This one is by CoRev, who objects to my characterization of events of the war in Iraq. My response will be in comments.
Several weeks ago we had a discussion, maybe in a comments thread, about why it is taking so long to field an effective IA. In it we discussed the 3-5 year time frame needed and expected in 2003. Bill Roggio, has an interesting article on the current Order of Battle (configuration and location info) of the IA. From its author DJ Elliott , buried in the comments, comes this summary:
Leadership is the biggest problem with expanding IA. All officers in IA above the rank of Major are former members of Saddam’s army. Those that are able to pass vetting have already done so. Which is why only Major and below are being offered a chance to rejoin.
– Takes a year to train a 2lt (Plt leader).
– Takes 3+ years experience to train a Cpt (Co cmdr).
– Takes 6+ years experience to train a LTC (Bn cmdr).
– Takes 10+ years experience to train a Col (Bde cmdr).
– Takes 15+ years experience to train a MG (Div cmdr).
We have been building the IA for less than 4 years.
Those are minimums that allow for the accelerated promotions that go with combat experience. Faster than that is dangerous for all concerned. Look up the average time in service for a US MG in WWII and you will find it longer. Experience is not optional for a combat commander…
E.G.: The Current Commander of 5th IA Div and the Diyala Operational Command was a Staff Brigadier General at the begining of May. Now he is a MG commanding a Div and dual-hatted as commander of all ISF in Diyala (Corps command is a LTG’s job). We are pushing them up as fast as possible but, there are too few to go around…
Using this as an AB article might foster an interesting discussion.
This post was by CoRev.