Alex Parker covers an interesting and important tax policy issue:
Former Vice President Joe Biden’s recent proposal to secure medical supply chains in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic includes tweaks to the 2017 federal tax overhaul, reigniting the debate about whether its international provisions are pushing manufacturing facilities offshore . . . the TCJA exempted most foreign income from taxation as part of a shift toward a more territorial tax system, similar to those used in Europe and much of the world. But it also enacted new provisions, including the GILTI tax and the base erosion and anti-abuse tax, which lawmakers said would block companies from shifting U.S. income abroad.
Many of the structures for tax avoidance that have drawn public scrutiny and outrage over the past decade have involved intangibles, which are relatively easy to move from jurisdiction to jurisdiction to chase the lowest tax rate. But the very attribute that makes them difficult to tax also makes them difficult to define. Rather than attempt to pinpoint the intangibles themselves, the TCJA instead targets unusually high returns on tangible assets.
Under the GILTI provision, the total foreign income of a U.S. company, beyond a 10% return on its offshore depreciable tangible assets, is taxed at 10.5%. That rate is half of the overall corporate rate of 21%.
As the bill was passed by Congress in 2017, Democrats and outside critics quickly noted that the GILTI tax could encourage companies to shift investments in tangible assets abroad. Because the GILTI tax kicks in only at a 10% return on foreign tangible property, the more valuable that property is, the smaller the ultimate GILTI tax bill will be.
Even further, because GILTI is calculated at the global level, in most cases it would not matter where new tangible assets were located; as long as they were offshore, they would decrease the GILTI tax. A reduced rate on foreign-derived intangible income, or domestic income defined through a formula similar to GILTI, also creates a similar incentive, critics contend. If a company has tangible assets at home, it will have less income defined as FDII, and less of the tax benefit.
The 2017 tax cut for rich people was written in secret by Republicans who had told us that it would somehow stop transfer pricing manipulation and would encourage onshoring. But when the details were released, a lot of economists including conservative economics were taken back by the complexity of the international provisions.
Interesting, Brad advocated eliminating FDII and adopting the Obama administration’s proposal to apply GILTI country by country (according to Parker the admin also proposed “a 19% global minimum tax with an exemption for returns from “active assets,” which generate profits other than rents, royalties, interest and other passive forms of income.”) Kimberly Clausing argues “the global nature of the minimum tax makes the U.S. the least desirable place to book income for many multinational companies, because if they do not have sufficient foreign tax credits to offset minimum tax due, even high taxed foreign income is preferable to U.S. income when foreign tax credits shield haven income from the GILTI tax. In contrast, under a per-country minimum tax, reductions in haven tax bases would be about twice as large, and U.S. revenue gains from the minimum tax would be more than two and a half times higher.” A lot of this might be difficult to measure because it relies on macroeconomic statistics, tax data, or survey data on multinational companies instead of financial accounting databases.
But on another level, do we not want importation of cheaper pharmaceuticals as long as the US can adequately tax gains? Cheaper medicine is a necessary part of alleviating health care costs.
And to be fair to Mr. Parker, he does define both GILTI and FDII, but does not make it clear he is doing so:
– “The provisions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act , such as the tax on global intangible low-taxed income, don’t single out any sector in particular.”
-“A reduced rate on foreign-derived intangible income, or domestic income defined through a formula similar to GILTI, also creates a similar incentive, critics contend.”
The Setzer link (pdf). (via Econospeak)
Idriss Z – thanks for noting Parker did indeed offer definitions of FDII and GILTI. It was a long and very informative discussion so I guess I missed that (or had to had my 2 cents). And yes one reason we import goods from abroad is comparative advantage. At some point I’m going to note something I think Brad Setser is missing.
Ken – thanks for providing a link to what Brad said. I had a follow-up Econospeak post that discussed his testimony.
https://econospeak.blogspot.com/2020/07/brad-setser-on-offshoring-life-science.html
July 19, 2020
Brad Setser on Offshoring Life Science Production and Transfer Pricing
https://econospeak.blogspot.com/2020/07/biden-proposes-ending-gilti-loophole.html
July 19, 2020
Biden Proposes Ending the GILTI Loophole
— PGL
[ These posts are interesting, but I am unsure what the prime purpose is. Is the purpose to increase tax collection from American drug companies, insure drug production in America or lower drug prices? Possibly all, but I am unsure. ]
We already make medical provisions. We can make them now. Like most things tied to the “market”, they simply either A) have no market for them in the US(normally like cloth masks) or only make enough to satisfy the low demand.
That is why you have industrial policy and the US’s lack of one is pretty telling. I mean, all Drumpf had to do was use the defense act and n95 masks would have been flowing off the supply line among all kind of other medical products. The only issue is if the US can’t source the materials needed, but I don’t think that would be a problem either.
Anne – I admit this is not the easy issue but my basic answer is that a well crafted tax reform with proper transfer pricing enforcement would both achieve more tax collections from Big Pharma and more production in the US. But we will see how Biden’s team moves forward with this. At least they are thinking about it.
PGL:
I took the liberty of editing the quotes. In the first quote, the first sentence was repeated. I also added the paragraphs (which exist in the article) to make it more readable.
PGL:
I admit this is not the easy issue but my basic answer is that a well crafted tax reform with proper transfer pricing enforcement would both achieve more tax collections from Big Pharma and more production in the US. But we will see how Biden’s team moves forward with this. At least they are thinking about it.
[ From the time of the patent rights reform for drugs at the end of the Carter presidency to 2006, drug production in the United States increased smoothly and rapidly. The change comes in 2006, when Puerto Rico lost tax exempt status for drug production. There is then a significant decrease in US drug production, but that decrease levels off before the tax changes of the Trump presidency. ]
Anne:
A bit more information. I was planning Pharma, Ointments, etc. for Baxter at the time. I would travel down to PR to visit the plants I worked with at the time. Puerto Rico’s Operation Bootstrap
This particular chart depicts annual net price and annual paid price increases showing the percentage increases. This becomes more interesting where I cover “rebates” and whether the reduce costs.
Given median cost increases of 9.5% annually, the yearly increases will result in a doubling of costs for brand name drugs in this study every 7 to 8 years.
New and old brand-name competition does little to control rising costs of products which can be used interchangeably (hence this shoots transparency in the foot for constituents talking to pharmacists) such as Humira and Enbrel or diabetes drugs such as Humalog, Humulin, and Novolog. “Relative cost changes are highly synchronized” resulting in large increases over the last 6 years. As mentioned there appears to be a pattern or practice of pharmaceutical companies acting in concert.
There is little evidence of price changes associated with the existence of therapeutic equivalents such as generics, biosimilar drugs, or drugs entering the market later.
Does President Trump Read “JAMA Network Open?”
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=t7qS
January 30, 2018
Pharmaceutical and Medicine production, 1980-2018
(Indexed to 1980)
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=t7w8
January 30, 2018
Pharmaceutical and Medicine production, 1992-2018
(Indexed to 1992)
Run:
A bit more information. I was planning Pharma, Ointments, etc. for Baxter at the time. I would travel down to PR to visit the plants I worked with at the time. Puerto Rico’s Operation Bootstrap
https://library.brown.edu/create/modernlatinamerica/chapters/chapter-12-strategies-for-economic-developmen/puerto-ricos-operation-bootstrap/
[ Excellent. ]
I was involved in bio-tech from the mid-70s thru 2002, have sat thru too many FDA meetings, … I was convinced that the manufacture of those meds would never be offshored because of the threat of fraud and cheating.