Russia is not a global power
I’m old enough to remember Russia as the mother country to the Soviet Union. While the USSR was never a world-class economic power, it did punch above its weight as a military power under Stalin and for a couple decades after.
Russia under Putin has been described as a gas station with an Army. Its economy is enfeebled by dependence on energy exports and international sanctions. The Ukraine invasion exposed Russia’s second-rate military. Its recent abandonment of the al-Assad regime in Syria, which had been propped up by Russian air power, further underscores the extent to which Russia has become a military paper tiger.
“The establishment of a military base in Latakia in 2015 represented Russia’s first substantial intervention outside its post-Soviet sphere of influence. This action not only sustained Assad’s regime for nearly a decade but also positioned Moscow as a key actor in the Middle East. Russia’s airstrikes and military presence forced Western powers, including NATO, to navigate the Syrian conflict cautiously. At the time, this was celebrated as a reassertion of Russia’s standing as a global power.
“The events of early December 2024, however, have undermined this perception. A series of swift offensives by opposition forces reclaimed key cities, including Aleppo, Homs, and Hama, culminating in the fall of Damascus. Despite the continued presence of Russia’s military base, its inability—or reluctance—to prevent Assad’s downfall raises significant questions about the efficacy of its deterrence strategy. The Syrian opposition, while avoiding direct confrontation with Russian forces, demonstrated that Moscow’s influence in the region is far from absolute.
“The implications of these developments are profound. For years, Russian military bases, like those of the United States, were regarded as a guarantee of security for allied regimes. However, the fall of Assad challenges the perception of Russian deterrence. Unlike the United States, which operates over 800 military bases worldwide and has a longstanding history of protecting client states, Russia’s military footprint is far more limited in scope and effectiveness. During the Cold War, U.S. bases served as a counterbalance to Soviet expansion, and they remain a cornerstone in countering both Russian and Chinese influence today. Russia’s failure in Syria suggests that its bases no longer function as a comparable strategic asset.”
Putin has threatened to use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. That threat is a sign of weakness as Russia confronts NATO on its western doorstep. While nominally a Russian ally, China is flexing its economic muscle in the third world, once a source of Russian clients. As China’s influence expands, Russia’s shrinks.
“A hallmark of great power status is the ability to operate effectively on multiple fronts. While Russia remains heavily engaged in the war in Ukraine, a true global power would possess the capability to uphold commitments in other regions simultaneously. Moscow’s inability to do so in Syria reinforces Obama’s 2014 characterization: Russia is not a global power but rather a regional one, capable of exerting influence in its immediate vicinity but falling short of broader global ambitions.”
Russia is a paper tiger
Russia under Putin has been described as a gas station with an Army. Its economy is enfeebled by dependence on energy exports and international sanctions. The Ukraine invasion exposed Russia’s second-rate military. Its recent abandonment of the al-Assad regime in Syria, which had been propped up by Russian air power, further underscores the extent to which Russia has become a military paper tiger.
“The establishment of a military base in Latakia in 2015 represented Russia’s first substantial intervention outside its post-Soviet sphere of influence. This action not only sustained Assad’s regime for nearly a decade but also positioned Moscow as a key actor in the Middle East. Russia’s airstrikes and military presence forced Western powers, including NATO, to navigate the Syrian conflict cautiously. At the time, this was celebrated as a reassertion of Russia’s standing as a global power.
“The events of early December 2024, however, have undermined this perception. A series of swift offensives by opposition forces reclaimed key cities, including Aleppo, Homs, and Hama, culminating in the fall of Damascus. Despite the continued presence of Russia’s military base, its inability—or reluctance—to prevent Assad’s downfall raises significant questions about the efficacy of its deterrence strategy. The Syrian opposition, while avoiding direct confrontation with Russian forces, demonstrated that Moscow’s influence in the region is far from absolute.
“The implications of these developments are profound. For years, Russian military bases, like those of the United States, were regarded as a guarantee of security for allied regimes. However, the fall of Assad challenges the perception of Russian deterrence. Unlike the United States, which operates over 800 military bases worldwide and has a longstanding history of protecting client states, Russia’s military footprint is far more limited in scope and effectiveness. During the Cold War, U.S. bases served as a counterbalance to Soviet expansion, and they remain a cornerstone in countering both Russian and Chinese influence today. Russia’s failure in Syria suggests that its bases no longer function as a comparable strategic asset.”
Putin has threatened to use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. That threat is a sign of weakness as Russia confronts NATO on its western doorstep. While nominally a Russian ally, China is flexing its economic muscle in the third world, once a source of Russian clients. As China’s influence expands, Russia’s shrinks.
“A hallmark of great power status is the ability to operate effectively on multiple fronts. While Russia remains heavily engaged in the war in Ukraine, a true global power would possess the capability to uphold commitments in other regions simultaneously. Moscow’s inability to do so in Syria reinforces Obama’s 2014 characterization: Russia is not a global power but rather a regional one, capable of exerting influence in its immediate vicinity but falling short of broader global ambitions.”
Russia is a paper tiger
I do not think Assad was worth the price to keep him in his palace.
What is the price of being a world power? Is it worth the cost?
Hindsigh:t Vietnam was not!
@paddy,
“I do not think Assad was worth the price to keep him in his palace.”
Putin agrees.
When I was in elementary school, I was surprised to discover that most of the Latin American nations won their independence from Spain around the same time, circa 1820. It was only years later that I learned about Napoleon and the Peninsular War. There’s nothing like a major war to break up an empire.
@Kaleberg,
Yep. See, e.g., World War I.
One thing I learned early on about the character of Russians is that they are a distrustful and paranoid people and they like to huddle. This is why the pre-WWII Soviet Union surrounded itself with “member republics” and, after that conflict, the Warsaw Pact sputniks. They don’t like having direct borders with other countries. The member SSRs were, more than anything else, buffer states insulating the borders of the RSFSR from contact with foreign borders, and the Iron Curtain countries were an additional buffer against contact with western Europe. This was not new to the Soviets – the Russian Empire annexed a lot of mostly empty land as well as absorbing neighbor states.
This, apparently, is also one of the reasons that American baseball never caught on in Russia: the players couldn’t feel comfortable standing alone on bases or in the outfield.
In any case, post-Soviet Russia suddenly found itself with an abundance of foreign borders and Putin doesn’t feel comfortable with that, and that’s a 19th-century way of thinking. It is no longer necessary for Russia’s enemies to wade through buffer territories to strike at the heart of the country, and Putin either fails to apprehend that or is just in denial.
@Blair,
The distrust and paranoia is understandable. Ca. 27 million Soviet citizens died during World War II, the majority being ethnic Russians, making it the country with the highest number of casualties in the war; this includes both military and civilian deaths. America has never experienced anything remotely similar.