The Treasury invited a small group of bloggers for a “discussion” with senior officials on Monday. Initially, the meeting was to be background, which is a sort of journalistic “FYI but you can’t use it” but we were told at the meeting that we could discuss the meeting as long as remarks were not attributed to particular individuals.
None of us knew in advance how many attendees there would be; there were eight of us at a two-hour session, Interfluidity, Marginal Revolution, Kid Dynamite’s World, Across the Curve, Financial Armageddon, Accrued Interest, and Aleph (and of course, others may have been invited who had scheduling conflicts). There was a place card for Megan McArdle as well.
I was surprised that the powers that be would bother with financial bloggers, and I wondered at the decision rule behind the selection (besides wanting a mix, particularly from a political standpoint). This was also not an anonymous briefing of the sort that has come under criticism (but the anonymity request is still peculiar; is this a Team Obama fixation?) Given that the efforts have Administration has been made efforts to bring critics from the left into the fold, I was wary of attending (I’m not keen about the idea of being propagandized) and expected a higher control format (10-15 people, which would have limited the opportunity to interact).
It wasn’t obvious what the objective of the meeting was (aside the obvious idea that if they were nice to us we might reciprocate. Unfortunately, some of us are not housebroken). I will give them credit for having the session be almost entirely a Q&A, not much in the way of presentation. One official made some remarks about the state of financial institutions; later another said a few things about regulatory reform. The funniest moment was when, right after the spiel on regulatory reform, Steve Waldman said, “I’ve read your bill and I think it’s terrible.” They did offer to go over it with him. It will be interesting to see if that happens.
Four of us had a drink afterward and none of us felt that we learned anything (not that we expected to per se; if the ground rules are “not for attribution” in an official setting, we are certainly not going to be told anything new or juicy). But my feeling, and it seemed to be shared, was that we bloggers and the government officials kept talking past each other, in that one of us would ask a question, the reply would leave the questioner or someone in the audience unsatisfied, there might be a follow up question (either same person or someone interested), get another responsive-sounding but not really answer, and then another person would get the floor. The fact that the social convention of no individual hogging air time meant that no one could follow a particular line of inquiry very far.
My bottom line is that the people we met are very cognitively captured, assuming one can take their remarks at face value. Although they kept stressing all the things that had changed or they were planning to change, the polite pushback from pretty all the attendees was that what Treasury thought of as major progress was insufficient. It was instructive to observe that Tyler Cowen, who is on the other side of the ideological page from yours truly, had pretty much the same concerns as your humble blogger does.
It was also striking to see that the Treasury officials lacked a vision for a banking system for the 21st century that was materially different that the one we have now. The flip side is if they did, articulating that publicly might get them accused of doing Communist central planning, but I didn’t hear second level arguments that said they had considered the issue in a serious way, save not winding the clock back to much more on balance sheet intermediation, aka traditional banking, as opposed to “market based credit”. Nevertheless, at a McKinsey alumni meeting months ago, a partner who has been advising the Treasury and Fed told the group that the Administration wants to make being systemically important very costly to force firms to do what is necessary to get out of that category. That of course is structural reform, but we got no acknowledgment of that as an aim. And aside from raising capital requirements more for big firms than smaller ones, it is not clear how far Treasury could go down that path on its own (and strictly regulatory measures can be rolled back by a new Adminisitration).
Several of us raised questions about whether what their vision for the industry’s structure was and that the objective seemed to be to restore the financial system that got us in trouble in the first place. The answers instead focused on more stringent regulations, higher capital levels, and of course the derivatives regulation bill. I tried twice to engage them on how the bill has so many loopholes that it is not going to make any difference as far as the real problem is concerned (the out for customized derivatives, in the Administration proposal, gave the industry an easy and obvious way to evade the rules; the House pretty much gutted what was left) but I was not specific enough in saying what “loophole” constituted and was basically deflected (and was also told the derivatives on balance sheet would be subject to tougher capital requirements, and the industry was complaining that the bill would make things more costly for them. Ahem, it has become standard practice of all the powerful lobbies to make a great deal of noise about any change on principle, so the level of complaining is not a valid indicator of the efficacy of reform).
I also asked about the size of the financial services industry (as in one of the distortions that resulted from deregulation and rates being too low was that the financial sector had grown too large, which by implication means it needed to shrink. I was told it had shrunk and that the Fed was winding down its programs. Yes, but the expectation is that as the Fed winds down, the private markets will step into be breach, which means more credit private credit extension. There was no acknowledgment of the issue raised by Joseph Stiglitz, that if credit intermediaries are making too much money, the banking system tail is wagging the economic dog.
They also defended the stress tests as being serious, and again did not seem to win converts.
One area that we didn’t get into was the special resolution regime, which is receiving considerable pushback from Congress. Treasury has asked for open-ended authority to resolve large financial institutions, which is pretty much a blank check. That’s a breathtaking power grab by the Executive and should not be acceptable in a democracy. It wasn’t surprising that post the TARP that Congress would be completely unwilling to go there. Any decision to wind up a large bank is going to require Congressional authorization; the amounts at stake are too large for this not to be a political decision. The Resolution Trust Corporation working capital needs ($50 billion, if I recall correctly) were authorized by Congress, and Congress also became impatient and called for it to be wrapped up sooner than Treasury wanted (some studies have argued that the faster sales that resulted gave the taxpayer a lower return than the RTC would have gotten otherwise). And even if you could solve the political impasse (remember, Bear failed in ten days; think Congress could agree to a big backstop in that short a period of time?) I am not certain this change will be salutary in the absence of trading counterparties knowing exactly what would happen to them while an organization was being wound down. One of the things that makes securities firms decay quickly is that no one wants to have their accounts frozen, as happens now in a bankruptcy. You need considerable detail on mechanics, and it does not appear to have been disclosed yet (my buddies at the Roosevelt Institute conference on Monday said Rodgin Cohen, who was presenting and advocating the Administration plans, was also scarce on details).
But the other fact is that these guys are very smooth, very smart, and seemed quite sincere, which made it difficult to discern how much they really did believe and how much of what they said they had to say because they need to defend official policy and maintain confidence. Let’s face it, they get prodded and roughed up by big dogs with some frequency. There was nothing we asked that would be new. They’ve covered this ground with other people of more consequence and therefore have answers ready. We are a pretty unimportant audience (yes, they did bother making time for us, but let us not kid ourselves on how far down the food chain bloggers are) and we cannot argue from a position of advantaged information, so it was inevitable that we would not get beyond standard responses.