by Mike Kimel
Most economists believe that unemployment benefits increase the unemployment rate. The idea is that even having a relatively small income coming in (from unemployment) can encourage people to stay jobless just a little while longer. And no doubt there are people who play the unemployment compensation game fairly well.
Now, consider severance packages. These days they aren’t uncommon. There are differences in how different states treat severance packages, but as I understand it, in general, if a jobless worker received a severance package equivalent to X weeks of pay in lump sum form, that makes the worker ineligible to receive unemployment benefits for what would otherwise be the first X weeks worth of claims. Which, would imply that for an unemployed worker, there is zero incentive to be jobless during the first X weeks of unemployment, but a jump in the incentive to be jobless beginning in week X + 1. One presumes, therefore, a greater probability of people turning down proffered job offers in weeks X-1 or X (when unemployment benefits are imminent) than in week 1 or 2 (when there is a much longer wait to get unemployment benefits).
If this solves the problem of anyone looking for a thesis topic at a Freshwater school, your thanks are all the payment I need but I do appreciate cookies.