The Enduring Relevance of “Manias, Panics, and Crashes”
by Joseph Joyce
The Enduring Relevance of “Manias, Panics, and Crashes”
The seventh edition of Manias, Panics, and Crashes has recently been published by Palgrave Macmillan. Charles Kindleberger of MIT wrote the first edition, which appeared in 1978, and followed it with three more editions. Robert Aliber of the Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago took over the editing and rewriting of the fifth edition, which came out in 2005. (Aliber is also the author of another well-known book on international finance, The New International Money Game.) The continuing popularity of Manias, Panics and Crashes shows that financial crises continue to be a matter of widespread concern.
Kindleberger built upon the work of Hyman Minsky, a faculty member at Washington University in St. Louis. Minsky was a proponent of what he called the “financial instability hypothesis,” which posited that financial markets are inherently unstable. Periods of financial booms are followed by busts, and governmental intervention can delay but not eliminate crises. Minsky’s work received a great deal of attention during the global financial crisis (see here and here; for a summary of Minksy’s work, see Why Minsky Matters by L. Randall Wray of the University of Missouri-Kansas City and the Levy Economics Institute).
Kindleberger provided a more detailed description of the stages of a financial crisis. The period preceding a crisis begins with a “displacement,” a shock to the system. When a displacement improves the profitability of at least one sector of an economy, firms and individuals will seek to take advantage of this opportunity. The resulting demand for financial assets leads to an increase in their prices. Positive feedback in asset markets lead to more investments and financial speculation, and a period of “euphoria,” or mania develops.
At some point, however, insiders begin to take profits and withdraw from the markets. Once market participants realize that prices have peaked, flight from the markets becomes widespread. As prices plummet, a period of “revulsion” or panic ensues. Those who had financed their positions in the market by borrowing on the promise of profits on the purchased assets become insolvent. The panic ends when prices fall so far that some traders are tempted to come back into the market, or trading is limited by the authorities, or a lender of last resort intervenes to halt the decline.
In addition to elaborating on the stages of a financial crisis, Kindleberger also placed them in an international context. He wrote about the propagation of crises through the arbitrage of divergences in the prices of assets across markets or their substitutes. Capital flows and the spread of euphoria also contribute to the simultaneous rises in asset prices in different countries. (Piero Pasotti and Alessandro Vercelli of the University of Siena provide an analysis of Kindleberger’s contributions.)
Aliber has continued to update the book, and the new edition has a chapter on the European sovereign debt crisis. (The prior edition covered the events of 2008-09.) But he has also made his own contributions to the Minsky-Kindleberger (and now –Aliber) framework. Aliber characterizes the decades since the early 1980s as “…the most tumultuous in monetary history in terms of the number, scope and severity of banking crises.” To date, there have been four waves of such crises, which are almost always accompanied by currency crises. The first wave was the debt crisis of developing nations during the 1980s, and it was followed by a second wave of crises in Japan and the Nordic countries in the early 1990s. The third wave was the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, and the fourth is the global financial crisis.
Aliber emphasizes the role of cross-border investment flows in precipitating the crises. Their volatility has risen under flexible exchange rates, which allow central banks more freedom in formulating monetary policies that influence capital allocation. He also draws attention to the increases in household wealth due to rising asset prices and currency appreciation that contribute to consumption expenditures and amplify the boom periods. The reversal in wealth once investors revise their expectations and capital begins to flow out makes the resulting downturn more acute.
These views are consistent in many ways with those of Claudio Borio of the Bank for International Settlements (see also here). He has written that the international monetary and financial system amplifies the “excess financial elasticity,” i.e., the buildup of financial imbalances that characterizes domestic financial markets. He identifies two channels of transmission. First, capital inflows contribute to the rise in domestic credit during a financial boom. The impact of global conditions on domestic financial markets exacerbates this development (see here). Second, monetary regimes may facilitate the expansion of monetary conditions from one country to others. Central bankers concerned about currency appreciation and a loss of competitiveness keep interest rates lower than they would otherwise, which furthers a domestic boom. In addition, the actions of central banks with international currencies such as the dollar has international ramifications, as the current widespread concern about the impending rise in the Federal Funds rate shows.
Aliber ends the current edition of Manias, Panics and Crashes with an appendix on China’s financial situation. He compares the surge in China’s housing markets with the Japanese boom of the 1980s and subsequent bust that initiated decades of slow economic growth. An oversupply of new housing in China has resulted in a decline in prices that threatens the solvency of property developers and the banks and shadow banks that financed them. Aliber is dubious of the claim that the Chinese government will support the banks, pointing out that such support will only worsen China’s indebtedness. The need for an eighth edition of Manias, Panics and Crashes may soon be apparent.
cross posted with Capital Ebbs and Flows
I was in China any number of times over the last 5 years and I was impressed by the amount of China’s infrastructure building going on until the Chinese engineer traveling with me told me it was not for most of the people to live in. It was done to keep the people employed.
I did not view this as a private venture and I still do not considering the acres of empty shopping malls around Shenzhen unoccupied, the numerous empty apartments built in Suzhou, Hangzhou, etc.
Will the government continue to finance the these ventures? Probably not and they will blacken over time due to the air pollution. Will the banks fail? It remains to be seen as the Chinese government fostered thise development.
I have never been in China (well I was drunk for three days in Hong Kong when I was in the Navy and it was still British but that hardly counts) but just at first blush there could be some big benefits in those empty apartment towers – if maintenence is funded. Because for the entire history of capitalism and its bastard child colonial-capitalism the inevitable result in poor rural workers piling in City sectors where there is no housing at all or totally sub-standard slum housing. London in the 1700s, New York in the 1800s, every 3rd World (financial/industrial) capital in the 1900’s were marked by and often still marked by huge concentrated slums. Mumbai when it was Bombay was famous for people staking out pieces of sidewalk for night time living, Kinshasha, Rio de Janiero, it goes on and on.
China might never actually thread that needle that had other countries struggling and largely faiing to build public housing after the fact. But it sounds like the age old question of where can we house the poor can in some cases be answered in China by “Ah, in those 100 empty housing blocks?”
Simplistic bordering on simple minded. So mock at will. But there are many, many homeless/home insecure advocates who have always claimed that the problem of people with no homes can be solved by supplying homes. Which if they already exist seems to a simpleton like me a no-brainer. (Which is a relief).
Bruce:
Coming out of Tianjin, Beijing, and Shantou, we would drop down and spend a weekend in Hong Kong relaxing at the Royal Garden (Kowloon) which is about a step below the Peninsula. Nice hotel and one time when they did not have my usual room ready for me, I was upgraded to a suite. I was there after the Brits left too. A great place to wander and see the different income strata come together. 50 cents for some is a lot of money to hydroplane across the bay while on Hong Kong island and “on the southern shore there are three streets in the Deep Water Bay neighborhood which is the home to 19 of the city’s richest residents, with an aggregate net worth of $123 billion.”
Your thoughts on allowing the country folk to inhabit these massive developments is probably not going to happen as they do not have the money. As my Chinese engineer boldly stated (which is unusual) the China government does not care about the lower income and these apartments will stay empty even though they are needed. There are other developments I have seen in a similar state, fenced-in, empty, blackening (from pollution) tall skyscrapers. Your thoughts are plausible except it will not happen from what I have seen over the last 20 years.
This might satisfy your curiosity:
“If the Treasury were to fill old bottles with banknotes, bury them at suitable depths in disused coalmines which are then filled up to the surface with town rubbish, and leave it to private enterprise on well-tried principles of laissez-faire to dig the notes up again (the right to do so being obtained, of course, by tendering for leases of the note-bearing territory), there need be no more unemployment and, with the help of the repercussions, the real income of the community, and its capital wealth also, would probably become a good deal greater than it actually is. It would, indeed, be more sensible to build houses and the like; but if there are political and practical difficulties in the way of this, the above would be better than nothing.” Book 3, Chapter 10, Section 6 pg.129 “The General Theory.”
The unrest China would most definitely occur if low income labor were not working is something the Chinese government must take into consideration. This is not the same as the days when Mao can tell the world they do not need grain and the china crops were adequate as millions starved. Connecting the dots would make sense; but, these building and shopping malls were build for a middle class which largely does not exist yet (my opinion) and is growing. It would not surprise me to see them tearing the same empty buildings down and paying the same work force.
I appreciate your comment. Thanks
Thou I only worked in China once (1988); what Run says about building being built or amusement parks that had staff but almost zero people using these faculties seems to suggest that China’s government may crack the code of housing the poor, much like controlling its own currency. The difference in Hong Kong where the British ruled has the slums and lack of good housing for the poor. Where China proper only problem is subsidizing farmers to remain farmers.
Add WalMart to this phenomena also. A clerk at each table of goods doing nothing as there were no customers.
Run, perhaps our government fails to understand the difference in subsiding what benefits a nation and what is destroying our nation.
What it all comes down to is more public works projects needed both in China and in the US. We will build the great wall of Trump like they built the Egyptian Pyramids and the Great wall of China long ago. We have brought 30 M more Chinese into the middle class with many of our manufacturing jobs being donated by the governmint. But I don’t see any inflation yet as we continue to print trillions of $ and raise the rate as a face saving move of the Fed Res who thinks they are in control of something.