Six thoughts about the election and democracy

The Trump problem is not – and never has been – the electoral college

The problem is that Donald Trump is a competitive presidential candidate in the United States, despite his manifest unsuitability for office. 

There are various reasons for Trump’s competitiveness.  Some of these reasons are structural (the weakness of our parties and our first past the post voting system), some reflect features of Trump (his celebrity, shamelessness, sociopathy, and charisma), and some reflect the cultural, ideational, economic, and political situation in the country (polarization, ethnocentrism, resentment of elites, slow growth etc.).  The electoral college is a structural feature of American democracy, but it is not a systematic contributor to Trump’s success. 

It is true that Trump’s victory in 2016 depended on the quirks of the electoral college. Trump lost the popular vote.  But the electoral college just adds a bit of randomness to the outcome, relative to pure majoritarianism.  Under slightly more favorable circumstances Trump could have easily won the popular vote in 2016, and it still would have been a huge threat to democracy and to the rights of disfavored groups.  Majoritarianism is no safeguard against Trump and Trumpism. 

Trump’s victory this year has made this clear, so perhaps we can now focus on the real question:  what can we do to make our democratic system less vulnerable to a populist authoritarian like Trump?  The answer to this question is not, “get rid of the electoral college”.

To be clear, I’d probably be happy to get rid of the electoral college.  But I’d much rather figure out how to deal with the background cultural, ideational, political and economic issues which make someone like Trump electable.

Economic disappointment may not be the whole story

Several smart commentators have focused on economic dissatisfaction as the key to understanding Trump’s victory.  This is certainly a plausible story, as far as it goes.  Notably, it seems consistent with Trump’s widespread gains in the popular vote.

But there are two important caveats to this explanation (besides the obvious point that experts still need to roll up their sleeves and look carefully at the data).  First, economic dissatisfaction at most explains the shift in the popular vote from 2016 to 2024.  It does not explain why Trump was so competitive to begin with.  Many people were willing to vote for Trump before the pandemic inflation and most of them would have done so again, despite, well, everything . . .

Second, it does not explain how Harris jumped out to a 3.5 pecentage point advantage in the horse race polls in the weeks after Biden stepped aside, or why she subsequently dropped down to a 1 point advantage.  This trajectory at least raises the possibility that Harris had a path to victory, and that campaign and messaging effects were in fact significant. 

Consider, for example, the following:  1) Trump regained control of the press narrative following his disastrous debate performance (e.g. by attacking Haitians and shifting attention to immigration, an issue that favored him), 2) Trump moved to limit the damage to his campaign on abortion, but Harris refused to distance herself from Biden, and 3) Trump focused his campaign on a small number of perceived problems that voters trusted him to fix, while Harris was fuzzier on both problems and solutions.

It’s not “it is who we are”

Before the election some hopeful liberal commentators suggested that Trump would not win re-election because “it’s not who we are”.  Now many are saying that, well, maybe it is who we are after all. 

In a literal sense I suppose this is true – Trump won the election – but this framing is misleading and unhelpful.  Many of Trump’s voters did not believe his most extreme rhetoric.  They supported him, but they were not endorsing his most autocratic statements – statements which were often ambiguous, or contradicted by other statements Trump made, and which, in any event, Trump deliberately encouraged his potential supporters to take either literally or not, whichever would help him win their vote.  

These voters will play a crucial role in restraining Trump over the next 4 years.  If Republicans could count on their unwavering support, there would be nothing to hold them in check (okay, maybe the courts, but don’t hold your breath).  But some of them will turn against Trump if his policies are too cruel or authoritarian or rekindle inflation, and this will put pressure on elected Republicans to push back against Trump’s worst excesses.

We need to constantly remind people that Trump does not have a mandate for the most extreme and unpopular policies his administration may adopt.  Saying “it’s who we are” implies that all of his voters bought into the most extreme interpretation of the Trumpian agenda.  This deprives us of one of our most important persuasive strategies going forward.  We need to give his cross-pressured voters permission to say “hey, wait a minute, I didn’t vote for that”.  And it drives away a critical group of potential allies by insulting the segment of his supporters who (perhaps naively) just wanted Trump to fix the economy or who interpreted his remarks on abortion to mean that he would not take any action to further restrict access.  It is “deplorables” in new clothing.

Let’s cool it with the “I am moving to Canada” shtick

The press seems to love stories about liberals threatening to leave the country in response to Trump. 

No doubt a few people have legitimate fears that might make emigration attractive.  However, leaving is not a realistic option for most, it will not help to safeguard American democracy, and stories about liberals emigrating are politically unhelpful.

For the vast majority of Americans, there is no reason to leave the country.  For one thing, this isn’t pre-war Europe, where Jews wanted to emigrate but couldn’t leave or find a place that would accept them.  In fact, it’s the opposite.  Today we have millions of people who want to live here peacefully but who may be forced out against their will.  That is the most immediately looming atrocity of Trumpism.

In addition, if democracy dies here it will be hard to sustain anywhere.  If you are worried about your children and grandchildren, your best bet is to stay and fight, or at least hope that things break our way and enough remains of our institutions and traditions to rebuild when Trump leaves the scene.  The risk of failure is way higher than it should be, but democrats still have a good chance to prevail.

Talk about leaving the country is also not helpful politically.  It just reinforces the belief on the right that democrats are unpatriotic or reject the legitimacy of Trump’s election.  We need to respect the legitimacy of Trump’s win, resist where we can, and hope that Trump moderates or overreaches. 

Politics is complicated:  abortion edition

My understanding is that abortion referenda were supposed to serve two political functions:  safeguarding abortion rights, and drawing democratic voters, especially women, to the polls.  The actual effect of referenda may be different:  they may allow voters to safeguard abortion rights without supporting democratic candidates.  Politics is complicated.

The turnout conundrum

Any theory of the election will need to grapple with this:

The dominant story of the election thus far is the turnout. Donald Trump collected 62 million votes in 2016, grew that to 74 million in 2020, and will check in at a bit less than 74 million this year. In other words, to the extent that he won new voters over this year, they were offset by voters who jumped ship. He really does have a pretty hard ceiling. On the other hand, Hillary Clinton collected 66 million votes in 2016, Joe Biden got 81 million in 2020, and this year, Kamala Harris is going to end up with about 68 million. “Where did all those Biden voters go?” is a question that will haunt Democratic operatives, not to mention political commentators, for months or years.