Defaulting Into Medicare Advantage Rather than Traditional Medicare Coverage

A bit of an explanation for this Health Affairs article. Today when you are eligible for Medicare Coverage, you are placed in Traditional Medicare. What would or could happen if every new enrollee were to be placed in Medicare Advantage instead of Traditional Medicare Coverage?

The discussion centers on a two-year period in the beginning of enrollment.

When enrolling in Medicare for the first time, Medicare beneficiaries are currently deemed to have chosen traditional Medicare if they do not affirmatively choose a Medicare Advantage plan. This default into traditional Medicare is explicitly required by Medicare statute and has been the way the program has operated since the 1970s, when private plans became available to new Medicare enrollees.

The Historical Landscape

Implications For Beneficiaries

Changing the default Medicare coverage to Medicare Advantage could have both adverse and positive implications for beneficiaries. One adverse effect would be potential limitations on beneficiaries’ freedom of choice within the Medicare program.

Limits On Medigap Availability After First Year

Medigap is critical to reducing unpredictable out-of-pocket expenses not covered by traditional Medicare. Medicare beneficiaries in all but a few states are not able to obtain Medigap coverage without medical underwriting if they don’t pick such a plan within one year of enrolling in Medicare Advantage. Outside of this one-year period, they do not have guaranteed issue rights under the law to purchase such supplementary coverage and may be denied coverage or subject to underwriting, meaning that those with chronic conditions or other preexisting conditions may have difficulty obtaining Medigap coverage affordably or at all. In other words, auto-enrollment in Medicare Advantage could effectively lock most defaulted enrollees into private plans for the remainder of their lives, even if they would prefer to switch to traditional Medicare later on.

Provider Networks

Prior Authorization Requirements

Private plans also restrict access to, and impose waits for, certain services through prior authorization requirements, which are generally not part of traditional Medicare. Such barriers to care can limit the use of low-value and unnecessary services, but they can also delay needed care and have quality and cost implications in the form of deferred services.

Lack Of Reliable Information

Supplemental Benefits, Beneficiary Satisfaction, Quality, and Value-Based Care

Medicare Advantage plans also have the potential to operate as value-based care organizations and provide better coordination than traditional Medicare. Such enhanced coordination could be particularly helpful for beneficiaries in poor health and those with multiple chronic conditions.

Implications For The Medicare Program

Thus, it seems likely that accelerating enrollment in Medicare Advantage would increase federal expenditures compared to current policy. Increased Medicare Advantage enrollment would add to soaring federal deficits and place even greater pressure on discretionary programs, including public health programs. Adding to already-growing Medicare Advantage enrollment by making it the default option would accelerate the insolvency of the Medicare Part A Hospital Insurance Trust Fund and continue to raise Part B premiums for beneficiaries.

Auto-enrollment could also reduce concerns about adverse selection if plans wish to offer benefits known to attract sicker and more costly enrollees, such as expanded behavioral health, although few plans have chosen in the past to do so.

Mechanics Of Default Enrollment

Traditional Medicare is the same for everyone everywhere, but Medicare Advantage plans differ with respect to provider networks, extra benefits, prescription drug coverage, cost sharing for Medicare-covered services, and out-of-pocket limits. This makes matching plans to beneficiaries’ needs and circumstances particularly important. A mismatch could have adverse effects on beneficiaries’ health, out-of-pocket spending, and Medicare spending overall. Under the best of circumstances, making the best possible choice would add to the administrative costs of Medicare and would be complex and difficult to achieve.

However, the matching process would be handicapped from the start because the Medicare program typically has no information about a beneficiary’s health care needs when they first enroll in the program. Ideally, the process would take into account beneficiaries’ health care status, economic situation, and preferences about care, but the program has no such information. It also doesn’t know when people enroll in Medicare if they have retiree health coverage from a former employer or union, or if they have already picked and paid for a Medigap policy. This creates a situation in which a mismatch between beneficiaries’ needs and plan assignment would be likely, particularly for the average beneficiary.

Beneficiaries dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid would be unlikely to have retiree health coverage or the means to purchase a Medigap policy, making plan assignments somewhat easier. However, the Medicare program would have better information about the needs and preferences of current Medicare beneficiaries who gain Medicaid coverage than about those of Medicaid beneficiaries who gain Medicare coverage.

Looking Forward: If We Make Medicare Advantage The Default, How Can We Do It Right?

If Medicare Advantage plans were to become the default for Medicare enrollment, several policy changes could reduce disadvantages for enrollees and the Medicare program. First, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) could extend the period during which new enrollees would be able to enroll in Medigap plans without underwriting—that is, the period during which they would enjoy Medigap guaranteed-issue and community rating rights. This would enable new enrollees to gain experience with their new Medicare Advantage plans before it became financially prohibitive to switch to traditional Medicare.

Second, Medicare authorities could more tightly regulate the marketing of Medicare Advantage plans and the incentives facing brokers so that new enrollees have more comprehensible and balanced guidance. Medicare could increase the availability and usability of its own information on plan performance on Medicare.gov and through publicly supported programs such as State Health Insurance Assistance Programs. It would be particularly important to require Medicare Advantage plans to accurately portray beneficiaries’ past experience with the accessibility, quality, and use of optional benefits, such as dental care.

Third, CMS could do more to reduce unjustified denials of services by Medicare Advantage plans and long and frustrating waits for prior authorizations. Supervision of the use of artificial intelligence in this process would be particularly important.

The prospect of default enrollment into Medicare Advantage raises the fundamental question of whether the benefits of Medicare Advantage justify changing or ignoring existing law, restricting beneficiary choice, and increasing federal costs. Because of the health needs of the Medicare population, the question of plan fit is critical: While beneficiaries can change their coverage, few might do so if not given the tools and unbiased help needed to evaluate their options, and access to affordable supplemental coverage through Medigap. On the other hand, defaulting new Medicare beneficiaries to Medicare Advantage could possibly increase the proportion of beneficiaries in value-based care arrangements.

Medicare Advantage will likely continue to grow, even without a change in default policy. The question is whether the federal government wishes to significantly increase that rate of that growth and hasten the arrival of a totally privatized Medicare system.

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