Does the Tea Party Dislike Goodwin Liu?
by Beverly Mann
Does the Tea Party Dislike Goodwin Liu?
Politico had an article last week called “Will Senate ever vote on Liu?” Liu is Goodwin Liu, a prominent liberal Constitutional Law professor at the UC, Berkeley. His official profile at the U. is here.
Obama nominated him in 2009 to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the appellate court for the west coast states, Arizona, Nevada and Hawaii, and by far the largest of the federal appellate courts. His Judiciary Committee hearing was held more than a year ago, and the nomination was voted out of that Committee more than a year ago but was never brought to a floor vote because Republicans planned to filibuster it. Obama renominated him early this year, and his Committee confirmation hearing was held yesterday. The Politico article says this time the nomination will be brought to a floor vote but that his confirmation is unlikely.
The Politico article summarizes the controversy about his nomination:
Liu, 39, has captured the hopes of liberals who see him as one of Obama’s few bold judicial picks, someone with the intellect and youth for the circuit court bench, a traditional stepping stone to the Supreme Court. But Republicans have argued that he lacks any judicial experience, his legal writings are proof of his intention to legislate from the bench, and his criticism of Supreme Court Judge Samuel Alito after he was nominated to the court revealed an inexperienced social activist who has no place on a federal bench.
The article says the Democrats and the Obama administration blame Senate gridlock, generally, on judicial nominees for the Senate’s earlier failure to confirm Liu, but “Republicans have suggested that Democratic leadership had been unwilling to take time on the Senate calendar in order to entertain a lengthy floor debate about Liu’s positions on controversial issues like affirmative action and the death penalty.”
Apparently what offends the Republican senators the most about Liu is that he testified against Samuel Alito’s confirmation to the Supreme Court in 2006, saying that Alito’s record as a federal appellate judge suggested that he “envisions an America where police may shoot and kill an unarmed boy to stop him from running away with a stolen purse … where a black man may be sentenced to death by an all-white jury for killing a white man.” Liu has retracted the comment and apologized for it, and said yesterday in his opening statement that it “was not an appropriate way to describe Justice Alito as a person or his legal views.”
He’s probably right that that statement was not an appropriate way to describe Justice Alito as a person or his legal views. The statement was, after all, about Samuel Alito, not Clarence Thomas. But the fact remains that Alito, like Thomas, selects a (very) few constitutional rights that he votes to interpret broadly, almost always those that are part of the rightwing political agenda, circa 1985, and, like Thomas, votes to effectively decimate the other constitutional rights, certainly when it comes to the rights of criminal defendants, but also concerning the rights of others. (Unlike Thomas, Alito and his spouse haven’t claimed intellectual-property rights to “Liberty.”)
The Politico article quotes Rep. Judy Chu (D-Calif.), chair of the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus as saying, “We will have to work very, very hard on his behalf and I know that Goodwin Liu is intending to meet with every senator that he can. I hope that through his one to one meetings people will see how reasonable and measured he is, and he can get enough support so that he can break through cloture.”
But Chu and the White House should focus their efforts as well on noting that Liu, unlike Alito, is a strong civil libertarian in most respects, not just the respects that rightwing ideology dictates, and certainly not just in the respects that Reagan-era rightwing ideology dictates. And although Washington has yet to recognize this, the two—Tea Party ideology and Reagan-era rightwing ideology—diverge significantly, at least in theory, on many legal issues, including concerning the issues that they really care about.
I mean, how many Tea Partiers really care one way or the other about the death penalty? Or, for that matter, about affirmative action? What they do care about is civil liberties, generally, not just a few select ones.
So moderate Republican senators who vote for cloture on Goodwin Lui’s nomination probably won’t be defeated by a Tea Party candidate in a primary election because of that cloture vote. If it’s mentioned at all, say in a TV ad by some private group (the Koch crowd, maybe?), the senator could simply respond that Liu is a libertarian.
And, if necessary, that Alito is almost entirely not.
—–
Beverly Mann maintains her own blog at the Annarborist
The short answer, Tea Partiers? No! Republicans and moderate Democrats? Yes!
Hi Bev:
Someone else we know spoke out on Alito and against his becoming a SC Justice.
“from his memos as a Justice Department lawyer, his speeches, and his judicial opinions – points in one direction: Judge Alito is likely to be extremely deferential to claims of executive power and very unlikely to enforce needed checks and balances.”
“Judge Alito’s views about executive power are reflected in other writings when he was at the Justice Department. For instance, he wrote a memorandum urging that the President issue statements when signing bills so that presidential views, and not legislative history, be used in interpreting statutes. Alito’s clearly stated objective was to shift power from the legislature, whose legislative history often guides statutory interpretation, to the executive branch. He said that his goal was to give the Executive “the last word” on issues of statutory interpretation and to ‘increase the power of the Executive to shape the law.'”
“in Doe v. Groody, Judge Alito dissented from a decision that allowed a woman and her 10 year old daughter to receive money damages after they were strip searched by police who were executing a search warrant unrelated to these two individuals. Judge Alito sided with the police and would have precluded any recovery for the injured individuals.”
“Judge Alito has dissented from en banc decisions on his Court protecting individual freedoms from government power. For example, Judge Alito dissented from a 9-2 decision of his court holding that notice must be sent by mail to the place where a person is being held and from a 10-1 decision that notice must be reasonably calculated to actually reach the person whose property is being seized. “http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1725&wit_id=4904
Gideon still might be locked up in prison if Alito was the deciding judge. Alito did pretty much shift the power of the court away from OConnor who retired to that of a Kennedy Court. As far as Goodwin Liu? No surprise there that his nomination would be blocked.
“Tea Partiers? No!”
Really? Do please share with us your links showing that the Teap party supports Goodwin Liu.
“Tea Partiers? No!”
Really? Do please share with us your links showing that the Tea party supports Goodwin Liu.
He wasn’t on their radar when nominated. Is barely there now. References to Liu and tea party are relatively recent, and even then mostly from left blogs/writers.
That’s why I said, no.
“That’s why I said, no.”
In other words, you don’t actually have any evidence for your assertion.
Sure do. My own tea party experience. You?
BTW, this is the search that I did: Liu Nomination + tea party
CoRev represents that tea party.
That tea party defending the munificence of a few million who got theirs, denegrating SS which is paying for that tea party and the few millions’.
When SS needs cash it cuts that tea party off, and the deficits won’t cover exorbitant taxpayer funded welfare for that tea party and the rich. The real rich won’t cover that tea party, they demand SS cover their excessive annuities from Uncle Sam.
That tea party attacked SS over the weekend because in 2010 half the interest accrued on the trust fund was needed as cash to cover about 7% of SS outlay, because of the trashing of the economy by their leaders and Wall St reduced SS payroll tax receipts.
That tea party.
Hi run,
You know that a running theme of mine, which I think is clear from my Goodwin Liu post, is the dichotomy on certain key civil liberties issues between circa-Reagan-era rightwingers and the current Tea Partiers. I’ve been working for the past two weeks on a long article for AB that will illustrate this point partly by discussing the metastasizing jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional “doctrines”—i.e., rules of law created by the Supreme Court—whose purpose is to severely limit access to federal court (including access to federal habeas review), especially regarding matters related to a state-court case.
These doctrines and the Supreme Court’s absurdly cramped interpretations of certain federal “jurisdictional” statutes (including that 1996 federal-habeas statute that you and I have discussed several times) have effectively removed the judicial branch of state governments from the need to comply with federal constitutional law.
The working title of my article, in which I really explain this stuff (I hope) for lay readers, is “O Liberty: Justice Kennedy’s Strange Civil Liberties Jurisprudence.” I gave it that title because Kennedy, who does recognize constitutional limitations on what laws state legislatures and local governments can enact that don’t have to do with the few select constitutional rights (e.g., gun-ownership rights; the right of free exercise of religion; real property “takings” rights) that the Federalist Society crowd cares about. But he also believes that states’ judicial branches are, effectively, not limited by most of the rights that the Constitution supposedly guarantees to individuals, including Fourteenth Amendment rights. O’Connor held this view too. The Rehnquist Court was incessantly creating and expanding these “doctrines.” Rehnquist was super-aggressive in that respect, but Kennedy and O’Connor were, too.
Thomas—he of the “My wide and I are the arbiters of constitutional Liberty!” persuasion—has been the most aggressive of any of them. Alito, though, is the most unremittingly anti-libertarian. Except for those 1980s-rightwing-favored rights, he doesn’t care whether it’s the federal government or a state or local government, or whether it’s a state court or a state legislature, that’s infringing on an individual’s liberty. He almost never sees a civil-liberties restriction or violation he doesn’t like. Or at least doesn’t think is unconstitutional.
Anyway, yesterday, the Court issued an opinion that finally all-but-killed one of the key “jurisdictional” doctrines, called “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,” that has been used for nearly 30 years to categorically deny access to federal-court constitutional review in cases related to cases that were litigated in state court. The key part of the ruling removes the heretofore distinction between, on the one hand, making a “facial” challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute or rule of law, and other hand, an “as applied” or “as construed” challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute, rule of law or court procedure. This is technical stuff, but it is absolutely huge.
The case was one you probably read about yesterday or today. It’s the one about the right to use a general federal civil rights […]
“Sure do. My own tea party experience.”
In other words, you don’t actually have any evidence for your assertion.
Bev, I am curious about your statement, referring to “Tea Partiers,” saying “What they do care about is civil liberties, generally, not just a few select ones.” Is that an impression or do you have some evidence to support the statement? A quick search took me to a University of Washington survey study that reached a different conclusion: “Survey shows that among whites, tea party supporters more willing than others to curtail civil liberties” at http://uwnews.org/article.asp?articleid=57364 I don’t know if the study is contradicted by other studies. If the study is accurate, however, then how would Liu look to a tea party supporter? (Whether he’s on the tea party’s’ radar screen today isn’t as important as how he’d look on that radar screen if his nomination is approved.)
Hi run,
You know that a running theme of mine, which I think is clear from my Goodwin Liu post, is the dichotomy on certain key civil liberties issues between circa-Reagan-era rightwingers and the current Tea Partiers. I’ve been working for the past two weeks on a long article for AB that will illustrate this point partly by discussing the metastasizing jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional “doctrines”—i.e., rules of law created by the Supreme Court—whose purpose is to severely limit access to federal court (including access to federal habeas review), especially regarding matters related to a state-court case.
These doctrines and the Supreme Court’s absurdly cramped interpretations of certain federal “jurisdictional” statutes (including that 1996 federal-habeas statute that you and I have discussed several times) have effectively removed the judicial branch of state governments from the need to comply with federal constitutional law.
The working title of my article, in which I really explain this stuff (I hope) for lay readers, is “O Liberty: Justice Kennedy’s Strange Civil Liberties Jurisprudence.” I gave it that title because Kennedy, who does recognize constitutional limitations on what laws state legislatures and local governments can enact that don’t have to do with the few select constitutional rights (e.g., gun-ownership rights; the right of free exercise of religion; real property “takings” rights) that the Federalist Society crowd cares about. But he also believes that states’ judicial branches are, effectively, not limited by most of the rights that the Constitution supposedly guarantees to individuals, including Fourteenth Amendment rights. O’Connor held this view too. The Rehnquist Court was incessantly creating and expanding these “doctrines.” Rehnquist was super-aggressive in that respect, but Kennedy and O’Connor were, too.
Thomas—he of the “My wide and I are the arbiters of constitutional Liberty!” persuasion—has been the most aggressive of any of them. Alito, though, is the most unremittingly anti-libertarian. Except for those 1980s-rightwing-favored rights, he doesn’t care whether it’s the federal government or a state or local government, or whether it’s a state court or a state legislature, that’s infringing on an individual’s liberty. He almost never sees a civil-liberties restriction or violation he doesn’t like. Or at least doesn’t think is unconstitutional.
Anyway, yesterday, the Court issued an opinion that finally all-but-killed one of the key “jurisdictional” doctrines, called “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,” that has been used for nearly 30 years to categorically deny access to federal-court constitutional review in cases related to cases that were litigated in state court. The key part of the ruling removes the heretofore distinction between, on the one hand, making a “facial” challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute or rule of law, and other hand, an “as applied” or “as construed” challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute, rule of law or court procedure. This is technical stuff, but it is absolutely […]
Hi run,
You know that a running theme of mine, which I think is clear from my Goodwin Liu post, is the dichotomy on certain key civil liberties issues between circa-Reagan-era rightwingers and the current Tea Partiers. I’ve been working for the past two weeks on a long article for AB that will illustrate this point partly by discussing the metastasizing jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional “doctrines”—i.e., rules of law created by the Supreme Court—whose purpose is to severely limit access to federal court (including access to federal habeas review), especially regarding matters related to a state-court case.
These doctrines and the Supreme Court’s absurdly cramped interpretations of certain federal “jurisdictional” statutes (including that 1996 federal-habeas statute that you and I have discussed several times) have effectively removed the judicial branch of state governments from the need to comply with federal constitutional law.
The working title of my article, in which I really explain this stuff (I hope) for lay readers, is “O Liberty: Justice Kennedy’s Strange Civil Liberties Jurisprudence.” I gave it that title because Kennedy, who does recognize constitutional limitations on what laws state legislatures and local governments can enact that don’t have to do with the few select constitutional rights (e.g., gun-ownership rights; the right of free exercise of religion; real property “takings” rights) that the Federalist Society crowd cares about. But he also believes that states’ judicial branches are, effectively, not limited by most of the rights that the Constitution supposedly guarantees to individuals, including Fourteenth Amendment rights. O’Connor held this view too. The Rehnquist Court was incessantly creating and expanding these “doctrines.” Rehnquist was super-aggressive in that respect, but Kennedy and O’Connor were, too.
Thomas—he of the “My wide and I are the arbiters of constitutional Liberty!” persuasion—has been the most aggressive of any of them. Alito, though, is the most unremittingly anti-libertarian. Except for those 1980s-rightwing-favored rights, he doesn’t care whether it’s the federal government or a state or local government, or whether it’s a state court or a state legislature, that’s infringing on an individual’s liberty. He almost never sees a civil-liberties restriction or violation he doesn’t like. Or at least doesn’t think is unconstitutional.
Anyway, yesterday, the Court issued an opinion that finally all-but-killed one of the key “jurisdictional” doctrines, called “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,” that has been used for nearly 30 years to categorically deny access to federal-court constitutional review in cases related to cases that were litigated in state court. The key part of the ruling removes the heretofore distinction between, on the one hand, making a “facial” challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute or rule of law, and other hand, an “as applied” or “as construed” challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute, rule of law or court procedure. This is technical stuff, but it is absolutely […]
Hi run,
You know that a running theme of mine, which I think is clear from my Goodwin Liu post, is the dichotomy on certain key civil liberties issues between circa-Reagan-era rightwingers and the current Tea Partiers. I’ve been working for the past two weeks on a long article for AB that will illustrate this point partly by discussing the metastasizing jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional “doctrines”—i.e., rules of law created by the Supreme Court—whose purpose is to severely limit access to federal court (including access to federal habeas review), especially regarding matters related to a state-court case.
These doctrines and the Supreme Court’s absurdly cramped interpretations of certain federal “jurisdictional” statutes (including that 1996 federal-habeas statute that you and I have discussed several times) have effectively removed the judicial branch of state governments from the need to comply with federal constitutional law.
The working title of my article, in which I really explain this stuff (I hope) for lay readers, is “O Liberty: Justice Kennedy’s Strange Civil Liberties Jurisprudence.” I gave it that title because Kennedy, who does recognize constitutional limitations on what laws state legislatures and local governments can enact that don’t have to do with the few select constitutional rights (e.g., gun-ownership rights; the right of free exercise of religion; real property “takings” rights) that the Federalist Society crowd cares about. But he also believes that states’ judicial branches are, effectively, not limited by most of the rights that the Constitution supposedly guarantees to individuals, including Fourteenth Amendment rights. O’Connor held this view too. The Rehnquist Court was incessantly creating and expanding these “doctrines.” Rehnquist was super-aggressive in that respect, but Kennedy and O’Connor were, too.
Thomas—he of the “My wide and I are the arbiters of constitutional Liberty!” persuasion—has been the most aggressive of any of them. Alito, though, is the most unremittingly anti-libertarian. Except for those 1980s-rightwing-favored rights, he doesn’t care whether it’s the federal government or a state or local government, or whether it’s a state court or a state legislature, that’s infringing on an individual’s liberty. He almost never sees a civil-liberties restriction or violation he doesn’t like. Or at least doesn’t think is unconstitutional.
Anyway, yesterday, the Court issued an opinion that finally all-but-killed one of the key “jurisdictional” doctrines, called “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,” that has been used for nearly 30 years to categorically deny access to federal-court constitutional review in cases related to cases that were litigated in state court. The key part of the ruling removes the heretofore distinction between, on the one hand, making a “facial” challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute or rule of law and, other hand, an “as applied” or “as construed” challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute, rule of law or court procedure. This is technical stuff, but it is absolutely […]
Hi run,
You know that a running theme of mine, which I think is clear from my Goodwin Liu post, is the dichotomy on certain key civil liberties issues between circa-Reagan-era rightwingers and the current Tea Partiers. I’ve been working for the past two weeks on a long article for AB that will illustrate this point partly by discussing the metastasizing jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional “doctrines”—i.e., rules of law created by the Supreme Court—whose purpose is to severely limit access to federal court (including access to federal habeas review), especially regarding matters related to a state-court case.
These doctrines and the Supreme Court’s absurdly cramped interpretations of certain federal “jurisdictional” statutes (including that 1996 federal-habeas statute that you and I have discussed several times) have effectively removed the judicial branch of state governments from the need to comply with federal constitutional law.
The working title of my article, in which I really explain this stuff (I hope) for lay readers, is “O Liberty: Justice Kennedy’s Strange Civil Liberties Jurisprudence.” I gave it that title because Kennedy, who does recognize constitutional limitations on what laws state legislatures and local governments can enact that don’t have to do with the few select constitutional rights (e.g., gun-ownership rights; the right of free exercise of religion; real property “takings” rights) that the Federalist Society crowd cares about. But he also believes that states’ judicial branches are, effectively, not limited by most of the rights that the Constitution supposedly guarantees to individuals, including Fourteenth Amendment rights. O’Connor held this view, too. The Rehnquist Court was incessantly creating and expanding these “doctrines.” Rehnquist was super-aggressive in that respect, but Kennedy and O’Connor were, too.
Thomas—he of the “My wife and I are the arbiters of constitutional Liberty!” persuasion—has been the most aggressive of any of them. Alito, though, is the most unremittingly anti-libertarian. Except for those 1980s-rightwing-favored rights, he doesn’t care whether it’s the federal government or a state or local government, or whether it’s a state court or a state legislature, that’s infringing on an individual’s liberty. He almost never sees a civil-liberties restriction or violation he doesn’t like. Or at least doesn’t think is unconstitutional.
Anyway, yesterday, the Court issued an opinion that finally all-but-killed one of the key “jurisdictional” doctrines, called “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,” that has been used for nearly 30 years to categorically deny access to federal-court constitutional review in cases related to cases that were litigated in state court. The key part of the ruling removes the heretofore distinction between, on the one hand, making a “facial” challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute or rule of law, and other hand, an “as applied” or “as construed” challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute, rule of law or court procedure. This is technical stuff, but it is absolutely […]
Hi run,
You know that a running theme of mine, which I think is clear from my Goodwin Liu post, is the dichotomy on certain key civil liberties issues between circa-Reagan-era rightwingers and the current Tea Partiers. I’ve been working for the past two weeks on a long article for AB that will illustrate this point partly by discussing the metastasizing jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional “doctrines”—i.e., rules of law created by the Supreme Court—whose purpose is to severely limit access to federal court (including access to federal habeas review), especially regarding matters related to a state-court case.
These doctrines and the Supreme Court’s absurdly cramped interpretations of certain federal “jurisdictional” statutes (including that 1996 federal-habeas statute that you and I have discussed several times) have effectively removed the judicial branch of state governments from the need to comply with federal constitutional law.
The working title of my article, in which I really explain this stuff (I hope) for lay readers, is “O Liberty: Justice Kennedy’s Strange Civil Liberties Jurisprudence.” I gave it that title because Kennedy, who does recognize constitutional limitations on what laws state legislatures and local governments can enact that don’t have to do with the few select constitutional rights (e.g., gun-ownership rights; the right of free exercise of religion; real property “takings” rights) that the Federalist Society crowd cares about. But he also believes that states’ judicial branches are, effectively, not limited by most of the rights that the Constitution supposedly guarantees to individuals, including Fourteenth Amendment rights. O’Connor held this view, too. The Rehnquist Court was incessantly creating and expanding these “doctrines.” Rehnquist was super-aggressive in that respect, but Kennedy and O’Connor were, too.
Thomas—he of the “My wife and I are the arbiters of constitutional Liberty!” persuasion—has been the most aggressive of any of them. Alito, though, is the most unremittingly anti-libertarian. Except for those 1980s-rightwing-favored rights, he doesn’t care whether it’s the federal government or a state or local government, or whether it’s a state court or a state legislature, that’s infringing on an individual’s liberty. He almost never sees a civil-liberties restriction or violation he doesn’t like. Or at least never sees one he thinks is unconstitutional.
Anyway, yesterday, the Court issued an opinion that finally all-but-killed one of the key “jurisdictional” doctrines, called “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,” that has been used for nearly 30 years to categorically deny access to federal-court constitutional review in cases related to cases that were litigated in state court. The key part of the ruling removes the heretofore distinction between, on the one hand, making a “facial” challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute or rule of law, and other hand, an “as applied” or “as construed” challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute, rule of law or court procedure. This is technical stuff, but it is absolutely […]
Hi run,
You know that a running theme of mine, which I think is clear from my Goodwin Liu post, is the dichotomy on certain key civil liberties issues between circa-Reagan-era rightwingers and the current Tea Partiers. I’ve been working for the past two weeks on a long article for AB that will illustrate this point partly by discussing the metastasizing jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional “doctrines”—i.e., rules of law created by the Supreme Court—whose purpose is to severely limit access to federal court (including access to federal habeas review), especially regarding matters related to a state-court case.
These doctrines and the Supreme Court’s absurdly cramped interpretations of certain federal “jurisdictional” statutes (including that 1996 federal-habeas statute that you and I have discussed several times) have effectively removed the judicial branch of state governments from the need to comply with federal constitutional law.
The working title of my article, in which I really explain this stuff (I hope) for lay readers, is “O Liberty: Justice Kennedy’s Strange Civil Liberties Jurisprudence.” I gave it that title because Kennedy, who does recognize constitutional limitations on what laws state legislatures and local governments can enact that don’t have to do with the few select constitutional rights (e.g., gun-ownership rights; the right of free exercise of religion; real property “takings” rights) that the Federalist Society crowd cares about. But he also believes that states’ judicial branches are, effectively, not limited by most of the rights that the Constitution supposedly guarantees to individuals, including Fourteenth Amendment rights. O’Connor held this view, too. The Rehnquist Court was incessantly creating and expanding these “doctrines.” Rehnquist was super-aggressive in that respect, but Kennedy and O’Connor were, too.
Thomas—he of the “My wife and I are the arbiters of constitutional Liberty!” persuasion—has been the most aggressive of any of them. Alito, though, is the most unremittingly anti-libertarian. Except for those 1980s-rightwing-favored rights, he doesn’t care whether it’s the federal government or a state or local government, or whether it’s a state court or a state legislature, that’s infringing on an individual’s liberty. He almost never sees a civil-liberties restriction or violation he doesn’t like. Or at least never sees one he thinks is unconstitutional.
Anyway, yesterday, the Court issued an opinion that finally all-but-killed one of the key “jurisdictional” doctrines, called “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,” that has been used for nearly 30 years to categorically deny access to federal-court constitutional review in cases related to cases that were litigated in state court. The key part of the ruling removes the heretofore distinction between, on the one hand, making a “facial” challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute or rule of law, and on the other hand, an “as applied” or “as construed” challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute, rule of law or court procedure. This is technical stuff, […]
Iadmit that my first reaction when reading about delays of judicial appointments is, “Oh, those darned Republicans again!” But a little reflection leads me to a different thought. In view of his new executive order restarting military commissions and formalizing lifelong detention without charge or trial, perhaps President Obama doesn’t really want any strong supporters of civil liberties to be appointed to judicial vacancies. They might be inconvenient to him later. Just sayin. Like with Dawn Johnsen nomination.
Whoa there folks. Why not first ask Beverly why she used the term tea party instead of other descriptors. I dont think her writing is random…Corev made a statement, but is the implied question relevant. See Bev’s partially relevant answer to this question in response to run’s topic.
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