My discovery that half the annual increase in the not seasonally adjusted core CPI occcurs in the first quarter and that simply doubling the first quarter increase gives you an amazingly accurate estimate of the December to December reading work again in 2018.
In 2019 it is saying the annual increase in the core CPI will be about 2% — the same as the widely accepted consensus.
In a low inflation world firms tend to raise prices once a year, typically in the first quarter of the calendar year or their fiscal year. Because of this very strong seasonal pattern, on a not seasonally adjusted around 50% of the annual increase in the core CPI — excluding food and energy — occurs in the first quarter
This very strong pattern gives great insight in to the annual inflation rate. One, is if this year’s first quarter is greater than or less that the prior year’s first quarter, this year’s annual increase will be greater of less than the prior year’s annual increase. This has worked every since year since 1990. Second, just doubling the NSA first quarter rate gives you an amazingly accurate estimate of the annual increase in the core CPI for that year. In 2018 the first quarter rose 1.20% and the annual increase was 2.16%. This year the first quarter rose 1.06%. This implies that the rise in the core CPI should be slightly less in 2019 than it as in 2018.
Based on my wage equation, last January I warned to expect a sharp acceleration in wage growth in 2018. Now that wage growth has risen from 2.4% in 2017 to 3.4% in 2018, the same economic variables imply that wage growth may be flattening out. If wage growth remains near current levels it will be one less factor pressurizing the Fed to tighten.
One of the key variables driving wages higher a year ago was inflation expectations. Because there are no good long run measures of inflation expectations I use the three year trailing growth in the CPI as a proxy for inflation expectations. A year ago that measure was starting to accelerate, but now it appears to be flattening out and should be an important factor limiting wage gains.
The first sign of slower wage growth was the 3 month growth rate of average hourly earnings slipping below the year over year change in this months employment report.
Along with fourth quarter GDP, corporate profits for the the fourth quarter was also reported. Profits growth was either quite strong or very weak depending on how you looked at them. On a year over year basis, after tax profits growth was 11% and appeared to be accelerating. However, on a quarter to quarter basis after tax profits actually fell -6.73% (SAAR) in the fourth quarter and that is after a third quarter annual growth rate of only 3.7%(SAAR). By comparison after tax profits growth surged 38.4 % (SAAR) and 14.0 % (SAAR) in the first and second quarters, respectively. Much of this early 2018 growth was due to the tax cut. But now that the tax cut is behind us, it looks like the Administrations promised strong growth remains just that, a Republican forecast and we all know how seriously to take them.
After this it looks like a good time to look at the impact of the corporate tax cut on the effective corporate tax cut — taxes as a share of pre-tax profits.
The effective tax rate fell from around 20% to just over 10%. That sounds like a big drop, but compared to the historic trend where the effective tax rate has fallen from almost 50% in 1950 to just over 10% now it does not look like such a massive tax cut after all. Moreover, as the data shows the big impact appears to be behind us and is unlikely to provide much of a boost to growth in 2019.
It also raises serious questions about the Republican promises to eliminate loopholes and other special arrangements so that the revenue loses from lower corporate taxes would not be significant. I have not seen them make much of an effort along those line. But maybe I am missing something and commenters can point out such legislation.
Trump is blaming the Fed for the recent poor stock market performance. For once, he may be right.
The recent market plunge took the stock market PE from the top of my fair value band through the bottom. The last observation is the 14 December close. The fitted PE has is a function of both short and long term yields. This approach implies that the market is now cheap, but that does not necessarily mean that it is a buy.
Maybe you would prefer a leading indicator approach. In this case real MZM growth ( zero maturity money= M1 +money market accounts). It is obvious that MZM growth is still weakening and signalling that the market PE should contito fall. It is just the simple theory that stock market liquidity and movement are driven largely by monetary policy and right now monetary policy is tight enough to drive the market below the fair value band. Moreover, since MZM growth is still weakening it implies that the market downdraft is not over.
If Trump applies a 25% tariff on a $1.00 item the price will go to somewhere from $1.00 to $1.25. At $1.00 domestic producers have have been building all they can to sell at $1.00. In the short run they can not build more capacity so the domestic producer can raise their price to $1.25, or something under $1.25 if the foreign supplier can absorb part of the tariff. In the longer run domestic producers can produce more of the item but their costs will now be over $1.00. If they could have supplied it at under $1.00 they already would have been. Before they invest the capital to generate more capacity they will need some assurance that the tariff will not be removed and the import price will not go back to $1.00 making their new capacity unprofitable. Does anyone, including Trump, have any idea how this end game will play out? Or, will we just see a 25% increase in the price and no change in the domestic and foreigner market share. In other words, why wouldn’t a new tariff just lead to higher prices and lower demand with no other changes?
When the second quarter real GDP report was published I saw that trade made a major contribution to growth — exports contributed 1.12 percentage points of the 4.1% real GDP growth. But that seemed like some sort of fluke produced by unusual conditions rather that what trend growth would generate. Moreover, the BEA estimate was based on only two months actual data and the other month was a BEA “guesstimates”. So new data was quite likely to generate large changes in reported real GDP. June data was released this morning at the same time as the unemployment report, so it did not get much attention. Real exports increased and real imports imports declined. Both moved back toward their intermediate growth trend.
The trade balance is the difference between two very large numbers so that small changes in either series can generate very large changes in the trade balance. The June real trade deficit was $ 7.9 ( B 2012 $ ) as compared to $7.7 ( B 2012$) in April and $7.5 ( B 2012 $) in May. The June trade balance is about where is was at the end of the first quarter. So when the 2nd quarter real GDP is revised the major contribution from trade is likely to be revised down significantly.
Along with the second quarter GDP report the BEA also published the results of its regular revision of the last five years of data. The most significant revision was to the measure of price changes in the high tech arena. This showed that business investment had been somewhat stronger than previously reported, but it only had a very minor impact on real GDP growth.
The chart shows the year-over-year growth in real GDP over the 2012 to 2017 period with the revised data. I doubt if you will see this data published by the Republicans.