course reply, “Are you a doctor?” The practice of medicine is a privilege and a calling, and that it combines both art and science. And yet, in these non-life threatening health issues, acting as a provider of health care, state court judges independently take on the serious role of playing doctor, prescribe without medical license or knowledge VA medical compensation issues. A practice forbidden, providing penalties by law, and border on medical negligence in maintaining it’s own state health practice standards.
Despite a ruling by the United State court of appeals, in VETERANS FOR COMMON SENSE, VETERANS UNITED FOR TRUTH, INC., v. ERIC K. SHINSEKI, December 13, 2011, in refusing to exceed their jurisdiction over service-related disability compensation, state courts judges, yes… purposely overlook and violate this canon of law.
A State’s navigable streams are regulated as commerce throughout it’s travel, to protect against pollution, and it’s effect to protect it’s health all along it’s travels. This is no different from a veterans VA disability compensation benefit, navigating it’s way across many states, and just as well recognized as commerce, regulated. State courts failing the constitutional standards for establishing a state priority over the Commerce Clause, Article 1, Section 8, have shown no State interest to protect the health and well being, or the property interests of a disabled veteran.
Realizing laws protecting VA disability compensation as exempt, state courts, therefore are unable, in any legal standing, to secure garnishment of veteran’s VA disability compensation. The court not satisfied, in a final move, will now consider, from any source, an equitable calculation of veteran’s resources, to include…. the very same disability compensation the court has acknowledged as exempt in determining court awarded support. Suggesting the use of a veteran’s disability compensation, or go to jail! As has happened. The mere mention, innuendo, or thought of VA disability compensation to satisfy indemnity obligations as a equitable consideration in any form, thought or calculation of VA disability compensation, suggests interference, in matters identified as exempt, are beyond the State courts jurisdiction, under “separation of powers” doctrine. The court has the responsibility to recognize “property” as a “due process’ right and the states obligation to uphold the State Constitution’s “separation of powers” doctrine.
A state court judge not wanting to violate federal law realizing the exempt status of VA disability compensation, so orders the veteran, that support payments… shall be made from his or her VA disability compensation. In many instances the only monies available, asking (coerced) the veteran to break federal law 38 USC 5301, one that the court will refused to violate. “Payments of benefits due or to become due under any law administered by the Secretary shall not be assignable except to the extent specifically authorized by law,.. and shall not be liable to ..levy or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary.”
To illustrate, an ultimatum of disabled veterans’ experiences. As California Vietnam disabled veteran explained to me, “So the court is playing the ‘contempt of court’ game…I am unfortunately too afraid to go to jail for any reason so I resentfully and reluctantly pay the balance.” (Piner v Piner Calif.)
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution… “The laws of the United States… shall be the supreme law of the land…anything in the constitutions or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. This means of course, that any federal law—even a regulation of a federal agency—trumps any conflicting state law.”
The federal agency’s Veterans Administration Secretary knowing of these concerns remains oblivious to what is their responsibility of care to veterans is, and remains unconcerned as to exactly what their administrative duty is to protect VA disability benefits from those who freely encroach on those constitutional responsibilities that clearly belong to the Veterans Administration. I find no duty of the Secretary to surrender control of VA disability benefits so freely to the States. The issue of disabled veterans right to property is about the law, and not setting a precedent.
As a veterans advocate, and a Korean era veteran, I am neither disabled or in any divorce action. The reality of law from the disabled veteran’s view.
William Heino Sr.
Observance to law and our disabled veterans.
Oregon and the United States Supreme Court observance to law and our disabled veterans.
Oregon’s statutes clearly offer many references, in compliance, observance, and their adherence to both state and federal law and protecting veterans benefits.
18.600 Definitions. As used in ORS 18.600 to 18.850:
(6) “Federal benefit payment” means:
(b) A benefit payment from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs that is protected under 38 U.S.C. 5301(a);
34 § 411.837¹ Compliance with state and federal laws required
10 § 409.040¹ Federal law supersedes state law.
26 § 279A.030¹ Federal law prevails in case of conflict
ORS 18.345 Exempt personal property generally. (1) All property, including franchises, or rights or interest therein, of the judgment debtor, shall be liable to an execution, except as provided in this section and in other statutes granting exemptions from execution. The following property, or rights or interest therein of the judgment debtor, except as provided in ORS 18.305, shall be exempt from execution:
(m) Veterans’ benefits and loans.
(ORS 18.305 [Property not exempt from execution for purchase price])
ORS 18.845 Notice of exemptions form; instructions for challenge to garnishment.
State and federal law specify that certain property may not be taken.
(21) Veterans’ benefits and loans.
(22) Medical assistance benefits.
YOU MAY USE THE CHALLENGE TO GARNISHMENT FORM ONLY FOR THE FOLLOWING PURPOSES:
(1) To claim such exemptions from garnishment as are permitted by law.
Compliance to federal law starts here. 38 USC 5301 Nonassignability and exempt status of benefits, is the Oregon state and federal protection of the disabled veteran’s VA disability compensation. “(a)(1) shall not be assignable… shall be exempt from taxation, .. creditors, ..attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary.”
Yet, Oregon courts, rather than comply with State or federal law (38 USC 5301) in protecting veterans benefits, offer in response, Landis v Landis, Oregon 6/1/2005, “.. benefits are divisible … because there is no conflict.” The United States Supreme Court concurs. Disabled veterans need not apply!
After costly legal expense, it wasn’t disabled Air Force veteran Oregon resident Peter James Barclay, or the thousands of other disabled veterans that received any benefit of these state and federal laws, involved in protecting VA disability compensation from State court ordered spousal support, and then, adding insult, denied his Constitution rights by Oregon’s State Supreme Court. And further, the unforgivable refusal of the United States Supreme Court to consider his May 2, 2012 petition, requesting, “The Court Should Grant Review to Determine Whether State Courts Are Erring as a Matter of Law By Preempting Federal Law with State Law Federal Law, by Considering VA Disability Pay Divisible Under State Community or Equitable Distribution Laws.” (Oct 1 2012) Petition DENIED.
As a Korean era veteran, I am neither disabled, or in any divorce action. Because of the Supreme Court of the United States and Oregon’s indefensible and unconscionable treatment of disabled veterans, reflects the unforgivable uncaring of most States, and it’s legislators towards their disabled veterans. Something that is happening now, in your state! Happening… because of Oregon’s rulings. The practice by State courts nationwide reliance on forum shopping and the false notion of ‘stare decisis’ “to stand by things decided.” (However, not happening in the only state that has not forgotten about the sacrifice disabled veterans gave to their country, IOWA).
William Heino Sr.
The reason Veterans disability compensation is not protected.
The Veterans Affairs Secretary is shielded from undertaking any response to illegal court rulings, whether violations of state, federal law, or the United States Constitution in protecting veteran’s benefits from the whim’s of state court judges, or the intent of Congress. Waffling, behind the Veterans Judicial Review Act (“VJRA”) 38 USC 511. As once VA benefits have been awarded, “.. the decision of the Secretary as to any such question shall be final and conclusive and may not be reviewed by any other official or by any court, whether by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.”
William Heino Sr