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Chris Cillizza Misses the Point. (The most important point, anyway.)

Anecdotal evidence, the basis of so much journalism prior to the rise of the data movement and still, to my mind, over-relied upon — is just that: anecdotal. Roughly 65,000 people voted in the Cantor-Brat primary; Brat won by more than 7,200 votes. Assuming that what a non-scientific sample  of 1, 10 or even 100 people in the district thought about Cantor (or Brat) in the run-up to the race — the shoe-leather reporting prized by Carr — was indicative of how 65,000 people were planning to vote seems to me to be somewhat misguided. (Now, if all 100 people a reporter talked to in the district loudly derided Cantor as an out of step liberal, then I take back my previous point. But, my guess is that wouldn’t have happened.)

Should I have seen Eric Cantor’s loss coming?, Chris Cillizza, Washington Post, today

I assume that Cillizza is, as he says, responding to New York Times writer David Carr’s column on Monday, “Eric Cantor’s Defeat Exposed a Beltway Journalism Blind Spot,” rather than also to, say, my AB post from Wednesday, in which I discuss Carr’s column and note that what the national news media missed, but what the local political reporters Carr mentions recognized, was not simply local antagonism toward Cantor but, to an apparently substantial extent, local antagonism toward Cantor because he is the very embodiment of the politician who shares John Roberts’ particular view, stated expressly in his opinion two months ago in McCutcheon v. FEC, of who or what a politician’s “constituent” is.

In my post on Wednesday (picked up in full elsewhere, I’m glad to see), I noted that the in-depth analysis of it by political several political journalists now that the post-Canter-defeat dust has settled is that critical to Brat’s victory was an anti-plutocracy theme and that Cantor provided the perfect foil for it. Most of the articles discussing this say that the Chamber of Commerce–an explicit target of Brat’s during the campaign, and other major players among the Republican business constituency, who Roberts described in McCutcheon as constituents entitled to secretly help draft legislation by dint of their ability to purchase that right, concur and are springing into action.  As Gail Collins summarized it in her New York Times column yesterday:

The defeat of the House majority leader, Eric Cantor, terrified many of the party establishment’s supporters, particularly since Cantor’s opponent ran against Wall Street, big business and bank bailouts.

It’s a problem, if you’re a big-money donor, to be worried that your party is being taken over by crazy people who will alienate the voters in a national election by opposing immigration reform and contraception. It’s a catastrophe to be worried that it’s being taken over by economic populists.

Cillizza and, I suspect, a number of other professional political analysts remain wedded to what is quickly becoming an outdated model.  They’re missing some important handwriting on the wall, which is that huge swaths of the public are dismayed at the meaning of “constituency” and “democracy” as defined in the New Dictionary of Supreme Court English, edited by Roberts and Anthony Kennedy.  As I said in my Wednesday post:

Call McCutcheon v. FEC the new poll tax. I do.  After all, John Roberts, in a surprising bit of honesty, described it in his opinion for the majority as pretty much that in his opinion in that case earlier this year. “Ingratiation and access . . . are not corruption,” he wrote, quoting Anthony Kennedy’s the Court’s decision in Citizens United, and then explained:

“They embody a central feature of democracy—that constituents support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns.”

But Cantor’s constituents–the ones that Roberts says should dictate Cantor’s policy positions and write legislation he proposes–couldn’t vote in Virginia’s 7th Congressional District last week. The district is too far away for them to commute to Wall Street, or to Wichita, KS, or downtown Houston, or Raleigh, NC.  And surprisingly, it turns out that Brat actually ran what was in large part a progressive economic-populist–an anti-plutocracy–campaign highlighting who exactly Cantor’s  constituents (to borrow Roberts’ term) are.  So, now that that is being widely reported and is sinking in, hedge-fund types and the Chamber of Commerce crowd apparently indeed are starting to pray.

Apart from the obvious reason for the definitional chasm between Roberts & Co. and most people embedded in that statement by Roberts–specifically, the definition of “democracy”–add to the rapidly growing list of Roberts’ casual redefinitions of common words this new definition of “constituent,” one disembodied from residency in the candidate or officeholder’s actual election jurisdiction.

Cantor was beaten, in substantial part, it certainly appears, by Citizens United and McCutcheon–by a backlash toward the political system that is now, bizarrely but expressly, institutionalized as a matter of constitutional jurisprudence.  Turnout was very heavy, far heavier than it was in the primary in that district two years ago, when apparently all the candidates were fine, thank you very much, with poll-tax democracy.

I titled that post “David Brat, et al. v. John Roberts, Anthony Kennedy, the Koch Brothers, the Chamber of Commerce, et al.”  And in the last two paragraphs, I elaborated upon the title, writing:

Brat, for his part, appears to be about to run a general-election campaign consisting mainly of slogans and non sequiturs.  No surprise, of course; slogans, cliches, non sequiturs are the very essence of the current Republican Party–both factions of the Tea Party/Republican Party. The Paul Ryan/Koch brothers/Chamber of Commerce faction and also, because of the mutual exclusivity of its premises, the (newly named) David Brat faction. That’s simply the nature of this beast.

But the divorce case originally known as Movement Conservatives v. Movement Conservatives, filed June 10, 2014 in the Richmond, Virginia Court of Public Opinion, is a class action.  I just checked the docket for the case, and it’s now called Movement Conservatives, et al. v. Movement Conservatives.  And already, there have been several amicus briefs filed on behalf of the petitioners.  And the Supreme Court may not decide the outcome of it after all.

That last sentence is true; the Supreme Court has lost control of the narrative on this.  It has tried, but unsuccessfully, to decree new non-legal definitions of “corruption,” “democracy,” “constituent,” “person,” and “speech.”  It is losing its case in the courts of public opinion in most jurisdictions around the country; that much already is clear.  But the Court will decide, very possibly–in other litigation; actual imminent litigation, in Wisconsin state court and very possibly in federal court–whether or not two key provisions of Wisconsin state, and of still-standing federal, campaign-finance statutes violate five Supreme Court justices’ view of the First Amendment within the peculiar prism of their definitions of those words.

Best as I can tell from news reports in the last 24 hours, the apparently forthcoming state prosecution of a few people involved on behalf of Gov. Scott Walker and Republican state legislators in the Wisconsin recall elections in 2011 and 2012, and perhaps of Walker himself, will necessarily involve challenges by the defendants to the constitutionality of Wisconsin’s (and possibly eventually to the federal government’s) statutory prohibitions against consort between election campaigns and PACs purporting to be “operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare” and unaffiliated with a political party or candidate.

The PACs are not subject to donor-amount limits, and they also can qualify for non-profit tax status if they meet a low bar for what constitutes “exclusively for the promotion of social welfare”.

But whether operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, as “social welfare” is defined by most people, or instead as it will be defined in New Dictionary of Supreme Court English, these groups embody a central feature of democracy as defined in the April 2, 2014 edition of that Dictionary—that constituents support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns. And Scott Walker and the Republican legislators who were subject to possible recall adopted the very definition of “constituent” included in the current edition of the New Dictionary. Most of the people and groups with which they appear to have been coordinating were Walker’s and the legislators’ constituents only in the newly defined sense.  They were not residents of Wisconsin and therefore could not show a valid photo ID at a polling place in Wisconsin. (They would have to vote by absentee ballot.)

But Walker & Friends still remain a bit too precocious in one respect.  The Court’s majority has not yet redefined “democracy” to include as a central feature a First Amendment right of constituents (under either definition, traditional or new) to hide their identity when contributing directly to a political campaign.  And it well may not do so.  Kennedy indicated in his opinion in Citizens United that he does not believe that secret donations to campaigns embody a central feature of democracy.  Uh-oh.

Ultimately, though, what matters most is the outcome that civil litigation, Movement Conservatives, et al. v. Movement Conservatives, because not all five of the current editors of the New Dictionary are young and healthy–and because of the political facts illustrated by the surprisingly high turnout in the open primary in Virginia’s 7th Congressional District and the predominant campaign theme of the winner.  But I don’t expect Chris Cillizza to get that.

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David Brat, et al. v. John Roberts, Anthony Kennedy, the Koch Brothers, the Chamber of Commerce, et al.

Uh-oh, hedge fund managers and Goldman Sachs partners.  Obviously, few of you are evangelical Christians.  So this guy, who wants good markets, has his sights set on you.  But, luckily not on that carried-interest tax-benefit thing y’all get to use, praise the Lord.

So maybe you hedge-fund types can skip church again this Sunday, after all.

— David Brat’s Golden Rule, me, Angry Bear, Jun. 13

I was wrong. The dust is all but settled now, six days after Brat’s highly unexpected defeat of Eric Cantor, and it looks like what defeated Cantor was not that he was too liberal for Tea Party tastes.  It was instead that he was too Establishment-Conservative for a spontaneous, makeshift coalition of Tea Partiers, liberal Democrats (it was an open primary; it was not limited to Republican voters), and others who reject the practice–and the now-formal claim by five Supreme Court justices–that it is necessary and desirable in our constitutional democracy that legislation and other government policy be dictated by those who can afford to buy it.

Call McCutcheon v. FEC the new poll tax. I do.  After all, John Roberts, in a surprising bit of honesty, described it in his opinion for the majority as pretty much that in his opinion in that case earlier this year. “Ingratiation and access . . . are not corruption,” he wrote, quoting Anthony Kennedy’s the Court’s decision in Citizens United, and then explained:

They embody a central feature of democracy—that constituents support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns.

But Cantor’s constituents–the ones that Roberts says should dictate Cantor’s policy positions and write legislation he proposes–couldn’t vote in Virginia’s 7th Congressional District last week. The district is too far away for them to commute to Wall Street, or to Wichita, KS, or downtown Houstonor Raleigh, NC.  And surprisingly, it turns out that Brat actually ran what was in large part a progressive economic-populist–an anti-plutocracy–campaign highlighting who exactly Cantor’s  constituents (to borrow Roberts’ term) are.  So, now that that is being widely reported and is sinking in, hedge-fund types and the Chamber of Commerce crowd apparently indeed are starting to pray.

Apart from the obvious reason for the definitional chasm between Roberts & Co. and most people embedded in that statement by Roberts–specifically, the definition of “democracy”–add to the rapidly growing list of Roberts’ casual redefinitions of common words this new definition of “constituent,” one disembodied from residency in the candidate or officeholder’s actual election jurisdiction.

Cantor was beaten, in substantial part, it certainly appears, by Citizens United and McCutcheon–by a backlash toward the political system that is now, bizarrely but expressly, institutionalized as a matter of constitutional jurisprudence.  Turnout was very heavy, far heavier than it was in the primary in that district two years ago, when apparently all the candidates were fine, thank you very much, with poll-tax democracy.

Actually, even before I wrote my post last Friday I had read an article in the Washington Post by Jia Lynn Yang, titled “Why Cantor’s loss is especially bad news for big business,” detailing Brat’s campaign and challenging the presumption that he won mainly on a  standard-issue far-right anti-immigration, Cantor-is-too-liberal-for-the-Tea-Party platform.  But because his cliche-ridden Ayn Rand, anti-tax, anti-government-regulation positions and loopy justifications for them–which were the subject of most of my Friday post–are, let’s just say, hard to reconcile with such things as, y’know, regulation of banks and hedge funds and objections to the fact of legislation being written by the Koch brothers and the Chamber of Commerce, I figured that the initial analyses were right: Cantor was defeated because he voted to end the government-shutdown and to increase the debt ceiling and wasn’t quite hard-line enough on immigration, and therefore flunked the purity test.

particularly jarring hallmark of the current Supreme Court majority’s aggressive Movement Conservative restructuring of American law in the image of 1980s Republican Party platforms is these justices’ spontaneous, unsupported declarations of fact upon which they claim to base the rulings.  These are statements of fact for which there is no support in the case record. Facts such as what motivates elected public officeholders, and also facts about people’s opinions, perceptions, conclusions concerning matters such as the effect of huge campaign contributions on the politician-beneficiaries, that are, most people recognize, contrary to actual fact.  Most people who are not a Movement Conservative Supreme Court justice and who are not named the Mad Hatter consider the idea of large campaign contributions in exchange for legislation that they offer the very essence of political corruption in a Democratic system.

And some of those people live in Virginia’s 7th Congressional District and voted in the Republican primary there last week, for Brat, entirely or largely because he campaigned against Cantor as Evidence Exhibit A belying Kennedy’s and Roberts’ weirdly loose pronouncements of fact in Citizens United and McCutcheon.  The lobbyists and big-money donors that Cantor met with for breakfast on the first Tuesday of each month and that he dined with at steakhouses were indeed his true constituents, and Roberts’ pretense that they or their corporations reside in the Richmond, VA area is not even just a syllogism like so much else Roberts claims; it’s patently, tangibly false.

Sure, the pronouncements of fact in Citizens United and McCutcheon were just window dressing, sort of a nod to the idea that they were not really overturning Supreme Court precedent, just refining it–a John Roberts routine that has become an eye-roller.  But actual people do see through it.  As long as the Tea Party was united in going along with this, all was fine.  But now something has happened: the Tea Party itself is split.  There is a growing contingent, apparently now reaching a politically significant number, that is anti-plutocracy.

I’ve thought ever since McCutcheon was released in early April that the Democratic congressional candidates should simply read two or three sentences from that opinion at their rally and include the sentences in some of their ads.  Brat himself didn’t do that, exactly, but statements made throughout his campaign directly countered the factual claims of the Supreme Court bare-majority.

Ultimately, because that part of his message can’t be reconciled with the standard Tea Party dogma or with the part of the pro-corporate Republican message that he parrots, his political message is incoherent.  And in some respects, as in the quotes from an academic paper of his that were the main subject of my post last Friday, they’re weird and flaky. I don’t know how statements like those I quoted from his academic paper manage to pass as academic research; they were overt statements of his political and religious beliefs, not the result of economic or political science research, but they were in a purported academic paper and not (apparently) repeated in his campaign. The fact is that you can’t reconcile Ayn Rand’s philosophy of little or no regulation of corporations and Wall Street, no social safety net, and extremely low taxes with Brat’s campaign promise to represent ordinary people as against the policy dictates of oligarchy and plutocracy.  And it is a fact; you can’t.

Nor can you reconcile it with the mindless states’-rights cliches, whether issued by Anthony Kennedy and John Roberts or by David Brat.  Apart from the aggressive three-decades-long states’-rights-to-violate-fundamental-constitutional-rights-of-individuals-as-long-as-those-rights-aren’t-part-of-Movement-Conservative-dogma dogma–which is now, finally, being rejected by fairly broadly by younger libertarians (read: too young to believe that it’s still the Reagan era) even of the right–the fact is that ALEC writes swaths of legislation for Republican state legislators.

In a June 12 Politico article, this one titled “Dave Brat and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism,” the writer, Geoffrey Kabaservice, points out that Laura Ingraham, “appearing on Brat’s behalf at a campaign event on June 3, even rejoiced that ‘Some people on the left are gonna work with us! I’d rather work with some people on the left today than work with some people in the GOP establishment who scorn us.’” The article’s subtitle is “Cantor’s loss isn’t about immigration or personality. There’s a bigger story.”

There certainly is.  And several similar articles make the same point, in detail. One, titled “Why Big Business Fears the Tea Party,” a June 15 Politico article by Michael Lund, says:

The primary election defeat of House majority leader Eric Cantor by the little-known Tea Party conservative David Brat has shocked business and financial elites as well as politicians and pundits. Conservative intellectuals such as Tim Carney have been arguing for a while that the right should adopt a new populism that targets “crony capitalism” and the collaboration of public and private elites at the expense of workers and small businesses. Brat is the first conservative candidate to have achieved a major electoral success by taking this line. He denounced Cantor for being too close to Wall Street and K Street, explained business support for immigration reform as a ploy for cheap labor and demonized the Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable.

In his views about the minimum wage, Social Security and Medicare, Brat is a fairly conventional libertarian, but he became the first candidate to oust a sitting House majority leader since the post was created in 1899 not by speaking the libertarian argot of Ayn Rand and Friedrich von Hayek but by deploying the populist language of Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson and William Jennings Bryan.

With that kind of talk, Brat and like-minded militants on the right are undermining the philosophy of market populism that has united the Main Street and Wall Street wings of the Republican party since the days of Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan. Market populism recycles the ideology of classic Jeffersonian populism—but expands the definition of the virtuous, self-reliant yeoman to include not only small business owners but also big business executives and capitalists.

“Sooner or later,” Lund continues, “the authentic Jeffersonians in the market populist coalition were bound to notice that the actual agenda of conservative politicians has less to do with the needs of small business owners and small farmers than with the desires of big companies and the financial industry.”  They’ve now noticed, he says, and want to swap business-friendly market populism for real populism, terrifying the business community.  And also terrifying Lund, who points out that conservative populists have the wrong answers, and that Jeffersonian populism is irrelevant in America and has been for a very long time.

Yes, for a very, very long time.  The theme that ties together the contradictory parts of Brat’s brand of populism is its inherent fallacy: the claim that what matters is not the goal or effect of the particular policy but instead whether it is the federal government that is promulgating the policy. Most people outside the rightwing bubble recognize this as ridiculous, at least when you are specific about the policy. Including so-called working-class whites under the age of about 36 (i.e., milliennials, few of whom listen to rightwing talk radio and what the national Fox News shows); a new, comprehensive poll confirms this. And also confirms that, increasingly, older Rust Belt blue-collar whites, too, recognize this.

Additional post-Cantor-defeat articles illustrate the point. In one, called “A Cantor Effect for Businesses and the G.O.P.,” published in the New York Times on June 14, the writers, Jeremy W. Peters and Shaila Dewan put together a list of similarities between what is increasingly referred to as the Elizabeth Warren wing of the Democratic Party and rightwing economic and civil-liberties populism, and a list of where the two groups diverge (very substantially) on economic issues.  The left’s economic populism isn’t libertarian.  The goals of economic populism–however much they state as their goal bringing economic power back to ordinary people–can’t be achieved through the anti-federal-government mantras of the right.

Which is a fundamental reason why we are heading, at a fast pace, into a progressive political era that is, in most respects, the very antithesis of the legislative agenda thinly disguised as constitutional law pushed so obsessively by five of the nine Supreme Court justices, for whom it will always, always, be 1988.

Only the federal government can regulate the financial industry–not only hedge funds and banks but also credit card companies, the latter two groups which were gouging small businesses as well as consumers to their heart’s content before legislation was enacted during the first two years of the Obama presidency, by a Democratic Congress, circumscribing those practices.

Only the federal government can regulate the student loan industry.  Only the federal government can provide the states with funding to support state university systems sufficiently to render those institutions once again financially accessible to the non-upscale.

Only the federal government can provide healthcare coverage to the elderly, and a secure, if small, pension benefit.

Only the federal government can provide the vast sums for extensive long-term medical and other scientific research. Or did.

On point after point–those, and many others–it is the liberal position, not the Koch position or the Brat position, that has support from vast majorities of the public.  Most people want clean drinking and bathing water and clean air, the dramatic slowing of climate change, safe consumer and food and pharmaceutical products, national parks, public walking trails, endangered species saved, public schools that are competitive with those in other advanced economies.  Most people want safe highways and bridges and modern, efficient infrastructure.  Most people believe that the federal government should play a role in enabling efficient export trade.

Most people don’t want generic clichesgibbergish banalities, and non sequiturs by public officials and candidates–a point made by Matt Bai in another post-Brat-victory analysis and, pre-election, by astute local reporters covering that campaign. So many people are so very tired of that.  But that is necessity in a political system whose real constituents are–as John Roberts said–those who play outsized roles in funding political campaigns.  Out of the mouths of Movement Conservative justices claiming to speak for the Republic’s founders.

Brat, for his part, appears to be about to run a general-election campaign consisting mainly of slogans and non sequiturs.  No surprise, of course; slogans, cliches, non sequiturs are the very essence of the current Republican Party–both factions of the Tea Party/Republican Party.  The Paul Ryan/Koch brothers/Chamber of Commerce faction and also, because of the mutual exclusivity of its premises, the (newly named) David Brat faction. That’s simply the nature of this beast.

But the divorce case originally known as Movement Conservatives v. Movement Conservatives, filed June 10, 2014 in the Richmond, Virginia Court of Public Opinion, is a class action.  I just checked the docket for the case, and it’s now called Movement Conservatives, et al. v. Movement Conservatives.  And already, there have been several amicus briefs filed on behalf of the petitioners.  And the Supreme Court may not decide the outcome of it after all.

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The Supreme Court’s opinion in Bond v. U.S. will be about separation of powers. But about separation of WHICH powers?

Update appended. 5/17 at 1:37 p.m.

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I’ve written several times in the last three-plus years about a Supreme Court case called Bond v. U.S. Actually, to be precise, Bond v. U.S. is two Supreme Court cases, although it’s only one lower-court case. This is not unusual, but the case itself is; both the facts and the legal issues are downright weird.

The case first came to the Court in 2010 as a “federalism” (states’ rights!) case, albeit a highly unusual one: Unlike virtually every other criminal-law-related case ni which federalism is at issue, the criminal defendant in this case was prosecuted not in state court but in federal court.  She argued, successfully, to the Supreme Court, on “direct” rather than “collateral” review–a distinction that gives federal criminal defendants an actual shot at Supreme Court review in order to clarify, broaden or narrow criminal or constitutional law; state-court defendants have virtually no chance, and are (very) effectively precluded, by the Supreme Court’s extreme (absurd) interpretation of a federal “jurisdictional” statute, from any such opportunity in the lower federal courts–that she herself had “standing” under the doctrine of federalism to challenge the constitutionality of her federal prosecution. Notwithstanding that she is not a state. But she had been prosecuted under a ridiculously broad reading of a federal anti-terrorism statute, of what should have been a state prosecution.

You have “standing” to sue if there is a direct, actual or imminent injury to you that could be rectified by a favorable court ruling on the issue you want to raise.

Kennedy wrote the opinion, in which he wrote: See, I told you that federalism equals freedom! (Okay, I’m paraphrasing. But you figured that out by yourself.)  Federalism , Kennedy said, is the separation of powers between the federal and the state governments.  Which makes us freer.  Even when it means that state courts (in criminal and civil cases) and prosecutors are free to violate individuals’ constitutional rights. (Okay he didn’t say that latter in that opinion, but he and his colleagues say it regularly in other opinions.)

The Court send the case back to the lower federal appellate court for review of Bond’s substantive claim: Was her prosecution under a ridiculously broad reading of a federal anti-terrorism statute instead of as a run-of-the-mill assault under state criminal law unconstitutional under the doctrine of federalism?  And while her case was in the lower appellate court, she argued that the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act–the statute under which she was prosecuted, and which Congress had enacted under it’s “enumerated” constitutional power to enforce and interpret treaties– was unconstitutional because, well, the part of the treaty that Congress had enacted the statute to enforce, at least as interpreted by Congress in enacting that statute, was an unconstitutional power grab by the executive branch, which had negotiated the treaty.  At least as interpreted by Congress in enacting that statute.

Something like that. I am, I hope it suffices to say, not an expert on international law.  I’m, I just say, way more comfortable discussing the usual federalism (states rights!) controversies than even mentioning, say, treaty law. But I will note that the Constitution’s Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, enumerates that the President “shall have Power, by and with Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”

Bond lost in the lower court on both her grounds, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case again.  The case was argued last November, in the same group of argument “sittings” as Town of Greece v. Galloway.

I had assumed until last week, when Town of Greece was released, that Kennedy would write the opinion in Bond–another ode-to-federalism-because-it-means-freedom opinion–and that Roberts would write the opinion in Town of Greece. (They sort of balance things that way.)  But I was wrong about that. Kennedy wrote Town of Greece and Roberts is writing (or has written; the opinion might be issued on Monday) Bond.  And Vanderbilt law prof. Ingrid Wuerth, who is an expert on international law, writes that she expects it to be a blockbuster.

Wuerth says, if I understand her correctly, that she expects that the opinion will substantially rewrite (i.e., limit) the extent of the federal government’s treaty powers–under some theory of the “structure” of the federal government under the original Articles.

I think it will use a different part of the original Constitution, though, than the one that structures the federal government so that Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, and the habeas corpus provision in the Constitution’s Article I and much of the Fourteenth Amendment (as necessary), are largely nullities. This part of the Constitution, I expect, will have been written not by James Madison, or by Oliver Wendell Holmes (to whom credit will be given, nonetheless), but instead by the Koch brothers, who await this ruling.  The purpose of which will have nothing much to do with terrorism–except the environmental kind that Koch Industries, ExxonMobil, and coal-fired power plants perpetuate.

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UPDATE: Reader Mike Hansberry and I exchanged the following comments in the Comments thread to this post:

HANSBERRY:  Your comment puzzles me. If the Court rules that the federal government overreached in prosecuting Ms Bond, that will strengthen Reid v. Covert, which teaches that the Treaty clause does not empower the Pres. and Senate to override Const,. protections, rather than weaken it. In my opinion, the court ought to expand on Reid and say that the Treaty clause does not empower the Pres. and Senate to violate structural principles any more than it allows them to violate enumerated protections.

Moreover the Court could simply say that the treat power extends as far as Missouri v Holland, but no further. So there is no need whatever to for this ruling to have an impact on the law as it stands.

ME:  Your comment indicates that you understand perfectly the point of my post, Mike.  Reid v. Covert indeed teaches that the Treaty clause does not empower the president and Senate to override the Constitution’s protections guaranteed to individual American citizens, in that case, to a U.S. citizen living abroad and tried and convicted, by a military tribunal, of murdering her husband.

I do understand that a major part of the Conservative Legal Movement is to privilege states’ alleged rights over the rights of the federal government and the rights of individuals who aren’t rightwing culture warriors, and attribute this to, as I put it in a new post on this blog, “the Constitution–by its structure, its history, its … whatever.  Whatever, usually being some comment by one of its framers (almost always James Madison, the unwitting mascot of today’s far right), or a pre-Civil War Supreme Court opinion.”

You acknowledge that a ruling in Bond that expands Reid’s “teaching” that the Treaty clause does not empower the president and Senate to override the Constitution’s protections guaranteed to individual American citizens–a ruling that expands it to a “teaching” that the Treaty clause does not empower the president and Senate to override the Constitution’s alleged sovereignty guaranteed to individual states American citizens–would be a clear expansion of Reid’s teaching.  It would, in fact, be not just an expansion but an alteration of the purpose Reid’s teaching, which was to protect individuals, not states, from evisceration of the Constitution’s direct guarantees to individuals.

The question is not whether a treaty can supersede the Constitution’s structure, but instead the right’s claim that the Constitution’s structure is, in essence, the right’s legislative agenda.  That is, the question is: What actually is the Constitution’s structure. In this case–and, really, this case only–a ruling for Bond based on the right’s claims about the Constitution’s structure also would reflect the left’s idea of the Constitution’s structure, but in an entirely different respect.  Carol Bond should win, but because her own individual constitutional rights were violated by a bizarre application of a federal statute.  She should not have to piggyback on some rightwing claim that states, and especially state courts and state prosecutors, are sovereigns whenever they choose to be, including whenever they choose to violate a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights.

THAT would avoid a de facto reversal of what Holmes actually wrote in Missouri v. Holland, as I read that opinion.

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Greece, Greece, I Tell You!

It’s not every day that a law professor has his book quoted by the Supreme Court, and so the University of Baltimore‘s Michael I. Meyerson was understandably intrigued when his 2012 work about the Framers’ views on religion made it into Monday’s decision on public prayer.

But the plug from Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion, was somewhat bittersweet. Meyerson says the decision misread the point of his book and took the quote out of context in a way that allowed the justices to draw an entirely different conclusion about how the Founding Fathers approached religion in public.

— Professor says Supreme Court drew flawed conclusion from book: University of Baltimore expert says Framers deliberately avoided sectarian language, John Fritze, The Baltimore Sun, May 10

No, the title of this post doesn’t refer to the bond-vigilantes/austerity/confidence-fairy crowd, but instead to (yet again) the Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision issued last week in Town of Greece v. Galloway–and to what will be the rallying cry of the pro-Christian-prayer-at-government-meetings crowd, going forward.

Before I swear off posting on AB about that Supreme Court opinion, I want to make one more point, this one about the perniciousness of the Court’s conservative majority’s pretense that in order to understand the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights, or the Reconstruction-era amendments, or anything else about the Constitution, you presume that the framers intended to freeze things the way they were before the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the Reconstruction-era amendments, were drafted and ratified.

Which raises this question: Why engage in a laborious process of gathering a large number of people to draft a Constitution and shortly afterward draft and ratify amendments, or fight a Civil War and, after you win, draft and ratify amendments reflecting the outcome of the war, if your purpose is to solidify the pre-Constitution, pre-Bill of Rights, pre-Civil War, pre-Reconstruction-era status quo?

The answer is that you don’t, and you don’t pretend that others did.  Unless you’re a 1980s-era Conservative Legal Movement lawyer, judge or justice.*

But it also highlights what is becoming a hallmark of the Roberts Court’s conservative majority: misrepresentations of the very meaning of words, phrases, legal doctrines, and (now, apparently) academics’ writings.

I wrote here recently that we’re “witnessing here a concerted, unremitting restructuring of fundamental parts of American law under the guise of constitutional interpretation, employing medicine-man semantics gimmicks and other such tactics, including baldly false, disorienting declarations stating what others’ opinions are.”

The title of Meyereson’s book is Endowed by Our Creator: The Birth of Religious Freedom in America.  As I said here yesterday, town governments are people, my friend.

I do think the Supreme Court has crossed a threshold now.  This crowd observes no recognizable bounds of propriety in achieving the Conservative Movement’s policy goals via the Court’s transparent machinations of history, language, false analogy. Nothing–nothing–is sacred any longer. Except, of course, Christianity.

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[Next up, later this week: Why I believe that Ruth Bader Ginsburg will announce her retirement at the end the Supreme Court term in late June, pending confirmation of her replacement. And the UnElena Kagan who I expect will replace her–and why it would be a very good development, for once.]

 

*This paragraph and the one above were edited for clarity and inclusion of an inadvertently-missing clause after posting, 5/14 at 6:28 p.m.

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Ah, federalism. Which is in the eye of the beholders. The beholders being Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia, Samuel Alito, Anthony Kennedy, John Roberts … and the Koch brothers.

(Correction appended.)

(Clarence Thomas in his separate concurrence]* adds that in his view the First Amendment religion clauses don’t apply to the states in the first place. And it only probably bars the establishment of a national church—leaving open the question for another day.

Let Us Pray:The Supreme Court gives its blessing for prayer at town meetings. Get ready for a lot more Jesus in your life., Dahlia Lithwick, Slate, yesterday

That’s right; the First Amendment religion clauses don’t apply to the states in the first place. No Sir. No way. No how. It’s only the First Amendment’s speech clause that applies to states in the first place.

In the last two years, Thomas and Scalia have voted with their three compadres to strike down Montana and Arizona campaign-finance laws as violative of the First Amendment’s speech clause–in the Montana case in a summary reversal of a ruling by the Montana Supreme Court; that is, without briefing and argument.  The vaunted freedom conferred by federalism (a.k.a., states’ rights!) is somewhat temperamental.  But, whatever.

I strongly recommend the entire Lithwick article, which discusses several parts of the Kennedy plurality opinion, a concurring opinion by Alito, and the Thomas concurrence.  The statements these people make go well beyond the issue in that case, and are truly breathtaking.

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*CORRECTION: Originally this post said that Scalia joined Thomas’s concurrence in full. That was incorrect; he joined all of it except the part in which Thomas repeats his belief that the First Amendment’s two religion clauses are not properly viewed as applying limitations to states via the Fourteenth Amendment, through what’s known as “the incorporation doctrine.”  Thomas is the only justice, to my knowledge, to express or support such a view–ever.

As I understand Thomas’s claim, it’s that the Framers’ intent in drafting the religion clauses was to prevent the federal government from stopping the states from adopting a state-sponsored religion. It’s utter nonsense–absolutely fanciful–but it is part and parcel of a key premise of the Conservative Legal Movement’s “federalism” claim: that the very structure of the Constitution itself as set forth in the original Articles is that the Constitution makes states sovereigns and that a threshold purpose of the document is to protect state’s prerogatives from incursion by the federal government–and that this includes the right of state courts in criminal and civil cases, and the right of state prosecutors, to infringe at will upon the rights of individuals.

Kennedy, in fact, actually has written that the structure of the original Constitution trumps Amendments that alter the relationship between the states and the federal government.  Roberts,for his part, made clear last year in his opinion striking down a key section of the Voting Rights Act that he agrees wholeheartedly with this; his opinion in that case, Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, effectively holds that these folks’ concept of the structure of the original Articles trumps Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.  And it explains the bizarre juggernaut that I wrote about here.

We’re witnessing here a concerted, unremitting restructuring of fundamental parts of American law under the guise of constitutional interpretation, employing medicine-man semantics gimmicks and other such tactics, including baldly false, disorienting declarations stating what others’ opinions are.  The Articles of the Constitution are viewed as really the Articles of Confederation, except when that would limit rather than advance this crowd’s lawmaking or outright partisan agenda.** And they’re getting away with it–and will until the Democrats actually start making it an issue.  My suggestion: that the Dems run ads this election year actually quoting from the opinion in McCutcheon v. FEC and also note the striking down of Arizona’s and, especially, Montana’s campaign-finance laws.  Montana’s statute was enacted in the early part of the last century. – 4/7 at 11:04 a.m.

**I just updated this post again to add “and outright partisan” to that sentence and to link to Thomas Edsall’s terrific op-ed about this in today’s New York Times. This issue is finally getting some mainstream-media attention.  Hurray. – 4/7 at 12:57 p.m.

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Do take advantage of your brand new prayer opportunities. Along with your newly created job opportunities and all your new freedoms.

The most important turn in Monday’s Supreme Court ruling in Town of Greece v. Galloway—a case that probes the constitutionality of explicitly religious prayer in legislative sessions—isn’t that the courts no longer have a role in policing the Establishment Clause, or that pretty much any sectarian prayers can be offered at town meetings so long as they do not “threaten damnation, or preach conversion” to minority religions. No, I think the interesting change in the court’s posture today is that sectarian prayer in advance of legislative sessions is no longer characterized merely as “prayer.” In the hands of Justice Anthony Kennedy, who writes for five justices, these benedictions are now free and unfettered “prayer opportunities.” And “prayer opportunities” are, like “job creators” and “freedoms,” what make America great.

Let Us Pray:The Supreme Court gives its blessing for prayer at town meetings. Get ready for a lot more Jesus in your life., Dahlia Lithwick, Slate, yesterday

My Polish-Jewish-immigrant grandmother, who’s been spinning in her American-cemetery grave since yesterday morning (trust me on that), might calm down once she realizes the benefits of this new all-in-one-case body of law.  Which are that town residents who’d rather not take advantage of their prayer opportunity but who do want to attend a town-government meeting can plug their iPhone earphones into their ears and enjoy some music until the policymaking stuff begins. And not have to worry about appearing rude.

Hopefully, someone will give some visual signal that the prayer opportunity is over and that everyone who didn’t grab the opportunity when it was available will have to wait until Sunday church service for another one. Although there probably isn’t a prayer that that will happen. And if all hell breaks loose before Sunday, like during the policymaking debate, that missed prayer opportunity will be regretted. My grandmother would have appreciated being forewarned.

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The Supreme Court’s Runaway AEDPA Train–And What Can Be Done About It Via Collateral Judicial Review. (Yes, this is technical language, but bear with me. I explain it.)

UPDATE: Elena Kagan served as an Associate White House Council in the Clinton administration in 1995-96, when AEDPA was being drafted and negotiated.

 

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“Freedom” does not include actual physical non-imprisonment; to the contrary, “freedom” means states’–or actually, state courts’–and prosecutors’ freedom to violate criminal defendants’ constitutional rights, to their heart’s content.

— Me, Angry Bear, Apr. 5

For about 24 hours this week, specifically between Tuesday morning and Wednesday morning, I thought that might be about to change.  The issue in Tuesday’s big affirmative action case, Scheutte v. BAMN, was not actually affirmative action.* It was instead whether a state voter initiative that amends the Constitution and that singles out minority races erects unconstitutionally high barriers to racial minorities’ practical ability to obtain a change in that policy, because it removes the possibility of gaining a change through the normal political and governmental processes.

Kennedy wrote the plurality opinion for himself, Roberts and Alito. Roberts also wrote a separate concurring opinion.  Breyer joined only in the outcome, writing a separate opinion only for himself. Scalia, joined by Thomas, wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Sotomayor, joined by Ginsburg, wrote a dissenting opinion.  Kagan did not participate.

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Turns out Alito isn’t the only justice who conflates the Securities Exchange Act with state-law corporate-structure statutes. Roberts does, too! (Unless, that is, racial-minority-owned corporations are denied access to restaurants and hotels when traveling. Or something.)

Roberts suggested that he believes Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood can bring forth claims of religious freedom, saying courts have held that “corporations can bring racial discrimination claims as corporations” and that “those cases involve construction of the term ‘person.'”

John Roberts Offers Conservatives A Way Out Of Birth Control Dilemma, Sahil Kapur, TPM, yesterday

Late Tuesday afternoon, after I’d read two or three early reports on the argument at the Supreme Court that morning in the Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood cases, I posted a piece here titled:

“My early take on the ACA-contraception-mandate-case argument: Alito conflates the Securities Exchange Act with state-law corporate-structure statutes (yikes); Kennedy really, really wants to give corporations the full complement of human constitutional rights; and Scalia really, really needs to limit this ruling to an interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.”

That post harked back to one I’d posted the day before about what to look for in the upcoming argument.  What to look for, I said? Mainly whether “the court will back away somewhat from its Citizens United claim that corporate CEOs can, in the name of the corporation, access the constitutional rights of citizen-association members.”  I predicted that it would–that the Court “will find some way to segregate speech rights from other constitutional rights, and will rule against the plaintiffs in these two cases.” I wrote:

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My early take on the ACA-contraception-mandate-case argument: Alito conflates the Securities Exchange Act with state-law corporate-structure statutes (yikes); Kennedy really, really wants to give corporations the full complement of human constitutional rights; and Scalia really, really needs to limit this ruling to an interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

When [U.S. Solicitor General Donald] Verrilli said the Court has never found a right to exercise religion for corporations, Alito wondered if there was something wrong with the corporate form that it would not be accorded religion freedom rights.  Did Verrilli agree, Alito said, with a lower court’s view that the only reason for a corporation to exist was to “maximize profits?”  Verrilli said no, but Alito had made his point.

Argument recap: One hearing, two dramas, Lyle Denniston , SCOTUSblog, reporting on this morning’s Supreme court argument in Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Specialties v. Sebelius

That paragraph was one of two in Denniston’s recap that dismayed me, albeit only momentarily. Unquestionably, a threshold issue in these cases is whether or not the proverbial corporate veil–a shorthand legal term that conveys that the very purpose of the state-created corporate structure is a severance of the rights and liabilities of corporations from those of its shareholders–can be “pierced” in order to allow the shareholders in these two closely-held corporations to confer to the corporation their personal legal right of religious exercise under the First Amendment or under a federal statute called the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the latter which expressly uses the term “person” to identify its beneficiaries.  I addressed this in detail in this post here yesterday.

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The Supreme Court and Politics–Especially the current conservative majority’s appropriation of the First Amendment in the service of Republican Party electoral victories

Dan Crawford emailed me this morning with a link to Linda Greenhouse’s op-ed in today’s New York Times, titled “Law and Politics,” and asked me to post about it.  A more apt title for the op-ed, which a headline writer rather than Greenhouse (whose bailiwick is the Supreme Court) titled, would be “The Supreme Court and Politics,” as that is its sole subject.

The piece discusses work by eminent political scientist Robert A. Dahl, who died earlier this month at the age of 98, establishing a particular  theory about the Supreme Court: that, although there is some inevitable lag time, the Supreme Court normally fairly quickly recalibrates to follow sea changes in public opinion.

Here’s how I responded to Dan’s email:

Hi, Dan.  I’m a big fan of Linda Greenhouse, but I disagree with some of what she wrote. I think Dahl’s 1957 article is more out-of-date than she says.  I agree more with Jack Balkin, whom she mentions, and who writes a popular law blog called Balkinization.  I think that the current Court majority will remain deeply steeped in the specifics of the Reagan-era conservative legal movement, which involves some really weird doctrines that they claim as constitutional ones, some of which the public is clueless about and that therefore these justices pay no price in public opinion for.  I’ve alluded to this on AB from time to time, but have wanted for a while to write in more depth about it.

There’s one really big “sleeper” case, especially, that was argued at the Court recently and that I mentioned, but that I want to write in more depth about.  I do think that if the majority rules the way they clearly want to in that case, there will be more publicity about it than they expect, and more backlash.  Not as much as with Citizens United or even as much as with the Voting Rights Act case last year, but they expect almost none and I think they’ll be surprised that they’re wrong about that.

But the bottom line is that I don’t think this crowd cares that much about public opinion.  They’d prefer, of course, that no one notice what they’re doing, but I doubt that fear of public backlash will stop what amounts to a Reagan-era legislative agenda that these people clearly are hell-bent on forcing into law, much of it inoculated against reversal by Congress (a la the Ledbetter case, which Greenhouse mentions) by claiming some constitutional ground for the ruling. Ledbetter and many of their other pro-business and pro-state-and-local-government procedural/jurisdictional-rules Supreme Court opinions–interpretations-cum-rewritings of procedural or substantive statutes, some overtly fabricated by the Court in pretty clear violation of the Constitution’s Articles I and II (separation of powers)–can eventually be reversed by a Congress not in thrall to the Koch brothers. (Congress reversed Ledbetter before Citizens United.)  But when the Court couches its rulings as constitutional dictate, Congress can’t reverse them.

But there are some aspects that are peculiar to this particular majority, and that has received very little attention.  Always in the past (at least to my knowledge), the Court limited itself in major, sweeping rulings to issues raised by the parties.  This was true, certainly, in the New Deal rulings first striking down New Deal legislation and then reversing itself and upholding most of the legislation.  It also was true in every aspect of the Warren Court era–racial issues, First Amendment issues, criminal defendants’ rights, etc.–and then in the Burger Court era (e.g., Roe v. Wade).  And those cases always were brought not by some manufactured-issue ideologues, as occurs regularly now, but instead by normal-circumstance “cases and controversies,” as the constitutional phrase goes.

What is happening now is an orchestrated dance between rightwing conservative-movement lawyers and groups, and the Reagan, Bush I and Bush II justices, in which some really bizarre constitutional and statutory-interpretation arguments are made, and then adopted by the Court, dramatically but very often quietly rewriting parts of the Constitution (e.g., the Supremacy Clause, flipping it upside-down when applied to state judicial branches but flipping it back to serve conservative-movement dogma in other contexts) and procedural and substantive statutes. In fact, a hallmark of this crowd is the casual flipping back-and-forth as convenient–a hallmark especially of Scalia and Alito.

Beverly

The “sleeper” case I referenced is Harris v. Quinn, which was argued to the Court on Jan. 21.  At first blush a labor-law matter under the National Labor Relations Act (a.k.a., “Taft-Hartley”), but apparently a majority of the Court plans to turn it into a First Amendment case. At oral argument, Samuel Alito claimed that public-employee unions, by their very existence, violate the First Amendment speech and assembly rights of workers who don’t belong to the union, and Anthony Kennedy suggested that the longtime labor-law rule known as a “fair share” provision in public-employee union contracts, allowed by Taft-Hartley and previous Supreme Court opinions, violates the First Amendment’s “petition” clause (right to petition the government for a redress of grievances).  Something about some anti-union public employees who are concerned about “the size of government” and who therefore want to be fired or have their wages and pensions reduced.

Seriously.

An op-ed in the Washington Post by labor and employment lawyer Moshe Marvit, published the day before the argument in the case, summarizes the background:

On Tuesday the Supreme Court will hear arguments in Harris v. Quinn, a case that has been referred to as a “sleeper” by both conservatives and liberals and may turn out to be the most significant labor law case in decades. It was brought by the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation (NRTW), whose mission is to use “strategic litigation” to “eliminate coercive union power and compulsory unionism abuses,”in this case on behalf of several personal assistants who provide in-home services to persons with disabilities under Illinois’s Medicaid program.

NRTW argues that these home-care workers are not public employees and therefore should not have the right to exclusive representation by a union, nor should they have to pay either membership dues or a “fair share” fee for the union they have chosen to represent them. (“Exclusive representation” means that all workers are covered by a union so long as the majority have voted for it. A “fair share” provision requires workers who are not union members to pay a proportionate share of the costs incurred by the union to support the workforce in the collective bargaining process. Unions are not allowed to use “fair share” fees on any political activities.)

But that was then.  Then, being before the oral argument.  Now, it’s a First Amendment case concerning forced speech about the role of government, and the right of public employees to petition their government employer for a redress of the grievance of big government.  Public employees who are concerned about the size of government should be entitled to resign, or forego a pay or pension increase and demand a larger employee contribution for healthcare insurance.

Or at least they should be allowed to accept those benefits without contributing to the union’s expenses to obtain them for the workers.

This is as opposed to, say, shareholders–some of them via their pension funds, some of them through mutual funds, and almost all of them entirely unwittingly–who care every bit as much about the size of government as do those anti-union public employees.  And who the Supreme Court has said must be forced to support the political views of the CEOs who use corporate funds to secretly contribute to Republican PACs.  Especially views about the size of government.  Each corporation is a person–specifically, the person who is its CEO.  At least if the CEO is a Republican.

States, too, it now turns out, also are people, entitled to Fourteenth Amendment equal protection of the law, a constitutional provision heretofore accorded to individuals as against a state’s denial of equal protection of the law.  Who knew?  Well, whatever.

No, Harris was not about the First Amendment until the Republican justices decided (apparently) that it will be.  As the articles about this case that I’ve linked to above show, this is in contrast to a case called Garcetti v. Ceballos in early 2006.  Wikipedia explains:

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States involving the First Amendment free speech protections for government employees. The plaintiff in the case was a district attorney who claimed that he had been passed up for a promotion for criticizing the legitimacy of a warrant. The Court ruled, in a 5-4 decision, that because his statements were made pursuant to his position as a public employee, rather than as a private citizen, his speech had no First Amendment protection.

The case was by no means incidentally Samuel Alito’s, um, very first case as a Supreme Court justice.  He insisted.  Again, Wikipedia explains:

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, ruling in a 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy that the First Amendment does not prevent employees from being disciplined for expressions they make pursuant to their professional duties. The case had been reargued following the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, as the decision was tied without her; her successor, Justice Samuel Alito, then broke the tie.

The four dissenting justices, in three dissents written by Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and Stephen Breyer, took issue with the majority’s firm line against the First Amendment ever applying to speech made within the scope of public employment, arguing instead that the government’s stronger interest in this context could be accommodated by the ordinary balancing test.

Actually, what happened is that the original 5-4 opinion was issued just before the Senate voted to confirm Alito as O’connor’s replace.  Technically, the opinion had not yet become final when Altio was sworn in, because the short time allotted the losing party to file a petition for reconsideration had not expired.  The Court had not granted a petition for reconsideration in the preceding four decades or so.  But Alito supplied the fifth vote to rehear the case in order to reverse the result.

Kennedy wrote the opinion for the new majority.  Wikipedia summarizes it:

The Court wrote that its “precedents do not support the existence of a constitutional cause of action behind every statement a public employee makes in the course of doing his or her job.” Instead, public employees are not speaking as citizens when they are speaking to fulfill a responsibility of their job.

Unless, of course, the job responsibility at issue is compliance with a labor agreement negotiated between a union and the employer.  Or if the statement at issue concerns something as unimportant as the legitimacy of a warrant rather than the all-important matter of the size of government.

Also in today’s New York Times, along with Greenhouse’s op-ed, is an article by Adam Liptak, the Times’ current Supreme Court correspondent, about a case to be argued at the Court on Monday that, as Liptak notes albeit obliquely, promises to illustrate one of the hallmarks of this Court.  A Court majority that itself routinely, casually rewrites procedural and substantive statutes and allows the lower federal courts to do the same, for decades, until ExxonMobil or Sprint petitions the Supreme Court about it, takes umbrage when it is the executive branch rather than the judicial branch that encroaches upon the Congress’s constitutional prerogatives. But only when the executive branch is headed by a Democrat.

A Court that has so brazenly and aggressively precluded access to federal court, and most certainly to itself, as a mechanism to petition the government for a redress of grievances–effectuating a key goal of the conservative movement from which these five justices all hail–is about to concern itself with the right of public employees to petition for small government by refusing to pay for their union representation.

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