In this corner, as previously mentioned, Yves Smith goes for the slam dunk: Let’s see, the credit default swaps market, due to some netting, is now somewhere north of $30 trillion (as opposed to its earlier “north of $60 trillion” level). Investment banks were believed to have hedged most of their exposure via offsetting contracts, […]

Dr. Black (you know the site) links to AIG Strike Three. And unlike the Citi debacle previously discussed (relatively) positively and rather negatively here, this one makes some form of sense. The difference comes down to the meaning of an accounting concept: ongoing concern. More below the break (yes, this might get wonkish. It’s me, […]

Robert Waldmann ended my last post 5 minutes ago wishing for part III of the saga and here it is !The final act for AIG by Robert O’Harrow Jr. and Brady Dennis The collapse was, of course, quick when it came. One interesting fact is that AIG Financial Products (AIGFP) stopped writing new CDSs in […]

Robert Waldmann The second of three parts of Dennis and O’Harrow’s series on the downfall of AIG introduces two new features—credit default saps and Joseph Cassano. Together the two managed to bring down AIG. Thus far we have only read about how AIG got into the business of writing CDSs — it seemed too good […]

Robert Waldmann Over at the Washington Post, Robert O’Harrow Jr. and Brady Dennis have a fairly interesting first of 3 articles on what went wrong at AIG. Of course, they tend to stress personalities and personal conflicts, but they do slip in some good points about economics. I’d say the key bit was that AIG […]

mmckinl mentioned the new AIG deal. Naked Capitalism has a post by Yves Smith regarding the new and improved AIG plan titled: The looting continues (Bannana republic watch). It reviews a WSJ article and notes that AIG is getting a rate cut (5.5 point reduction) with more money for a longer term (5 years instead […]

Unlike Fannie and Freddie, AIG was royally and truly doomed. The Fed tells us so: In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such periods as the said board may determine, at […]