Carried Interest — a tax privilege for the rich whose end time has come

by Linda Beale

Carried Interest — a tax privilege for the rich whose end time has come
I should have written about this long ago, but a recent “dealbook” by my former colleague Steven Davidoff, A Chance to End a Billion-Doillar Tax Break for Private Equity, New York Times (Oct. 23, 2013) reminded me of the import of a recent court decision–Sun Capital Partners (No. 12-2312 First Circuit Cout of Appeals July 2013), –important for its implications for the private equity industry’s privileged “carried interest” tax treatment (income to managers currently treated as preferentially taxed capital gains rather than ordinary compensation income) and the assumed treatment of the pension obligations of employees of companies taken over by those funds (ability of private equity funds to disavow a company’s pension obligations to its ordinary workers through bankruptcy).

As Davidoff notes, private equity managers claim that changing the carried interest privilege would result in less investment and ultimately harm economic growth.  That’s an argument long used by the right to justify the capital gains privilege, but certainly controversial (at least), since uninvested money will earn even less than invested money that is taxed at a slightly higher rate. Given the hugely outsized earnings by equity fund managers–in the hundreds of millions and even billions annually–it seems unlikely that a higher tax rate would sharply reduce investment.  They’d still have after-tax income equal or more than most CEOs.  And as I’ve noted frequently here, getting carried interest taxation right would be at least one step towards ensuring that the tax system performs its most important justice function by reducing, rather than exacerbating, the income inequality dynamic that harms the kind of broad-based economic growth that underlies a sustainable economy.  See, e.g., works on income inequality and the problems of unequal wealth distribution for sustainable economies by Benjamin Friedman, Piketty & Saez, Kate Pickett and Richard Wilkinson  (e.g., The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone (2009)).

The Sun Capital case arose out of the takeover of Scott Brass, a manufacturing business, by Sun Capital Partners, a private equity fund that buys out distressed companies for restructuring and resale (often involving firing workers and using bankruptcies to disavow pension obligations).  As Davidoff summarizes:

About a year after the takeover, Scott Brass sought bankruptcy protection.  Sun Capital sued the comapny’s pension fund, the New England Teamsters and Trucking Industry Pension Fund, seeking a judgment that it was not liable for $4.5 million of the company’s pension.  Under the pension laws, Sun Capital would be responsible for this amount if Scott’s employees were under the control of Sun and the funds were engaged in a ‘trade or business.’ The pension fund argued that the Sun Capital funds were liable because the funds were engaged in the trade or business of operating Scott.  Sun Capital argued the opposite, saying that it was merely a passive investor.  A Chance to End a Billion-Doillar Tax Break for Private Equity

The court concluded that the private equity fund was engaged in a trade or business for purposes of the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act (ERISA), rather than merely a passive investor in the business that it took over, Scott Brass, Inc. Sun Capital Partners (No. 12-2312 First Circuit Cout of Appeals July 2013).

This decision could clearly “make it harder for private equity funds to walk away from the unfunded pension liabilities of companies they have bought if the company goes bankrupt.”  Vic Fleischer, Sun Capital Court Ruling Threatens Structure of Private Equity, DealBook, New York Times (Aug. 1, 2013).  And it is “not a big leap to argue that the fund was [also] engaged in a trade or business for tax purposes.”  Id.

No one disputes that the general partner (or its affiliated management company) often gets highly involved with the fund’s portfolio companies.  In Sun Capital, for example, the management company weighed in on the portfolio company’s personnel decisions, capital spending and possible acquisitions.  The critical question is whether the general partner’s activities can be attributed ‘downward’ to the fund–that is, from the partner to the partnership.

***

…[T]he court noted that Scott Brass Inc. paid fees to the general partner of the fund for the management services it provided.  Those fees were then used to offset part of the 2 percent annual management fees that the limited partners normally pay to the general partner.  The court explained that these fees thus ‘provided a direct economic benefit’ that ‘an ordinary, passive investor would not derive: an offset against the management fees it otherwise would have paid its general partner.’ …

…But even without a management fee offset, limited partners generaly derive an economic benefit from the activities of the general partner. …  Sun Capital Court Ruling Threatens Structure of Private Equity.

If the Treasury and IRS (or courts) were to conclude that the trade or business determination for ERISA should carry over to tax, a number of tax consequences could well follow that would upend the current highly favored tax treatment of private equity fund investors and investor/managers.

• foreign investors in a private equity fund could be treated as having income that is “effectively connected” with a U.S. trade or business, resulting in being subject to tax on that effectively connected income;
• tax-exempt investors in a private equity fund could be treated as having trade-or-business income, resulting in application of the UBTI (unrelated business taxable income) rules that would subject the normally tax-exempt investors to tax on that income; and
• private equity fund managers’ profit shares (“carried interest”) could be treated as ordinary income from sales in the ordinary course of business (bought out and restructured companies) rather than as capital gains income from a passive investment.

Will Treasury grab this lifeline for eliminating the privileged private equity tax treatment?  Remains to be seen.

PS.  If private equity funds are really trades or businesses, then isn’t a private “credit fund” really a banking business that should be regulated as such?  See, e.g., Manning, Exclusive: Florida Private Equity Fund Expands, Plans to Offer Credit, Tampa Bay Business Journal (Oct. 28, 2013).

cross posted with ataxingmatter