Financing Up Coming U.S. Government Debt

Or How Trump’s Bill (with the help of Republicans) Funding Tax Breaks to a Select Upper Income Few Deliberately Breaks the Rest of the Nation.

The Issue:

The share of government spending devoted to paying interest on the United States’ government debt has risen since 2020 exceeds what the government spends on defense. The outlook for the burden of the debt over the next decade has worsened. The projections of debt interest costs have been revised upwards with successive forecasts.

The Facts:

US federal debt as a share of GDP is close to its highest level ever and projected to keep increasing.

Interest payments on the debt as a share of government outlays have risen sharply since 2020. 

The cost of servicing this debt depends on the level of interest rates. The long decline in interest rates since 1980 reduced the interest burden of our growing stock of debt. With interest rates increasing since 2020, the net interest burden of servicing government debt has increased. The cost of servicing the debt is projected to keep increasing over the next decade. This worsening outlook is illustrated by the sequence of upward revisions in forecasts between 2020 and January 2025 before H.R. 1 was signed into law (see chart below). 

Back-of-the-envelope analyses of the interest burden of the debt often use interest rates on 10-year government debt as a shorthand proxy for the cost of government borrowing, but the United States Treasury borrows at different maturities, so a range of interest rates affect the interest cost of financing the debt. 

Deciding the “right” maturity structure for government debt involves tradeoffs between paying higher interest and assuming rollover risk.

Typically, yield curves (which plot interest rates at different maturities) tend to slope up. Borrowing at longer maturities carries higher interest rates. It does lock in financing at those rates. Shorter maturities typically have a lower interest cost. Since short maturity bonds must be rolled over more frequently, this creates a risk the government might need to borrow at extremely high rates during a crisis.

This occurred during the pandemic recovery period, when the Federal Reserve tightened monetary policy in response to a burst of inflation. The tightening raised the benchmark Federal Funds interest rate from near zero in March of 2022 to a range of 5.25-5.5% in July of 2023. The outstanding debt in late 2022 was scheduled to mature within the subsequent three years. That debt has been refinanced at higher interest rates and sharply raising debt service costs over earlier forecasts (see here). There also may be some limit to the government’s ability to exploit any apparent upward slope in the yield curve by borrowing at the lower shorter-maturity rates. The slope of the yield curve reflects supply and demand in the bond market. Borrowing more in the form of short-term debt may disproportionately increase yields at that maturity.  

The maturity structure of U.S. Government debt is heavily weighted towards the short term. 

Greater than 20% of the current outstanding debt will need to be refinanced in fiscal year 2025. More than 80% of the currently outstanding debt will mature within 10 years. By face value, 61% of our currently outstanding government debt will mature by the end of fiscal 2028 (see top chart). With shorter-maturity borrowing, changes in interest rates will quickly pass through to government interest payments on the debt.

The current profile is not particularly short by recent historical standards. The average weighted average maturity of Treasury borrowing has been about 5 years over the period since 1980, and since 2020 has been closer to 6. However, these average masks the fact that most debt is maturing before six years, as shown in the chart. The weighted average is heavily influenced by the inclusion of the very long 30-year bond.

Higher interest rates will add to the cost of servicing the debt. 

H.R.1 is expected to contribute to higher interest rate. Changes in tax law can have impacts on the rate of economic growth, inflation, and interest rates. In the short run, the Congressional Budget Office  estimates H.R.1 would increase aggregate demand, increase employment, and put modest upward pressure on inflation. This inflationary pressure would likely slow the pace at which the Federal Reserve lowers interest rates relative to what the CBO had projected in January.

What this Means:

The relatively short maturity structure of US government debt means that increases in interest rates translate rapidly into higher interest costs. Mostly through making the 2017 tax cuts permanent, the One Big Beautiful Big Act will increase the burden of government debt, both by increasing the amount of debt and also by increasing the interest rates we pay on debt. Complicating the situation, interest rates could also rise due to inflationary pressure from tariffs and the erosion of the independence of the Federal Reserve. Higher interest payments mean less government spending is available for defense, social safety net programs, research, and other important government functions. Rising levels of debt service contribute to fiscal issues for our country.