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Should the Beveridge curve scare the Dickens out of us ?

Robert Waldmann

Brad DeLong and Paul Krugman consider the increase in the number of job vacancies to be bad news — to be a sign that long term unemployment has made it hard to increase employment even if there are vacant jobs. The high vacancies are held to be a sign of a problem which is more persistent and less absurdly easy to deal with than low aggregate demand.

I comment after the jump

One might imagine that high unemployment and high vacancy rates are, as you directly state, a bad sign as high unemployment combined with high vacancies lasts longer — that the combination is a sign of hysteresis from a) deteriorated jobs skills, or b)deteriorated work habits, or c) irrational stigma due to employers assuming a or be or d) missmatch.

I recall such a graph. It was the terrifying UK Beveridge curve from 1988-9 (look it up). The word (from among others Layard) was that unemployment had become almost impossible to fight as the long term unemployed were discouraged. Then employment took off.

The Beveridge curve is the lower envelope of a slightly more complicated dynamic with counterclockwise cycles above the curve. That’s a fancy way to say it takes a while after a labor demand trough to get the unemployed into the vacant jobs. You see a smaller shift in the matching function (hires as function of vacancies and unemployed). In the UK very late 80s you saw a shift in the matching function too.

That was just before the UK ceased to be an example of the European unemployment problem and became an example of well functioning labor markets in English speaking countries.

My reading is that when the market crashed in 87, Thatcher panicked and allowed the (not independent) bank of England to stimulate. So the economy took off. It took a while to into work down the huge stock of unemployed, but there was no sign of a bad tradeoff. Just further proof that her insane policies (until she miss-interpreted the crash of 87 as the crash of 29) were the problem.

Krugman shares your view and he does tend to be right, but still, I’m tempted to make a prediction.

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When S != I

As Brad DeLong has noted, Tim Geithner believes it is time for “the economy has now recovered sufficiently for government to begin to make way for private business investment.”  In short, he expects “the private sector” to do the heavy lifting in these joyous times of economic recovery.

Cynics among us—why, yes, that might well include me—would note that the private sector has had to do much of the heavy lifting for the past several quarters, in the face of what is varyingly described as “a precipitous decline in Aggregate Demand” or “a rise in unemployment.” (You say overextended credit, I say bankrupt.)  And that its performance has been, not to put too fine a point on it, exemplary in the face of the constraints presented.

Yes, I’m praising the efforts of the private sector.  Not just because small businesses especially are trying to sustain current levels of production and services in the face of tightened credit and the aforementioned AD decline, but also because they, as LBJ once observed in another context, have been put into the position of trying to run a race when the shackles are just being removed from their ankles.

I blame the banks.

Now you know it’s me.  The problem is, the evidence is on my side.  Recall that the alleged reason we needed to “save” the banks is that they are Financial Intermediaries, taking a slice out of the matching between Investors (Savers, in most economics models) and Capitalists, who borrow to recombine Capital (K) and Labor (L) into a new product that presents a better return than the old one.

Call it “creative destruction.” Call it “capitalism.” Call it “economic growth.”

Let us ignore—though it Abides, like Earth or a steaming pile of elephant dung—that the “intermediaries” were making somewhere between 30 and 40% of the total profits in the U.S. for the past decade. We can (1) pretend that those were all payday lenders, (2) be a “first-best economist” and claim that is the way things should be, or (3) realize it’s a problem and leave addressing it for another time.*

But let us not ignore that capital supply is essential to growth possibilities. With labor abundantly available, the limitation on creating new product is essentially The Big K, and it’s “Main Street” proxy, money.

As noted above, in most models of economic growth, we treat Savings as being equal to Investment.  This makes sense: even when the Financial Intermediaries were making $3 or $4 of every $10, they were reinvesting in better systems, better technology, better analysis, and better methods.  Low Latency leads to High-Frequency Trading (HFT) which leads to…well, let’s be nice and just say “greater firm profits.”  Even if only 50% of those profits are being directly reinvested, they are being reinvested, while the rest produces at worst greater paper investments and at best a higher velocity of money and/or a multiplier (“trickle-down”) effect from increased spending.**

Put your money in a Mutual Fund, it’s Invested. Buy a stock, it’s invested.  Put it in a Demand Deposit Account (what used to be a “Savings” or “Checking” account), and it’s invested (“swept”) by the Financial Intermediary, who gives you a share of the profits in the form of interest.

Not to sound like a broken record, but Excess Reserves put a spanner in that last one.  Don’t believe me, ask economists Bruce Bartlett or Joe Gagnon.  Or just look at a graphic of M2 and what I’m calling “Intermediary Private Investment” (M2 minus the Excess Reserves maintained by Financial Intermediaries).

 

FinInstPrivInvest

As Excess Reserves are not Seasonally Adjusted, I used the NSA version of M2.  As noted in my previous post, up until September of 2008,  the Fed did not pay interest on Excess Reserves (or Reserves, for that matter), so that excess reserves were essentially a rounding error—funds kept because of the asymmetric risk-reward of a miscalculation, or “precautionary savings.”  They tended to total about $1-2 Billion on average, rather minor in the context of $7-8 Trillion.***

But once you hit September of 2008, the growth in M2 is more than negated by the growth in Excess Reserves. Indeed, the horizontal line on the graphic above is the level of Intermediary Private Investment in August of 2008—nine months into the “Great Recession.”—isn’t exactly reaching for the skies.  But it’s also significantly higher than the current I, as opposed to S.

(Note that the NSA trend is also downward since the alleged beginning-of-recovery months of June-July, 2009. That the performance has been as good as it has been in such a context is amazing.)

When Savings=Investment, there is potential for growth. When savings go into mattresses—for good reason, especially in the pre-FDIC days—intermediaries cannot do their job so efficiently as the models presume.

What are we to call it when Intermediary Private Investment is significantly less than Savings—when not the people, but the intermediaries themselves, are stuffing money into their own, interest-bearing mattress?

I would suggest “bad economics,” but that term seems too applicable to more general conceits.

*I would rather lose what is left of my eyesight and hearing than take the second position; others, from Scott Sumner explicitly to Brad DeLong implicitly, have significantly variant mileages, which is why there’s a horserace for describing economic policies in the past decade or so. They are winning, while I received several decent paychecks over the time.

**It is left as an exercise whether the “trickle-down” effect is positive or significant.

***Another sign of improved technology is that the growth in reserves decelerates—funds are used more efficiently by the intermediaries—after ca. 1990/1991; the trend moves slightly upward in the Oughts, though that is both relatively minor and possibly due to complications related to the expansion of products offered.

ExcResTrends

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The Messenger Again Wears A Skirt

op-ed by Run

“The Messenger Again Wears A Skirt (Mama Tucker on Brooksley Born)”

Taking a page from his former boss and mentor Larry Summers, Geithner behind closed doors has expressed opposition to Dr. Elizabeth Warren heading up the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as reported by The Huffington Post.

For those of you who may not recall, Larry Summers testified in front of Congress about Brooksley Borns efforts to regulate CDS as:

“casting a shadow of regulatory uncertainty over an otherwise thriving market.”

While one could not predict what Brooksley may have been able to accomplish if given the go-ahead, it is pretty certain the market place as Greenspan describing it as “self-regulating” did little to regulate itself. At least, Larry had more balls than Timothy and Brooksley would have been more proactive than either Larry or Timmy.

Make no mistake, Dr. Elizabeth Warren has asked the pointed questions needing to be asked of Timothy Geithner “Show Me The Money” on You Tube. Joining Timothy Geithner is Senator Dodd, the same as Greenspan, Levitt, and Rubin joined Larry Summers in opposing Brookley Born.

“Well, you probably will always believe there should be laws against fraud, and I don’t think there is any need for a law against fraud,” Alan Greenspan

“I thought it was counterproductive. If you want to move forward . . . you engage with parties in a constructive way,” Rubin told the Washington Post. “My recollection was . . . this was done in a more strident way.”

“characterized as being abrasive.” Arthur Levitt
“Prophet and Loss.” Stanford Magazine, April 2009.

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HEALTH CARE Thoughts: IRS resources

HEALTH CARE thoughts: The Taxpayer Advocate and others are unhappy

National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson is reported to be unhappy about the major IRS role in the new health care regime. Olsen believes the IRS is already overworked (she used “overtaxed” in her annual report issued this month, a great pun) and needs more money and time in order to do the job.

“Obamacare” (PPACA) requires the IRS to create an entirely new enforcement and penalty system, while the Service struggles to deal with such programs as the new home buyers credit, not to mention the regular work burying the agency.

Estimates of resource needs vary, and nothing is very concrete yet, but certainly a substantial increase in manpower and infrastructure will be necessary, very soon (and the IRS never moves very fast).

Then it gets worse.

Obamacare includes various add-ons, one of which will require additional Forms 1099 for supplies purchased to be filed by millions of businesses and entities and then sent to hundreds of thousands of businesses and entities and copied to the IRS so everything can be matched. This is supposed to minimize the “tax gap” and cut down tax evasion.

(For example, I will have to send a 1099 every year to Staples.)

Problem is, Congress clearly does not understand how tax evasion really occurs and this will distract the IRS from more important work, and clog the processing capabilities for an eternity.

(I am quite certain Staples is already reporting my purchases.)

In a strange twist, credit card purchases are apparently exempt. This could be because credit cards will be traced via another route (worrisome) but more likely because some bank lobbyists got inside the sausage factory (so I could eliminate the 1099 to Staples by using my credit card).

The story of the health care reform bill is just getting started, and lots of problems are ahead.

Tom aka Rusty Rustbelt

Rdan here…Linda Beale adds a comment I lifted from an e-mail:

Its no secret that the IRS Is overtaxed—its becoming the primary agency for all kinds of jobs—tax collection, sure, but also health, social security, environmental, aging generally…..

and as for the 1099s, yes, that is another paperwork mountain that will go to the IRS. Fine if it is all computerized and matched, but that may be a big if.

The problem with most enforcement, these days, is that it takes quite an effort to do anything to catch up with all the effort that is being put into nonenforcement.

Linda M. Beale

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Forget Jumping the Shark? The WaPo is Doing the Tango with It

UPDATE: Jason Linkins at one of the non-Breast-Enhanced sites of the Huffington Post did a burlesque of which I can only dream on the same piece.

Via Chris Hayes’s Twitter feed (and he got it from David Sirota), the following is from “No more ‘me first’ mentality on entitlements“:

While it does not happen often, our political system is capable of making unpopular decisions that are in our collective best interest. In 2008, during the most severe financial crisis in 80 years, Republican and Democratic leaders in Washington came together to do something deeply unpopular: bail out the financial system via the Troubled Assets Relief Program. These leaders understood the consequence of inaction was economic devastation for Americans. Passing TARP was the right thing to do.

[B]ailing out the financial system went directly against our shared beliefs in free markets and fair play. While the vast majority of Americans did not cause the financial crisis, we all had to sacrifice to stop it. Such a cultural violation has angered people nationwide, which makes cutting entitlements more difficult because it will again betray our sense of fairness.

The challenge of entitlements is more difficult than the financial crisis: First, we must reach consensus to make cuts before the fiscal crisis is upon us….If we wait until the bond market shuns Treasurys, the economic consequences could be dire. Virtually overnight, we could have far less money to spend on priorities such as defense, education and research.

Cutting entitlement spending requires us to think beyond what is in our own immediate self-interest. But it also runs against our sense of fairness: We have, after all, paid for entitlements for earlier generations. Is it now fair to cut my benefits? No, it isn’t. But if we don’t focus on our collective good, all of us will suffer.

I’ve resequenced the above paragraphs a bit, but remained faithful to the argument as presented.

The author: Neel Kashkari, who is described as “a managing director of the investment management firm PIMCO, served as an assistant Treasury secretary during the George W. Bush administration. He led the Office of Financial Stability and ran the Troubled Assets Relief Program until May 2009.”

His sacrifices for the sake of TARP are well known; indeed, documented in the paragraph above. And, gosh, isn’t it nice that he pushes an argument that would make fixed-rate securities—you know, the thing PIMCO is famous for trading—more valuable?

It’s good to know that “Me First” needs to change, and nice to see the Post presenting a prime example of why.

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Not earthshaking, but here is an interesting comparison for today

Data 101

US new home sales rebound in June in the Financial Times today and New Home Sales: Worst June on Record at Calculated Risk.

Both headlines are “true”.

Much of the same data sources and figures are used. The differences in information are not as stark as the headlines suggest after reading the articles. CR offers a broader historical context but that context is not left out of the Financial Times. Both appear to offer information for the same purpose, as information (ie. not information from National Realtors Assoc.). Yet I come away with very different feelings about the nature of this news in a casual reading.

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A Look at the Current Recession, A Signpost for the Start of Recessions & Some Thoughts on the Likelihood of a Double Dip

by Mike Kimel

Cross posted at the Presimetrics Blog.

A Look at the Current Recession, A Signpost for the Start of Recessions & Some Thoughts on the Likelihood of a Double Dip

These days there’s a lot of talk about whether the recession is going to double dip. And frankly, there’s a lotta yadda yadda, some bad news, and some not-so-bad news. You’ve heard it all before, you don’t need to hear it again from me, and frankly, I’d like to take a different approach. Before launching in, links to all data sources will be provided at the bottom of the post.
Let’s get started with a look at the pace of recoveries from recessions and how the current one compares to others. The graph below shows the percentage change in real GDP per capita each quarter from the end of a recession. Every recession since 1947, the first year for which quarterly data is available, is depicted.

Figure 1

The graph makes a few things apparent. First, it is clear that the double dip or no double dip, the current recovery is pretty feeble. Second, the most recent recoveries have all been pretty feeble.

Things look even worse when one looks at recoveries from deep recessions:

Figure 2

Part of this feebleness is no doubt due to the government’s policies. As I’ve noted before, the data shows that when tax rates were cut during or right after a recession, recoveries were slower and shorter. And both GW and Obama were happily cutting taxes of one sort or another during the latest recession. And of course, the government spending they threw on as a stimulus was in large part ill-conceived, going to benefit primarily some of the parties most responsible for the meltdown, buying toxic assets at inflated prices, and trying to prop up housing prices that should have been allowed to fall.

But what’s there is there. The question du jour is double dips – is the economy going to fall into another recession so quickly after coming out of the previous one, as occurred in 1981, or repeated times in the 1920s?

To answer that question, we need to know what causes recessions. While the academic literature has some complex explanations which depend on all sorts of odd assumptions, I think the answer is simple. The following graph shows the 12 month percentage change in real M1 per capita in the month that a recession begins. M1 is simply the narrowest of the Fed’s measures of the money supply (cash, money in checking accounts, and traveler’s checks), and I’ve adjusted it for inflation and population. Note that the Fed from 1947 to 1958, the Fed doesn’t report M1, but it does report “money stock” which is sufficiently similar to use in its place.

Figure 3

Notice that every recession except one, the one that began in July of ’53, began after the Fed reduced the real M1 per capita by at least 2%. That’s enough to suggest that the change in real money supply per person may well matter; no certainty, but it’s a suggestion.

Assuming for the moment that real M1 per capita does matter, notice that the twelve month change in that variable through June of this year is about 2.8%, which doesn’t make it look an awful lot like a recession about to begin, even if (to repeat the points of Figures 1 and 2) the recovery is crummy.

But the graph also suggests that the theory needs something in order to be complete – it needs to be improved in order to explain July of ’53. What happened then? The big event at about that time was the wind-down from the Korean War. Another way to look at it… real government spending was about to start dropping a lot. Additionally, the very next month, the 12 month change in real M1 per capita went negative, and it stayed negative through the duration of the recession.

Call a drop in real M1 per capita a necessary but not sufficient condition for a recession, at least so far. Now, it is quite possible, pace Rogoff & Reinhart that this time it will be different. I would imagine that the way the Fed has put money into the economy lately, essentially giving freebies to badly run financial institutions, is not quite as useful as its usual M.O. In that case, it might take more than just being on the positive side of the real M1 per capita ledger to make a difference. And check out where that variable is going, anyhow:

Figure 4

It’s down quite a bit… but still it is positive. Can that number go negative in a hurry? Ayup. But the last bit of information we’ve had doesn’t seem to show that.

So what’s the conclusion? I’ve never had much of a problem going out on a limb. Back in March of 2008 I had my first few posts discussing the recession we were in, at a time when the consensus was that we weren’t in one. And check out the comments when I claimed, back in December of ’08 real GDP per that the recession would be over in the first half of the year. (Yes, I know, the post went up in January. And yes, I know the NBER hasn’t called the end of the recession yet but real GDP bottomed out in the second quarter of ’09.) This time, I’m not as comfortable; given where and how the Fed has been putting Money I just don’t see increases in the real money supply as being quite as effective as normal. The money is going to fill in a big hole the financial industry created in its collective balance sheet, and isn’t necessarily leading to a lot of additional spending. Furthermore, with all the talk of austerity, it wouldn’t be surprising if the Federal Government starts cutting back on spending.

So I’m just not sure. But as often as not, when things are bad enough for everyone to see a problem, they’re not as bad as most people think. Given that the weight of the evidence seems almost equally balanced on both sides, this little thing tips it slightly for me: unless and until the Fed starts removing money from the system, I don’t think we’re going into a second dip. But given the Federal Government’s current policies, I don’t expect much more than mediocre growth for the next few quarters either.

Data Sources

FRED, the Federal Reserve Database, was the source for most of the data used to compute real M1 per capita: population from 1952 to the present , M1 from 1958 on and M1 from 1958 on.

Quarterly data on real GDP per capita and population. Note – the quarterly population figures were used to extrapolate monthly population for 1947 to 1952.

Finally, money stock figures were substituted in for M1 from 1947 to 1957. Those were copied by hand from this document at the Federal Reserve of St. Louis’ FRASER archives

Mike Kimel

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Should Potential Employers have Access to Credit Scores ?

Robert Waldmann

Oh good, Kevin Drum and Matthew Yglesias disagree. This is bound to be interesting.

Drum remembers the good old days when liberals had less respect for the standard results of simple neoclassical economic models.

The specific issue is that firms are using credit scores to decide who to hire. This can trap some people as they can’t improve their credit score without a job and can’t get a job with their current credit score. Kevin Drum thinks the practice should be banned. Matthew Yglesias isn’t sure.

Yglesias wrote

But at the same time I try to adhere to the principle I outlined here and resist the urge to call for regulating the business practices of private firms when the issue isn’t pollution or some other case where the externalities are clear. After all, it seems like either this credit check business is a sound business practice (in which case allowing it is making the economy more efficient and ultimately building a more prosperous tomorrow) or else it’s an unsound business practice (in which case competition should drive it out).

That is actually a pretty radical position. I wonder what clear externality the 64 civil rights act addressed. I’m quite sure Yglesias doesn’t think what he seemed to assert, but I want to figure out what he had in mind.

Drum responds “More important is the fact that we liberals shouldn’t view the relationship between businesses and individuals as solely economic transactions” and gives an example

Here’s an example. Back in 1968, Congress passed the Truth in Lending Act. Among other things, it made credit card companies liable for charges on stolen credit cards over $50. In a purely economic sense, there’s really no excuse for this.

Ah how naïve. There is always an excuse based on economic theory (with the assumption of full rationality) for any policy. I view any assertion to the contrary as a personal challenge. This one is easy. Drum argues that the regulation creates a moral hazard problem as we are more careless with our wallets. I see his moral hazard and raise him an adverse selection (Hint: adverse selection is a great tool for justifying regulations as market outcomes are inefficient if there is adverse selection).

So let’s say everyone is better off with the regulation so the most wallet guarding yet not risk averse person is willing to pay extra to the bank in exchange for this protection. That doesn’t mean that this will be the market outcome. Let’s say a credit card company introduces a new card with the $50 limit. It will attract all the people who can’t keep track of their wallets. It will also attract people who commit a rare kind of fraud giving their card to an accomplice, having the accomplice buy stuff and then reporting it lost. There aren’t many of those, but there are enough that the extra interest (or other fees) that the company would have to charge would drive away everyone but the fraudsters and the most absent minded yet risk averse (I raise my hand). So the new product would enter the adverse selection death spiral.

The only solution is to force everyone to buy the protection which everyone wants if the fee is the actuarially fair fee for 100% coverage. Oh look, that’s the current law. That was easy. No sweat, no equations.

I mean Kevin you consider the health care reform debate and recall how forcing people to buy insurance, whether they want it or not, can be Pareto improving in a standard economic model.

Now on the original topic, I side with Drum. I think there is an externality. If people are rendered unemployable, maybe because of their fecklessness maybe because of their unluckiness there are externalities. For one thing the standard argument for laissez faire assumes we are totally selfish and absolutely needs that assumption to get the result. If desperate unemployable people cause others pain, then there is an externality. Another simpler externality is crime. People who are excluding from employment have little to lose from turning to crime. That’s an externality.

I’m pretty sure Yglesias’s idea is that both of these are arguments for redistribution from rich to poor and that such redistribution is more efficiently obtained by taxing and transferring. First, self esteem can’t be transferred. Good examples for the children can’t be transferred either. More importantly, there is no way that the feckless poor are getting much in the USA. You make policy with the electorate you have not the electorate you want. US voters are very willing to regulate business. They are totally unwilling to transfer money to people who firms don’t want to employ, because they seem to be irresponsible.

Assuming a social planner who taxes and transfers optimally is like assuming regulators can’t be captured or assuming that CO2 doesn’t cause global warming. That’s not the world we live it. I think we have to transfer however we can and that includes hiding information from potential employers. The loss in efficiency is a social loss only if one assumes that income distribution doesn’t matter (or assumes that there are optimal lump sum taxes and transfers which is an oxymoron). The link clicking reader will notice that my arguments are pretty much orthogonal to Drum’s.

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