Matt Yglesias posted a jarring tweet this past week when he wrote:
He elaborated by linking to a long-form article he wrote four years ago, explaining his position, where in relevant part, he wrote:
America’s constitutional democracy is going to collapse.
Some day … there is going to be a collapse of the legal and political order and its replacement by something else. If we’re lucky, it won’t be violent. If we’re very lucky, it will lead us to tackle the underlying problems and result in a better, more robust, political system. If we’re less lucky, well, then, something worse will happen.
In a 1990 essay, the late Yale political scientist Juan Linz observed that “aside from the United States, only Chile has managed a century and a half of relatively undisturbed constitutional continuity under presidential government — but Chilean democracy broke down in the 1970s.”
Yglesias — and Linz — saved me a lot of work. Because I had long ago heard that the US was the only Presidential democracy that hadn’t succumbed to autocratic rule. That was precisely Linz’s finding. At this point the only other democracies that I know of that come close are Costa Rica (since the last coup of 1948) and the Fourth and Fifth French Republics (since 1945).
Historically, the problem has been that, over time, in any Presidential system, the President accretes more and more power (vs. a corrupt, ineffective, and/or deadlocked Legislature) until the Legislature degenerates into a toothless rubber-stamp, or else is disbanded by a President turned autocrat.
The US has not been immune. The first six Presidents, through John Quincy Adams, saw themselves as “Chief Magistrates,” only vetoing laws they thought were unconstitutional, and at least approximating a meritocracy in their limited number of appointments. That began to change with Andrew Jackson, who vetoed any legislation that did not exactly conform to his wishes, and initiated the “spoils system” of appointing only political backers to government posts.
With the vast expansion of the bureaucracy during the 20th Century, Presidents obtained much more power via all of the appointments they were able to make. And following the Second World War, the large and permanent global military footprint enabled lots of chances for the Commander in Chief to flex his muscle.
Now we are getting very close to the final crossroads. Obama committed troops to Syria after the Congress completely gave up their war-making authority, preferring to sit on the sidelines and snipe. Trump’s declaration of an emergency simply because he could not get what he wanted out of Congress, if upheld by the Supreme Court, all but ensures that government by Executive Decree, that can only be overruled by a 2/3’s majority of both Houses of Congress, will probably quite soon become the norm.
In fact, Trump’s refusal of the GOP’s compromise proposal is almost certainly because, now that he has found this powerful new toy, he intends to use it more.
Once Presidential Emergency Edicts become more routine, unless this or any future President’s party fails to seat at least 1/3 + 1 in both Houses of Congress, why even bother convening?
The bottom line is, I agree with Yglesias. We are on the way to autocratic Presidential rule unless the power of the Presidency is definitively reined in.
So, how should the Executive be reined in? Obviously, this must be via Constitutional changes. Below are my considered opinions for how to do that.
The mixed Presidential-parliamentary system used, for example, in France, in which some Executive powers are vested in a “Premier” or “Prime Minister” who is a member of the Legislature seem to be the best remedy. In the US, there are seven Presidential powers that ought to be either limited, or devolved in whole or in part to the Congress or its Legislative head:
1. Appointment of rule-making authorities in the bureaucracy (vs. adjudicating authorities, whose appointments would remain with the President). For example, the SEC both makes rules for corporate governance, and enforces those rules. The President ought to be completely taken out of the former, Legislative, role. Those regulators should be appointed solely by Congress.
2. Aside from full declaration of war, or the need for an emergency response, devolution of the authority for taking of limited military action. Thus, for example, if the Congress were to refuse to declare war, then any commitment of troops to Syria would be the sole authority of the Legislative head. (This would make Congress far more responsive to popular skepticism of any such adventure). This is in accord with the manifest intention of the Consitution originally, in which *all* types of hostilities, including limited ones such as a “Writ of Reprisal” were vested in the Congress.
3. The 2/3’s majority requirement to overcome a veto gives the President too much Legislative power. The requirement, if not outright eliminated, ought to be reduced to something like 60%. And in any case, a sustained veto should only delay implementation of a law duly passed by Congress for two years, so that whether the law should go forward or not becomes a campaign issue in the next Congressional elections.
4. The Legislative head should be able to be removed in a no-confidence vote just as in Parliamentary systems, although a majority negative vote in both Houses of Congress might be required.
5. Unless specifically embodied in the language of Treaties, the President should not be able to single-handedly terminate them (just as the President cannot unilaterally terminate laws with which he disagrees).
6. The President should not be able to pardon any member of his own Administration for any acts committed before or during that person’s service during the Administration, nor for any acts undertaken in support of the President, or in conspiracy with the President.
7. No emergency declared by any President should be allowed to last longer than the time necessary for Congress to convene and debate the alleged emergency, e.g., 60 days.
I know I’m just typing some words on a keyboard for a few readers. But the bottom line is, government by Presidential Edict looks like it is looming in our near future. Parliamentary democracies are far less susceptible to such autocratic power grabs than Presidential systems have been. Two hundred years of such history ought to be enough to learn the lesson. The remedy must be a clear circumscribing of Presidential authority, with an effective counterweight in the Congress.