Tom Schelling Is Rolling Over In His Grave
Tom Schelling Is Rolling Over In His Grave, Econospeak
By Barkley Rosser
Thomas Schelling got his Nobel Prize in economics for saving the world from global thermonuclear war in the 20th century, when many thought it was inevitable. Rival nuclear game theorist, John von Neumann, said to bomb the Soviets as soon as possible, like, tomorrow, preferably before noon
Schelling won the debate in real time, being an advisor on “Dr. Strangelove…” bringing about as a result of that the installation of the “red phone,” for immediate and direct communications on such matters between the then USSR and the US. I suspect that phone still exists in some form, bur I do not know
What Tom got his visit to Stockholm for, which I told him in person he would get before he got it, (yeah, really), was his formulation of how to find a socially beneficial game theoretic solution when many of those exist. He proposed finding a socially agreeable solution that all accept that is also socially good. This proposal he put forward and became accepted was no first use of nuclear weapons, period, even though, of course, the US violated that at the end of WW II. But while it did not become formally or officially accepted, this doctrine became accepted in practice, and we had no nuclear wars, and Tom was the most important person behind this, both intellectually, and in terms of policy in the 1960s.
So unfortunately before he died in 2016, he lived long enough to see the beginning of the unwinding of his rule. When Putin conquered and annexed Crimea in 2014, and much of the West put some pretty minor economic sanctions on him for this, one of his media flunkies (apologize I am not going back to dig up this immoral asshole’s post or who is, let him die unknown), declared: “We can turn New York into ashes,” or words to that effect. The moment I saw that media post, not shut down by Putin, I knew that Tom Schelling’s hidden and implicit rule that had prevented the world from being destroyed in a global thermonuclear war, was over.
Needless to say, as he has become more desperate as his poorly functioning military is being defeated by the military of the nation he invaded without a shred of justification, Putin is making himself not only a world historical war criminal, but a total hypocrite. He actually reminded the world that Ukraine gave up what was then the world’s fourth largest stash of nuclear weapons in 1992 He ludicrously complains that somehow now they regret that. No, he claims they are actively trying to get them back, which is another excuse for his invasion.
But, of course, in 1992, when Ukraine gave up its large stash of nuclear weapons, Russia along with US and UK signed the Budapest Memorandum/Accord that involved recognizing both the independence and the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Obviously Putin violated this in 2014, with both the US and UK failing to respond. That he now reminds of his violation of this agreement at this point is, well…
Barkley Rosser
Yep, MAD (mutually assured destruction) was not nearly so mad as the former first strike posture in the event that Russia invaded anyone that was our ally. However, maintaining the nuclear stalemate has been a long complex web of ideas from big thinkers and big stinkers.
The False Allure of Escalation Dominance
Michael Fitzsimmons
November 16, 2017
“Anyone who thinks they can control escalation through the use of nuclear weapons is literally playing with fire. Escalation is escalation, and nuclear use would be the ultimate escalation.”
So warned then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work in his 2015 congressional testimony. Coming at a time of seemingly more prevalent nuclear saber-rattling, Work’s statement may appear to indicate a laudably cautious policy and a useful reminder to America’s rivals about the need for restraint in a crisis.
Yet the notion that nuclear escalation is a binary and prohibitively risky strategic choice belies decades of theorizing and planning for the possibility of limited nuclear war. Indeed, the prospect of limited nuclear escalation was central to NATO’s deterrence policy for much of the Cold War. Beginning in the 1960s, as Soviet nuclear forces approached parity with U.S. capabilities, policymakers increasingly sought to moderate the risks of mutually assured destruction with what came to be known as “limited nuclear options”: weapons and warfighting strategies that might include initiating nuclear use, but were designed to terminate conflict short of Armageddon.
One of the earliest and most influential concepts associated with these efforts was Herman Kahn’s “escalation ladder,” which defined 44 “rungs” on a metaphorical ladder of escalating conflict. The rungs ranged from “sub-crisis maneuvering” to civilization-destroying nuclear exchanges. In between were two dozen distinct levels of escalation beyond the threshold of nuclear use, including such “limited” attacks as non-lethal demonstrative detonations, tactical strikes on military forces, and small-scale attacks on civilians.
In this context, Kahn also introduced the term “escalation dominance,” which became shorthand for one school of thought in deterrence and nuclear strategy. The idea posits the ability of a state to maintain such a markedly superior position over a rival, across a range of escalation rungs, that its rival will always see further escalation as a losing bet. Such dominance, the thinking goes, serves as the most effective possible deterrent to conflict, as well as the most reliable means for managing escalation if deterrence fails. As Colin Gray and Keith Payne put it in their famous “Victory is Possible” article in 1980, “an adequate U.S. deterrent posture is one that denies the Soviet Union any plausible hope of success at any level of strategic conflict.” Beyond U.S.-Soviet competition, analysts have continued to apply the concept to such contemporary strategic challenges as the India-Pakistan rivalry, a potential Taiwan Strait crisis, and even Middle Eastern terrorism.
Is escalation dominance still relevant to U.S. strategy today? A debate on this question may soon be revived. In the next few months, the Trump administration will publish the results of its Nuclear Posture Review, the first comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear strategy and capabilities since 2010. Among the topics most worth watching is whether and how the review addresses U.S. strategy for managing escalation. Perhaps even more than the Obama administration’s team in 2010, the current Nuclear Posture Review authors must confront a growing risk of escalation from limited regional conflicts to nuclear war. Tensions with North Korea may pose the most obvious of such risks at the moment, but unfortunately, the problem is broader and more deeply rooted. Two related factors account for this growing risk.
First, the erosion of U.S. conventional superiority — especially with the growing sophistication of “anti-access / area denial” capabilities — means adversaries may be increasingly tempted to engage in quick, limited, territorial aggression — a fait accompli — against a U.S. ally. For China, this could be over contested islands in the South or East China Seas or over Taiwan. For Russia, it could be anywhere in its “near abroad,” even against the Baltic NATO allies. On the Korean Peninsula, U.S. conventional superiority remains intact, but major gains in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities could serve as a shield for a number of different limited provocations against South Korea.
However, even where U.S. power projection advantages over regional challengers may be strained, they are still sufficiently robust to potentially foil or reverse an attack. So the result of this evolution in conventional military balances is a set of increasingly plausible scenarios in which a nuclear-armed power launches a limited attack on its neighbor, only to find itself on the verge of conventional defeat at the hands of the United States.
The second risk driver is the presence, in precisely these limited-war scenarios, of asymmetric interests between the United States and its potential adversaries…
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{ way too much more at above link }
Oversimplifying considerably, MAD represents a war stratagem so terrible that it has kept the peace (sort of) over about 75 years. Sort of, in that we have still had all sorts of wars involving various blocs (USA & Nato and/or USSR/Russia, or China (PRC)) without them going nuclear. This seems to a ‘It Could Have Been Worse’ kind of deal that avoided Doomsday.
The situation in Ukraine is certainly testing that idea, in that Russia holds that Ukraine is inextricably linked to Russia, so whatever happens there is somehow strictly an internal matter. This notion is not acceptable to Europe (Nato) as a whole, and if it’s not acceptable to Nato, then the US (and of course Canada) are drawn in also.
However, if Russia does NOT attack a Nato member, then the US does not NEED to get further involved. Otherwise, it’s all over/just begun.
It is probably premature to reach the conclusion that Russia is being defeated militarily by Ukraine. As time passes after the Kharkiv advance, not so sure that it had a lot of positive meaning for Ukraine. It is a little puzzling that what was billed as a rout on that front was not swiftly followed by offensive activity further south. They have no obligation at all to do so, but if they actually broke Russia’s forces decisively it would be pretty common to stay engaged and keep going rather than allow them to regroup and learn lessons. Putin’s call-up could be Russia feeling a lot of stress or it could be that NATO has looked at Ukrainian material consumption and casualties in this advance and is thinking Ukraine’s goals can’t really happen without much more direct involvement by NATO and Putin wants Russia to stay ahead of that possibility. Either is possible and probably there are many other factors also.
Obviously, Ukraine is receiving much logistical support with high tech weaponry from ‘the West’ that so far Russia has been unable to halt. Are they going to try harder to stop that flow of weaponry?
I read that Germany is not going to supply Ukraine with main-battle tanks, so that is something.
If western weaponry and logistical support stops flowing, then the ‘special military operation’ will ultimately end in a Russian victory, presumably.
Otherwise, Doomsday is still a possibility, if Putin will initiate it.
Analysis of the populations of various countries involved in WW1 suggested that victory would be achieved by the countries (or alliances) with the largest populations. This was true in the sense that eventually the US get involved.
A similar analysis of the Ukraine situation would note that Russia has a much larger population than Ukraine, but Ukraine plus Europe/Nato has an even larger population than Russia. So, go figure.
Thomas Shelling, yet another economist (Nobel-prize winning even) who I never heard before…
Thomas Schelling on Nuclear Deterrence
Mark Thomas – Economist’s View – Feb 17, 2007
Two Nobel prize winning economists, Michael Spence and Thomas Schelling, discuss strategies to prevent the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons …
Oversimplifying considerably, MAD represents a war stratagem so terrible that it has kept the peace (sort of) over about 75 years. Sort of, in that we have still had all sorts of wars involving various blocs (USA & Nato and/or USSR/Russia, or China (PRC)) without them going nuclear. This seems to a ‘It Could Have Been Worse’ kind of deal that avoided Doomsday.
The situation in Ukraine is certainly testing that idea, in that Russia holds that Ukraine is inextricably linked to Russia, so whatever happens there is somehow strictly an internal matter. This notion is not acceptable to Europe (Nato) as a whole, and if it’s not acceptable to Nato, then the US (and of course Canada) are drawn in also.